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Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are crucial players for economic growth and prosperity.
In 2012, for instance, the ten largest German MNEs alone generated total revenues of
922.3 billion Euros and employed 2.6 million people in—on average—46 countries (FAZ,
2013).1 MNEs are not only big in absolute terms, they are typically also more produc-
tive than exporters or internationally inactive firms (Tomiura, 2007) and account for
disproportionate shares of domestic output and employment. The mere 1% of U.S. man-
ufacturing firms that are multinationals generate 34% of total U.S. output and employ
26% of the U.S. workforce (Bernard and Jensen, 2007). As these exemplary figures clearly
illustrate, the economic significance of MNEs cannot be overestimated. Understanding
the behavior of MNEs is thus essential to comprehending economic fluctuations and to
drafting sound economic policies.
A vast literature analyzes the characteristics of MNEs, the incentive to conduct foreign
direct investment (FDI) and the impact of activities of multinational firms on home and
host countries (e.g. on the incentives for FDI Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Help-
man, 1984; Markusen, 1984; Chen and Moore, 2010; on investment promotion Harding
and Javorcik, 2011; on the effects of FDI on host country technology adoption Javorcik,
2004; on the labor market effects of FDI Muendler and Becker, 2010). Still, some of the
most basic aspects of MNEs’ behavior are not well understood. Though MNE affiliate
networks are commonly believed to span the globe, MNEs are essentially most likely to
invest in host countries that are proximate to their home country, and their revenues
tend to decrease in distance from the home country (e.g. Keller and Yeaple, 2013). This
is the case even though serving proximate markets via exports is relatively cheap, so
1Companies are ranked according to their revenues.
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common theories predict that exporting should be preferred to FDI (e.g. Brainard, 1997;
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004), and many attractive investment destinations with
low factor costs are located far from typical FDI source countries. Despite the surge
of innovation in communication technologies and continual upgrading of transportation
infrastructures, distance has thus remained a relevant factor for MNEs. Further, MNEs
tend to pay higher wages than only nationally active firms or competitors that only export
in both their domestic and foreign markets (Girma and Görg, 2007; Heyman, Sjöholm,
and Tingvall, 2007; Hijzen, Martins, Schank, and Upward, 2013). It is unclear why that
should be the case. After all, MNEs have the option to relocate expensive activities to
countries with lower factor input costs. Most explanations of these multinational wage
premiums so far are based on anecdotal evidence or informal arguments, and relate to
factors such as international rent sharing agreements or compensation for restructurings
after multinational take over (e.g. Girma and Görg, 2007). Finally, MNEs have repeatedly
been exposed to sharp criticism as they increasingly channel their investments through
offshore financial centers or tax havens (e.g. The Economist, 2012). Policy makers have
raised severe concerns about the consequences and the legitimacy of this behavior (e.g.
the G20 summit in 2013, the OECD, 2013’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting). After all, MNEs tend to be the largest players in the economy, so the resulting
losses to public finances may be sizeable. However, the only available systematic evidence
so far indicates, counterintuitively, that MNEs that face lower tax rates are more likely
to invest in tax havens (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006). This seems inconsistent with tax
haven investment motivated by tax avoidance.
This thesis contributes to the understanding of these aspects of MNEs’ behavior. Chap-
ters 1 and 2 propose and test a mechanism that rationalizes the importance of distance
for MNEs’ location decisions and their pattern of revenues as well as the emergence of
multinational wage premiums.
Both chapters consider a set-up where knowledge and labor are required for production,
building on Garicano (2000). Knowledge refers to the competencies required to take
decisions in the production process, including knowledge about the firm’s production and
management technologies. Knowledge is only useful in production if a firm’s employees
2
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learn it. Knowledge is thus not just a Hicks shifter in the production function that enables
a firm to turn labor input more efficiently into output. Instead, a firm’s employees
have to spend time to acquire knowledge. Finally, knowledge can be communicated
among employees, so employees can leverage their potentially different knowledge sets.
Communication, however, is costly. Employees are remunerated for the time that they
contribute to the production process and for the knowledge that they acquire.
Whereas previous papers restrict their analyses to firms that are active at exactly one
location (e.g. Garicano, 2000; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), firms are assumed to
maintain production establishments at multiple locations in our work. They face a trade-
off between costly local knowledge acquisition and costly communication across space.
This basic trade-off is identical in Chapters 1 and 2, but the structure of the two models
is distinct: the model elements in each chapter are tailored to the data that are used in
the respective chapter to test model insights.
Chapter 1 develops and tests a stylized model of the organization of a multinational firm.
The overall knowledge level of the firm is given exogenously. The firm employs managers
in its headquarters in the home country and production workers both in the home country
and in the foreign country. Countries vary with respect to the local wage level, the
knowledge acquisition costs, the labor productivity and the bilateral communication costs
with the home country. Both domestic and foreign workers can communicate with the
managers. The firm may thus choose to have its knowledge acquired locally—at home or
abroad—by production workers or centrally by managers.
In optimum, firms allocate a higher amount of knowledge to locations with lower know-
ledge acquisition costs and wages, higher labor productivity and higher bilateral com-
munication costs between the production workers and the headquarters. This behavior
implies that the marginal costs of production are increasing in the bilateral communica-
tion costs with the headquarters. Foreign sales and the probability of entry are corre-
spondingly decreasing in the bilateral communication costs. As communication costs and
distance are correlated, the mechanism proposed in Chapter 1 thus explains the impor-
tance of distance for MNEs’ investment patterns in an equally simple and elegant way.
The allocation of knowledge within the firm additionally affects wage payments in a way
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that is consistent with multinational wage premiums in the home and host market. The
higher the bilateral communication costs, the more knowledge is allocated to the foreign
country, so wages increase in the host country (consistent with Girma and Görg, 2007).
Due to non-random selection of firms into FDI and restructuring of firms after FDI,
domestic production workers earn higher wages in multinational than non-multinational
firms (consistent with Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall, 2007).
We test the insights on the relation between factor input cost and communication costs
and the marginal costs of production, as well as additional predictions on the cut-off
productivity levels required for foreign market entry using the Microdatabase Direct
investment (MiDi), a firm-level database on German MNEs provided by the German
central bank.2 All predictions are strongly supported by the data.
Chapter 1 contributes to the literature by proposing a novel mechanism that rationalizes
both the relevance of distance for MNEs’ behavior and multinational wage premiums
based on one simple insight. Most previous papers on gravity in FDI adopt the standard
model by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and are silent on implications of FDI
for firms’ wage setting behavior (e.g. Bahar, 2013; Keller and Yeaple, 2013). To our
knowledge, Chapter 1 is further the fist paper that extends the framework by Garicano
(2000) to a set-up with more than one establishment.
The second chapter studies the proposed model mechanism in greater detail and uses
national data on multi-establishment firms to test the resulting hypotheses. The theory
section endogenizes the overall knowledge of the firm that is taken as given in the first
chapter. In addition, each of the production establishments may have a more complex
structure with employees assigned to several hierarchical layers instead of just a group of
production workers. The number of layers is endogenously determined.
The knowledge allocated to an establishment increases in the bilateral communication
costs and decreases in local factor input costs for a given number of layers, as in Chapter 1.
We additionally demonstrate that the increase in knowledge, and correspondingly the
increase in employees’ remuneration, is not linear: lower layers are assigned relatively less
2To facilitate readability, the pronoun “we” is used throughout this thesis to refer to the author or
the authors of the respective chapter.
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additional knowledge than higher layers. This implies that higher layers benefit relatively
more in terms of higher remuneration. To test the model, we construct a novel data set
that contains linked employer-employee data at the establishment level from the German
Social Security records as well as information on the affiliation of establishments to firms.
We use record-linkage techniques to combine the data sets. The available information
is very reliable, as it is relevant for social security contributions. We construct variables
that allow assigning employees to hierarchical layers in each establishment and measuring
the average remuneration per layer as well as the span of control, i.e., the average number
of lower layer employees that employees in a layer are responsible for.
We find that the average remuneration per layer increases in the bilateral communication
costs between the establishments and the headquarters in the cross section, as predicted
by the model. Chapter 2 thus contributes to the literature by furthering our understand-
ing of the organization of multi-establishment firms. In addition, chapter 2 demonstrates
that firm organization is an important element to understand employer wage premiums
also in the national context. Differences in remuneration of observationally equivalent
workers may be driven by the responsibilities that they are assigned within the company,
and these vary systematically with the position of the employee within the firm.
The third chapter develops and tests a stylized model of the decision to invest in tax
havens to explore whether tax avoidance is a relevant factor in MNEs’ use of tax havens.
The chapter analyzes the decision to invest in a tax haven for MNEs whose foreign income
is exempt from domestic taxation, unlike earlier studies such as Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2006). The chapter contributes to the literature by informing the debate on tax haven
investment by MNEs as the incentives faced by the firms in our sample correspond to
incentives faced by MNEs in most economies in the world.
We assume that MNEs face heterogeneous tax rates at their different foreign locations
and have the option to engage in costly profit reallocation to a tax haven. Higher levels
of taxation are conducive to tax haven investment, but fixed costs of investment in
tax havens as well as marginal costs of profit shifting hamper tax haven investment.
Further, the decision to invest in a tax haven has repercussions on the optimal investment
decisions in non-haven countries. We test the model using the Microdatabase Direct
5
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investment mentioned above. We specify a linear probability model with observed tax
haven investment as dependent variable and the average foreign non-haven tax rate as
well as other firm characteristics as covariates. To take the effect of tax haven investment
on optimal non-haven investments into account, we use a novel instrumentation strategy.
We instrument the average foreign non-haven tax rate using the counterfactual average
foreign non-haven tax rate had the firm refrained from any adjustments in its set of
foreign non-haven destinations after the first period. We further control for heterogeneity
between firms by employing firm fixed effects. Among German manufacturing firms, a
one-percentage point higher foreign tax rate is associated with a 0.3 percentage point
greater likelihood of owning a tax haven affiliate. This is consistent with tax avoidance
incentives, and contrasts with earlier evidence for U.S. firms. Tax haven investment of
firms in sectors with higher R&D intensity is more sensitive to higher taxation than the
investment of firms in less R&D intensive sectors. The relationship seems less strong for
firms in service industries, possibly reflecting the difficulty of reallocating taxable service
income. The scope of profit reallocation and thus the incentive for tax haven investment
varies with firm and sector characteristics.
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Chapter 1
The organization of knowledge in
multinational firms
1.1 Introduction
Firm organization has long been considered as one of the decisive determinants of pro-
ductivity (see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2010, for a recent survey). Multinational
enterprises are particularly challenged: they have to manage production processes that
span different countries and involve employees from diverse economic and cultural con-
texts. Spatial and intercultural frictions often hamper communication and information
flows within multinational firms (Ambos and Ambos, 2009; De Long and Fahey, 2000;
UNCTAD, 2004, ch. IV A. 2).1 Organizational design is thus of particular importance
for multinational enterprises. It helps to ensure that a firm’s knowledge is productively
allocated within the firm, and that communication across the organization takes place
smoothly.
The first chapter of this thesis analyzes the organization of knowledge within multina-
tional firms and derives its consequences for foreign direct investment patterns. As in
much of the previous literature (e.g. Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla, 2013; Markusen
1The business economics and management literature discusses and evaluates various strategies to
address the frictions in within-firm communication faced by internationally active firms (e.g. Foss and
Pedersen, 2002; Ghemawat, 2007; Hansen and Løvås, 2004; Lagerström and Andersson, 2003).
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and Maskus, 2001), knowledge is a non-rival factor within the firm. The chapter addi-
tionally assumes that knowledge can only be fruitfully employed in production if it is
learned by a worker. This assumption captures the fact that technologies are typically
only useful if someone knows how to utilize them. Based on a stylized model of the organi-
zational structure of a multinational firm, the chapter determines the optimal allocation
of knowledge within the firm given internationally heterogeneous market sizes, wages,
labor productivities, knowledge acquisition costs and communication costs between the
employees at the production locations and the headquarters. The resulting predictions
on the within-firm distribution of productivities across countries and the cut-off produc-
tivity levels for investment in a country are consistent with the investment patterns of
German multinational firms.
The chapter shows that the optimal amount of knowledge allocated by the firm to for-
eign employees in the host country increases with the communication costs between
managers in the multinational’s headquarters in the home country and the employees
in the host country. Lower foreign labor productivities, higher foreign wages, higher
knowledge acquisition costs and larger market size discourage the allotment of expertise.
Correspondingly, the marginal costs of foreign production increase in the communication
costs between the home country and the host country. At the same time, firms miti-
gate cost increases due to higher wages and knowledge acquisition costs or lower labor
productivities by reallocating knowledge.
The implications of the model are consistent with the stylized facts of multinational
firms’ investments: both the probability of entry and MNEs’ sales are predicted to be
geographically concentrated and decreasing in distance, i.e., the investment patterns of
MNEs are predicted to exhibit gravity. The concentration is higher in sectors with more
complex production processes, as found in Bahar (2013). In line with empirical evidence
in the literature (Girma and Görg, 2007; Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall, 2007), the
model also explains why the remuneration of employees of multinational firms is higher
than the remuneration of employees of domestic firms both in the home and the host
country, and that multinational wage premiums vary with distance between the domestic
and the foreign country.
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To evaluate the model systematically, the empirical analysis derives and tests predictions
on within-firm differences in performance across different foreign countries and the selec-
tion of firms into foreign investment. Consistent with the theoretical hypotheses, German
multinational firms tend to be relatively more productive in countries that are larger, that
are characterized by lower bilateral communication costs with Germany, higher labor pro-
ductivities, lower knowledge acquisition costs and lower wages. The findings are robust
to the inclusion of additional determinants of foreign performance as well as alternative
ways of measuring the model parameters. The cut-off productivity levels for entry are
found to decrease in country size and increase in bilateral communication costs.
The results of the chapter have important implications for investment promotion pur-
poses. The chapter recommends that investment promotion policies should not only
focus on improving the investment climate inside a country, but also on ameliorating
bilateral communication facilities with targeted source countries of FDI, for example by
improving language training and communication infrastructures.
The chapter builds on two distinct strands of the literature. In developing the model
of the optimal organizational structure, the chapter uses ingredients from the literature
of firms as communication networks and knowledge hierarchies (e.g. Bolton and Dewa-
tripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000; Radner, 1993). This literature studies how firms organize
in response to differences in knowledge acquisition costs and in the cost of communication
between agents, how hierarchical structures emerge, and how knowledge is efficiently allo-
cated within a firm. Garicano (2000)’s knowledge hierarchies framework has been applied
to various settings, and its main predictions have been confirmed empirically (e.g. Bloom,
Garicano, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2009; Garicano and Hubbard, 2009). Caliendo and
Rossi-Hansberg (2012) and Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) demonstrate
theoretically and empirically that the model framework is useful to understand the labor
market consequences of international trade. To the best of our knowledge, this chapter
is the first paper to apply the knowledge hierarchy framework to a context with several
establishments.
Concerning the international investment aspects, the chapter draws on the large literature
on multinational firms. Much of this literature has associated multinational activity
9
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predominantly with its advantages for a firm, such as savings of trade costs with the host
market (e.g. Markusen, 1984; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004), savings of trade costs
with third markets (e.g. Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007; Tintelnot, 2012), savings
of factor input costs (e.g. Helpman, 1984; Antràs, 2003; Antràs and Helpman, 2004), or
a combination of these (e.g. Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Grossman, Helpman,
and Szeidl, 2006; Yeaple, 2003). In line with recent evidence on U.S. multinational
firms indicating that most foreign affiliates are market-seeking, the theory section of this
chapter assumes a horizontal motive of foreign activities (Ramondo, Rappoport, and
Ruhl, 2013).
Within the literature on multinational firms, the strand most relevant to this chapter
is concerned with the role of headquarter inputs for local affiliate production. Keller
and Yeaple (2013) estimate the cost of transferring knowledge within multinational firms
using data on U.S. manufacturing FDI. In their model, firms face a trade-off between the
costs associated with disembodied and embodied knowledge transfer from their headquar-
ters. Firms can either produce intermediaries locally but subject to efficiency losses due
to communication frictions with the headquarters, or import intermediaries from home
subject to transport costs. This chapter analyzes a complementary margin of multina-
tional firms’ behavior: it focuses on the choice between employing domestic expertise
from the headquarters or hiring foreign expertise in the host market. The mechanism
explains the gravity of foreign direct investment in sales and the probability of entry, as
does the model in Keller and Yeaple (2013), but is applicable across sectors and also gen-
erates multinational wage premiums consistent with empirical evidence in the literature.
Yeaple (2013) develops a model featuring managerial expertise as a scarce input within
a multinational firm to explain empirical regularities in the expansion patterns of U.S.
multinational multi-product firms. Similarly, Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013)
assume that headquarter inputs, such as managerial oversight or marketing services, are
required in the production process of affiliates and demonstrate that this assumption
helps to explain the gravity of FDI in sales and the probability of entry. Defever (2012)
assumes that smooth communication between foreign affiliates and the headquarters acts
as a productivity shifter in a Cobb–Douglas production function and finds that geograph-
ical proximity to existing affiliates is a relevant consideration for the location decision of
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a multinational firm, above and beyond other locational characteristics. Bahar (2013)
demonstrates that the probability of firms’ conducting horizontal FDI decreases in their
knowledge intensity, and that firms tend to prefer proximate destinations for the location
of knowledge intensive FDI. He argues that iceberg type knowledge transfer costs that
increase in the knowledge intensity of activities are appropriate for explaining this find-
ing. All papers share their focus on the gravity of FDI and their theoretical approach,
extending the basic framework in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) with productivity-
shifting mechanisms. This chapter is distinct in modeling the organizational structure of
multinational firms and contributes to the literature by providing a coherent rationale
for both the gravity and multinational wage premiums.
The following section develops the theoretical model. It is divided into four subsections.
The first subsection analyzes the cost-minimization problem at the firm level. The second
subsection investigates the internationalization decision of the firm in a partial equilib-
rium framework. The third subsection outlines the general equilibrium implications. The
last subsection discusses the robustness of the theoretical insights to specific assumptions.
Section 1.3 discusses the empirical strategy and Section 1.4 describes the data used in
the empirical analysis. Section 1.5 presents the empirical results. Section 1.6 examines
how far the empirical results discriminate between the mechanism proposed in this chap-
ter and alternative models that may generate the observed empirical patterns. The last
section concludes.
1.2 Theory
The model economy consists of two countries, the home country j = 0 and the foreign
country j = 1. The countries are populated by Nj agents that are each endowed with
one unit of time.
There is an unbounded mass of potential firms in each country. To enter, firms have
to pay a fixed entry cost of f e units of domestic labor which is thereafter sunk. Upon
entry, each entrant i draws a firm-specific knowledge level z¯i from a known distribution
G(z¯) which is symmetric in the two countries. Mathematically, knowledge is an interval
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that ranges from zero to a firm-specific upper bound Z¯i.z¯i denotes the length of a firm’s
knowledge interval [0, Z¯i] (i.e. its Lebesgue measure). z¯i captures the competencies
required to produce a specific product and empirically corresponds to the state of a
firm’s technology.
The problem of each firm is to determine the set of countries it would like to serve and
the set of production locations given its knowledge level z¯i. In addition, firms choose the
cost-minimizing allocation of knowledge within the firm.
The following section first analyzes the cost-minimization problem for different sets of
production locations, then determines the optimal set of countries and production loca-
tions, and finally investigates the entry decision.
1.2.1 Cost minimization
1.2.1.1 Assumptions
To simplify the exposition, subsection 1.2.1 focuses on the cost-minimization problem of
a single firm located in the home country and characterized by the knowledge level z¯.
The firm consists of a headquarters in country j = 0 and production plants in country
j = 0 and, potentially, in j = 1 as well. The headquarters are composed of a number
nh of managers, and the production plants are made up of a number nj of production
workers.
Production is assumed to be a problem solving process that is based on labor and know-
ledge (as in Garicano, 2000). The firm can employ labor for production in both countries
j = 0 and j = 1. For each unit of labor employed in production, a mass Aj ≥ 1 of
problems is realized. Problems entail production possibilities. Transforming labor input
into output requires that the problems be solved. Aj therefore corresponds to the labor
productivity: higher values of Aj imply that more production possibilities, and thus po-
tentially more output, can be generated with a given amount of labor. Aj varies across
countries. The problems are distributed according to a problem probability distribution
12
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function from the exponential family:
f(z) = λe−λz
where z ∈ [0,∞) refers to the domain of possible problems and λ > 0 denotes the problem
arrival rate. Higher λ implies that the mass of the probability distribution is concentrated
close to zero. Intuitively, this means that the production process is more predictable as
problems in the tail of the probability distribution occur with lower probability.
A firm is able to solve a problem if it is realized within the firm’s knowledge inter-
val. Consistent with the previous literature (e.g. Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla,
2013), knowledge is assumed to be non-rival within the firm and can thus be used at
all locations. Unlike previous papers, knowledge is only useful if it has been acquired
by an employee. The underlying idea is that firm knowledge by itself is insufficient for
production. Knowledge is only useful if there is someone who knows how to employ it.
Knowledge can either be acquired locally by production workers, or centrally by man-
agers. Employees can communicate with each other and leverage the potentially different
knowledge sets. Communication is costly. As is standard in the literature (e.g. Bolton and
Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000; Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2009),
communication costs are borne by the employee who is asked a question: the employee
has to spend time listening to the problems. Garicano (2000) demonstrates that at op-
timum, only production workers spend their time in production and managers use their
time solely for communication. Both production workers and managers are optimally
characterized by knowledge levels that are uniform within each group and different be-
tween the two groups. The knowledge level of production workers covers the solution to
the more frequent problems, whereas managers know the solution to problems that occur
more rarely.
The production process thus works as follows. During each unit of time that they spend in
production, the production workers scrutinize which of the problems are covered by their
knowledge interval. Problems covered by the knowledge interval are solved immediately
and output is produced. The production workers communicate all problems that are not
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covered by their knowledge interval to the managers. The managers spend a production-
country specific amount θj, 1 > θj > 0 of time listening to the problems delegated
by the production workers and solve all problems covered by their knowledge interval.
It is generally assumed that θ1 ≥ θ0 capture the fact that frictions in international
communication may be more severe than frictions in communication within a country.
Any problems that are not covered by the knowledge intervals of either the workers or
the managers remain unsolved.
The output qj of one unit of labor input can be calculated as the value of the cumulative
distribution function:
qj = Aj(1− e−λz¯)
nj workers are correspondingly able to produce qj = njAj(1 − e−λz¯) units of output. A
higher value of z¯ implies that more infrequent problems can be solved, so the resulting
product is more sophisticated.
This theory of production is similar to Kremer (1993)’s O-ring theory of production.
According to the O-ring theory of production, a single error in the production process
implies that the product is wasted. In the present set-up, a single problem that the
firm cannot solve implies that the production process cannot continue. As the firm is
assumed to be able to distinguish between problems that it can solve and those it cannot,
the product is not wasted. Instead, the firm finishes a less knowledge intensive product
based on the knowledge it has available.
Products are heterogeneous with respect to their knowledge intensity, defined as the ratio
of knowledge to labor input per unit of output. The knowledge intensity is given by
z¯
1
Aj(1−e−λz¯)
= z¯Aj(1− e−λz¯)
and is increasing in z¯ and Aj. Intuitively, both the production of products by more
knowledge-intensive firms and in countries with higher labor productivity involve lower
labor inputs.
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Knowledge acquisition is costly: employees have to hire teachers to teach them (as in
Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). Similar to the modelling of communication
costs, teaching costs are fully borne by the teachers. TEachers have to spend cjx units
of time to teach a knowledge interval of length x. All agents receive wage wj per unit
of time they spend working. Correspondingly, teachers receive remuneration wjcjx. The
firm in turn has to remunerate its employees for the time they spend in production and
for their knowledge acquisition expenses.
The problem of the firm is to design the optimal knowledge acquisition process. As
outlined above, Garicano (2000) shows that only production workers spend their time
in production and that they optimally learn the solutions to problems that occur more
frequently in the production process. The knowledge interval of workers correspondingly
starts at 0, where the mass of the problem density is highest, and ranges to a country
specific upper bound Zj, j = 0, 1. zj denotes the length of the knowledge interval of
production workers [0, Zj]. The managers learn to solve infrequent problems. It is never
optimal for the firm not to learn part of its knowledge interval [0, Z¯]. More knowledge
enables the firm to produce more output with a given amount of labor input and, as will
be shown below, knowledge decreases marginal costs. The upper bound of managerial
knowledge and the upper bound of the knowledge interval of the firm thus coincide. The
knowledge interval of managers ranges from a lower bound Zh to Z¯. zh denotes the length
of this interval [Zh, Z¯]. The firm chooses the knowledge levels zj and zh as well as the
number of production workers nj and the number of managers nh. By choosing zj and
zh, the firm determines the upper bound of the workers’ knowledge interval(s) Zj and
the lower bound of the managerial knowledge in the headquarters Zh.
1.2.1.2 The optimization problem
The firm strives to minimize the costs of producing a given quantity qj in country j.
The costs are composed of the cost for personnel at the headquarters and at the different
production locations. Each employee is remunerated with the country specific wage
wj for each unit of time spent working for the firm and for the knowledge acquisition
costs wjcjzk, k = h, j.
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The firm optimally chooses the number of production workers {nj}1j=0 employed at the
different production locations, the country specific knowledge level of the production
knowledge {zj}1j=0, the number of managers employed in the headquarters nh, and the
knowledge level of those managers zh.
C(q0, q1, w0, w1) = min{nj ,zj}1j=0,nh,zh
1∑
j=0
njwj(1 + cjzj) + nhw0(1 + c0zh) (1.1)
s.t. njAj(1− e−λz¯) ≥ qj ∀j (1.2)
zj ≥ z¯ − zh ∀j (1.3)
nh ≥
1∑
j=0
njAjθje
−λzj (1.4)
nh ≥ 0, zh ≥ 0, zh ≤ z¯ (1.5)
nj ≥ 0, zj ≥ 0, zj ≤ z¯ ∀j (1.6)
In the cost minimization problem, the production quantities {qj}1j=0 are taken as given,
but they will be endogenized in subsection 1.2.2, as will be the set of production locations
of the firm. Wages {wj}1j=0 will be endogenized in subsection 1.2.3. The problem arrival
rate λ, communication costs {θj}1j=0, labor productivities {Aj}1j=0 > 0 and knowledge
acquisition costs {cj}1j=0 > 0 are exogenous parameters determined by the state of a
country’s economic development and institutions.
In choosing the optimal values of {nj}1j=0, nh, {zj}1j=0 and zh the firm has to take four
types of constraints into account:
Eq. (1.2): The firm has to produce a total output njAj(1−e−λz¯) of at least qj units.
Eq. (1.3): The knowledge intervals of the production workers zj = [0, Zj] and the
managers zh = [Zh, Z¯] have to jointly cover the full knowledge interval
z¯ = [0, Z¯] of the firm.
Eq. (1.4): The firm has to hire a sufficient number of managers such that the man-
agers are able to listen to all problems brought up to them. The amount
of problems is calculated as the sum of the country specific masses of
problems njAj times the probability that the solution is not found by
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the production workers in j e−λzj . This term is multiplied by the com-
munication costs θj to obtain the required number of managers.
Eq. (1.5, 1.6): All choice variables are restricted to be positive. Employees’ knowledge
cannot exceed the total knowledge of the firm.
Assumption 1. The exogenous parameters z¯, λ, cj, Aj and θj, as well as those exoge-
nous parameters that are contained in {qj}1j=0 and {wj}1j=0, fulfil the following parameter
restriction:
eλz¯ ≤
q0w0
A0
(λ+ c0) + q1w1A1 (λ+ c1)
c0
(
q0w0c0
A0
+ q1w1c1
A1
) (c0 + λ(1 + c0z¯)) (1.7)
The parameter restriction ensures that constraints (1.3) and (1.4) are innocuous in the
sense that the firm is never forced to adopt a knowledge level z¯ that exceeds the level
it would adopt if it were free to choose its total knowledge level, and that the firm is
never forced to hire managers even though it would prefer to produce a product based
on a lower knowledge level allocated to the production workers. Given Assumption 1,
the marginal costs of production are strictly decreasing in the overall knowledge level,
so covering the full knowledge interval is always optimal for the firm. The parameter
restriction is formally derived in Appendix A.1.1.1.
The Lagrangian equation is given by
L =
1∑
j=0
njwj(1 + cjzj) + nhw0(1 + c0zh)
+
1∑
j=0
ξj
[
qj − njAj(1− e−λz¯)
]
+
1∑
j=0
φj [z¯ − zh − zj] + κ
 1∑
j=0
njAjθje
−λzj − nh
 .
The Lagrangian multiplier ξj denotes the marginal costs of production. The other La-
grangian multipliers do not have intuitive interpretations.
The first order conditions are detailed in Appendix A.1.1.2. The optimal number of
production workers is determined by the quantity constraint:
nj =
qj
Aj(1− e−λz¯) . (1.8)
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The optimal number of managers results from the constraint on the number of managers:
nh =
1∑
j=0
njAjθje
−λzj =
1∑
j=0
qjθje
−λzj
1− e−λz¯ . (1.9)
The optimal knowledge levels of the production workers {zj}1j=0 may be different due to
asymmetries in the country characteristics. The knowledge constraint is binding for at
least one country:
zj = z¯ − zh. (1.10)
Intuitively, if the knowledge constraint were non-binding for both countries, the overlap
of knowledge at the headquarters and all production locations would remain unused. This
cannot be optimal because any superfluous knowledge is saved in optimum.
If the knowledge constraint is non-binding, the knowledge level of the production workers
is determined by
e−λzj = wjcj
Ajθjλw0(1 + c0zh)
. (1.11)
The knowledge constraint is binding whenever the marginal costs of additional local know-
ledge exceed the marginal benefit of using fewer services from the headquarters, i.e. when-
ever the firm would actually like to choose knowledge level 1
λ
ln
[
λAjθjw0(1+c0zh)
wjcj
]
< z¯ − zh.
From 1
λ
ln
[
λAj¯θj¯w0(1+c0zh)
wj¯cj¯
]
< z¯ − zh < 1λ ln
[
λAjθjw0(1+c0zh)
wjcj
]
, it follows that the country
characteristics of the country with binding constraint j¯ and non-binding constraint j are
related by
θj¯Aj¯wjcj < θjAjwj¯cj¯.
The knowledge constraint is more likely to be binding in countries with ceteris paribus
lower communication costs, lower labor productivity, higher wages and higher knowledge
acquisition costs.
Managerial knowledge is implicitly determined by
1∑
j=0
[1(zj = z¯ − zh)λ(1 + c0zh)
(
qjθje
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))− qjwjcj
Aj
)
+ 1(zj > z¯ − zh)c0 qjwjcj
Aj
]
= 0. (1.12)
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The indicator function 1(·) determines whether the constraint zj = z¯ − zh is binding or
not.
If the firm only produces in the domestic country, z0, n0 and nh are determined by
the constraints (1.2)-(1.4). Managerial knowledge is implicitly defined by the simpler
condition
θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))− c0
A0
= 0. (1.13)
The marginal costs of production are given by
ξj =
1
Aj(1− e−λz¯)
[
wj(1 + cjzj) +
1
λ
wjcj
]
for zj > z¯ − zh;
(1.14)
= 1
Aj(1− e−λz¯)
[
wj(1 + cj(z¯ − zh)) + w0(1 + c0zh)Ajθje−λ(z¯−zh)
]
for zj = z¯ − zh.
(1.15)
As ξj > 0 ∀qj, the cost function is strictly increasing in qj.
1.2.1.3 Comparative statics
Proposition 1. The optimal choices of the firm vary with country and firm characteris-
tics.
1. The number of the production workers nj is increasing in the production quantity
qj and decreasing in labor productivity Aj and the firm’s knowledge level z¯.
2. The knowledge level of production workers zj is increasing in communication costs
θj and in labor productivity Aj, and decreasing in wages wj, knowledge acquisition
costs cj and the production quantity qj. If the firm is active only domestically, the
workers’ knowledge level z0 is independent of wages w0 and production quantity q0.
3. The number of managers nh is increasing in the production quantity qj, the know-
ledge acquisition costs cj and wages wj. It is decreasing in labor productivity Aj
and the firm’s knowledge level z¯. The effect of communication costs is ambiguous.
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4. Managerial knowledge zh increases in firm knowledge z¯. The effect of the coun-
try characteristics depends on whether the knowledge constraint is binding or not.
If the knowledge constraint is binding, managerial knowledge decreases in labor
productivity Aj and communication costs θj, and increases in the production quan-
tity qj, knowledge acquisition costs cj and wages wj. If the knowledge constraint is
non-binding, country characteristics have opposite effects on managerial knowledge,
except for communication costs. Managerial knowledge is independent of commu-
nication costs θj if the knowledge constraint is non-binding.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.3.
Paragraph 1 is intuitive. Concerning the knowledge level of the production workers,
higher communication costs entail an incentive to assign workers more knowledge to in-
crease the amount of problems that do not need to be communicated to the headquarters
and thus save on communication costs. Higher wages wj and higher learning costs cj
increase the remuneration for every single worker, so it is optimal to decrease their know-
ledge to mitigate cost increases. If labor productivity is lower, or a larger quantity qj is
to be produced, more workers need to be hired, each of whom receives wj(1 + cjzj). It is
optimal to decrease their knowledge level to decrease total labor costs.
Wages and the production quantity do not affect the production workers’ optimal know-
ledge level for domestic firms. The production quantity scales the “breadth” of the
organization. An increase in the production quantity leads to a proportional increase
in the number of workers, which in turn causes a proportional increase in the number
of managers. Changing the allocation of knowledge within the firm does not affect this
requirement. Similarly, wages scale the total costs of production. The effect of knowledge
acquisition costs and communication costs is different. The firm faces a trade-off: allocat-
ing more (less) knowledge to the production workers increases (decreases) the total costs
at the production level, but decreases (increases) the costs that accrue due to commu-
nication between production workers and managers. The optimal amount of knowledge
allocated to the production workers therefore decreases in the knowledge acquisition costs
c0 and increases in the communication costs with the headquarters θ0 also in a firm that
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produces only domestically. All the results for domestic firms are in line with the findings
for single-establishment firms in Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009).
The effect of the bilateral communication costs on the knowledge level of production
workers is interesting in view of the empirical findings on the labor market implications
of foreign direct investment. Girma and Görg (2007) analyze establishment level data
from the UK and find that despite controlling for establishment characteristics, establish-
ments acquired by U.S. firms pay higher post-acquisition wages than comparable domestic
establishments or establishments acquired by investors from Europe. They discuss differ-
ent potential reasons for this finding, including a more efficient use of firm specific assets
by U.S. firms, international rent-sharing agreements within MNEs, and non-random se-
lection of workers to firms. The present thesis offers an additional explanation. The
difference in post-acquisition wages may be driven by U.S. multinational firms’ allocat-
ing more competencies to the U.K. Bilateral communication costs between the U.K. and
the U.S. may be higher than between the U.K. and European firms even though English
is officially spoken in both countries, for example as it takes longer for management to
reach the U.K. from the U.S. or due to time zone differences.
The effect of the production quantity and labor productivity on the number of managers
is straightforward. The number of managers increases in wages and knowledge acquisition
costs because these lead to a decrease in production workers’ knowledge. This implies
that the number of problems sent to headquarters increases, so more managers have to be
hired to deal with them. Communication costs have an ambiguous effect on the optimal
number of managers. On the one hand, an increase in communication costs implies that
managers have to spend more time to accomodate a given number of problems, so the
number of managers increases. On the other hand, higher communication costs lead to
higher knowledge levels at the production locations. The number of problems referred to
the headquarters decreases, as does the number of managers.
If the knowledge constraint is binding, country characteristics have exactly the opposite
effect on managerial knowledge as they have on production knowledge, because the sum of
the two knowledge levels has to cover the full knowledge interval. Country characteristics
(except communication costs) have an identical effect on managerial knowledge as on
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production knowledge if the knowledge constraint is not binding. This result may seem
counterintuitive at first. Take the effect of wages as an example. Higher wages imply
that the firm decreases the level of knowledge of production workers. Consequently, the
number of problems sent to headquarters increases. This entails an incentive to decrease
the marginal costs of using the headquarters, which is achieved by decreasing heaquarter
knowledge. This is possible, as the knowledge constraint is not binding. The effect of the
other characteristics can be derived analogously.
1.2.2 Profit maximization
There are many firms in each country j = 0 and j = 1. Each firm i is characterized by a
firm-specific knowledge level z¯i and solves the cost minimization problem analyzed in the
previous subsection. The analysis is conducted for a firm in the domestic country j = 0,
and the analogous results apply to firms in the foreign country j = 1.
Consumers in country j have CES preferences:
U(xj(z¯)) =
(∫
ζj
xj(z¯i)
σ−1
σ dz¯
) σ
σ−1
(1.16)
where ζj is the set of varieties available in country j, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
and xj(z¯i) is the individual consumption level of the variety produced with knowledge
input z¯i in country j. Preferences are assumed to be symmetric across countries. The
set of varieties ζj is determined by the set of firms that are active in the economy, which
is endogenized in the next subsection.
Utility maximization subject to the individual’s budget constraint implies that the de-
mand function for product i is given by
p(z¯i) = qj(z¯i)−
1
σQ
1
σ
j P
σ−1
σ
j (1.17)
where Qj is the consumption basket in country j and Pj denotes the price index. We
normalize the price index to 1.
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The total demand is given by the product of the number of customers Nj and the indi-
vidual demands:
qj(z¯i) = Njxj(z¯i). (1.18)
Firms maximize profits. Each firm chooses whether and how to serve the foreign country,
and determines the profit maximizing quantities q0 and q1. Firms can access the foreign
country via exporting or foreign direct investment. They incur fixed costs fX for the
former and fI for the latter option, where fI > fX .
In the following, optimal quantities are characterized by the mode superscripts D for
domestic firms, X for exporters, and I for multinational firms.
The profit maximization problem of a multinationally active firm is given by
max
qI0 ,q
I
1
piI(z¯i, w0, w1) =
1∑
j=0
pj(qIj (z¯i))qIj (z¯i)− C(z¯i, qI0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1). (1.19)
Optimal prices are a constant mark-up over marginal costs:
pj(z¯i) =
σ
σ − 1ξj(z¯i, q
I
0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1). (1.20)
The marginal costs ξj are a function of {qIj }1j=0 through zh and zj. The optimal quantities
are thus implicitly defined by
qIj (z¯i) = Qj
(
σ
σ − 1ξj(z¯i, q
I
0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1)
)−σ
. (1.21)
An exporting firm solves an analogously defined profit maximization problem:
max
qX0 ,q
X
1
piX(z¯i, w0, w1) =
1∑
j=0
pj(qXj (z¯i))qXj (z¯i)− C(z¯i, qX0 (z¯i), qX1 (z¯i), w0, τ1). (1.22)
Optimal prices are a constant mark-up over marginal costs including transport costs τ1
if applicable. The marginal costs are constant. The optimal quantities are given by
qX0 (z¯i) = Q0
(
σ
σ − 1ξ0(z¯i, w0)
)−σ
; qX1 (z¯i) = Q1
(
σ
σ − 1τ1ξ0(z¯i, w0)
)−σ
. (1.23)
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The optimal production quantity of a purely domestically active firm is determined by
similar considerations. As the marginal costs are constant in q = {qD0 (z¯i), qX0 (z¯i) + τ1qX1 (z¯i)}
if the firm only produces domestically,
qD0 (z¯i) = qX0 (z¯i). (1.24)
Firms can either be active purely domestically, produce domestically and export to the
foreign country or produce both at home and abroad. The profits of these three options
are given by
piD0 (z¯i) =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
Q0ξ0(z¯i, w0)1−σ; (1.25)
piX0 (z¯i) =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (
Q0 +Q1τ 1−σ1
)
ξ0(z¯i, w0)1−σ; (1.26)
piI0(z¯i) =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (
Q0ξ0(z¯i, qI0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1)1−σ
+ Q1ξ1(z¯i, qI0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1)1−σ
)
. (1.27)
Firms start exporting if
p1(qX1 (z¯i))qX1 (z¯i)− τ1ξ0(z¯i, w0)qX1 (z¯i) ≥ w0fX (1.28)
and become multinationals if
piI(z¯i, w0, w1)− w0f I ≥ piX(z¯i, w0, w1)− w0fX . (1.29)
The exporting decision only depends on foreign profits because the firm is able to produce
additional output without adjusting its organizational structure. Domestic profits are
unaffected by the exporting decision. Foreign investment entails reallocations to the
optimal allotment of knowledge inside the firm because the firm has to balance domestic
and foreign requirements. This implies that domestic performance is affected by the FDI
decision, so total profits—domestic and foreign profits—in case of FDI have to exceed
the total profits in case of exporting. Unlike conventional models of FDI, the model thus
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features an interdependence between the marginal costs of production and the profits
across countries.
1.2.2.1 Firm performance across different modes
The quantities sold in the domestic country in case of exporting and only domestic activity
are equal due to the constancy of the marginal costs with a single production location.
Quantities sold domestically by a multinational firm are lower than domestically sold
quantities if the firm produced only domestically:
qD0 (z¯i) = qX0 (z¯i) ≥ qI0(z¯i). (1.30)
This result arises because a multinational firm cannot tailor its headquarters to domes-
tic needs (unless the knowledge constraint is binding at both locations). Instead, the
knowledge level chosen at the headquarters balances domestic and foreign requirements.
Correspondingly, domestic marginal costs increase in the quantity of foreign production
and domestic output, and profits are lower in the case of FDI than in the case of exporting
or domestic activity.
In the foreign country, quantities sold in the case of FDI exceed export quantities.
qI1(z¯i) > qX1 (z¯i) (1.31)
Otherwise, the difference in fixed costs and the sales foregone in the domestic country
would not be worthwhile. FDI therefore only takes place if ξ1(z¯i, qI0 , qI1 , w0, w1) < τ1ξ0(z¯i, w0).
This is more likely to be the case for high τ1 and low θ1, low w1, low c1, high A1 and a
large market size (see Proposition 2 below).
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1.2.2.2 Firm performance across different countries
An exporting firm sells larger quantities in the domestic country than in the foreign
country by τ1 > 1 and σ > 1.
qX0 (z¯i) > qX1 (z¯i) = τ−σ1 qX0 (z¯i)
Foreign sales decrease in transport costs, so country attractiveness as export destination
decreases with τ1.
A multinational firm’s foreign performance varies with country characteristics.
Proposition 2. Foreign marginal costs ξ1 are increasing in the communication costs with
the headquarters θ1, with foreign wages w1 and foreign learning costs c1. Foreign marginal
costs ξ1 are decreasing in foreign labor productivity A1 and the production quantity q1.
Proof. Proof see Appendix A.1.2.
It is important to note that the marginal costs of production ξ1 are decreasing in the
foreign production quantity q1, but increasing in the domestic production quantity q0
(see Appendix A.1.2). Intuitively, the firm chooses the optimal allocation of knowledge
in a way that benefits affiliates with larger output. Equation (1.12) foreshadows this
implication: the firm takes the size of its output at the different affiliates into account in
choosing the optimal headquarter knowledge level zh.
Proposition 2 implies that foreign output and foreign sales are higher in countries with
lower communication costs θ1, lower wages w1 and lower knowledge acquisition costs c1
as well as higher labor productivity A1 (see Appendix A.1.2). The effects of the commu-
nication costs, wages, the knowledge acquisition costs and the labor productivity work
through two channels. Take the communication costs as an example. Higher communica-
tion costs have a direct, positive effect on the marginal costs of production, which exerts
a negative effect on foreign output and foreign sales. Higher communiation costs also
have an indirect, positive effect on the marginal costs of production as the firm favors
affiliates with larger output. Due to the lower production quantity, the affiliate is rela-
tively less important for the firm. The firm adjusts the allocation of knowledge. A lower
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production quantity due to higher communication costs thus implies that the marginal
costs of production increase even further, depressing foreign output and foreign sales. In
summary, the foreign country is more attractive for FDI if the communication costs with
the home country, wages and the knowledge acquisition costs are lower and the labor
productivity is higher due to the positive effect of these variables on foreign output and
sales.
1.2.3 General equilibrium
1.2.3.1 Closed economy
Firms draw a firm-specific knowledge level z¯i upon paying the fixed entry cost f e in
units of domestic labor. The distribution of potential knowledge levels G(z¯) is known
and defined on the interval [0, z¯max], where z¯max is the highest knowledge level that
fulfils Assumption 1. Production additionally entails a fixed cost of production f paid in
domestic labor. Firms with adverse knowledge draws cannot profitably cover these fixed
costs, and so exit immediately.
The general equilibrium conditions determine the cut-off knowledge level for entry, z¯∗,
the number of firms M , wage w and total income Q. Recall that the price index P is
normalized to unity. The parameters λ,A, c, θ and N are exogenous. Country subscripts
are suppressed for simplicity of exposition.
A single firm’s variable profits are given by
piD(z¯i) =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
Qξ(z¯i, w)1−σ.
The marginal costs of production ξ are constant in the production quantity q and strictly
decreasing in the knowledge level z¯i (for a proof, see Appendix A.1.3.1). Profits are thus
strictly increasing in the knowledge level z¯i.
The least productive active firm is indifferent between entering and remaining inactive:
its variable profits are equal to the fixed costs of production. The zero cut-off profit
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condition determines the knowledge level z¯∗ of the marginal entrant.
wf = 1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
Qξ(z¯∗i , w)1−σ (1.32)
As profits are strictly increasing in knowledge, the cut-off is unique. The cut-off increases
with the knowledge acquistion costs c, wages w and communication costs θ and decreases
in labor productivity A (for a proof, see Appendix A.1.3.1).
Potential entrants enter up to the point where the expected net value of entry is zero:
entry occurs until the expected value of profits is equal to the sunk cost of entry. The
free entry condition determines wages w:
wf e =
∫ z¯max
z¯∗
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
Qξ(z¯, w)1−σdG(z¯) (1.33)
A unique equilibrium exists as the zero cut-off profit condition is strictly increasing in z¯∗
and the free entry condition is strictly decreasing in z¯∗.
In equilibrium, labor and goods markets clear. Labor supply N equals labor demand.
Labor is used to cover the fixed cost of entry, the fixed costs of investment, and the
demands for labor in production, for management, and for teaching. Labor demand for
production, management and teaching can be calculated by setting wages equal to 1 in
the cost function C(q, w). The labor market clearing condition determines the number of
firms M .
N = M
(
f e + 11−G(z¯∗)
∫ z¯max
z¯∗
(f + C(q, 1))dG(z¯)
)
(1.34)
The goods market clearing condition determines the total income wN .
wN = Q (1.35)
1.2.3.2 Open economy
Firms can either export or conduct foreign direct investment. Both activities entail fixed
costs fX and f I to be paid in units of domestic labor, with f I > fX > f .
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The general equilibrium conditions determine the cut-off knowledge level for activity z¯∗,
the cut-off knowledge level for exporting z¯X and for FDI z¯I , the number of firms {Mj}1l=0,
wages {wj}1l=0 and total income {Qj}1l=0.
As above, the least productive active firm is indifferent between entering and remaining
inactive. The variable domestic profit is equal to the fixed costs of production. The first
zero cut-off profit condition determines the knowledge level z¯∗ of the marginal entrant.
w0f =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
Q0ξ0(z¯∗i , w0)1−σ (1.36)
The marginal exporter is indifferent between exporting and not exporting: the variable
foreign export profits are equal to the fixed costs of exporting. The second zero cut-off
profit condition determines the exporting cut-off Z¯X .
w0f
X = 1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
Q1(τ1ξ0(z¯Xi , w0))1−σ (1.37)
Domestic and export profits are strictly increasing in z¯i as the marginal costs ξ0 are
strictly decreasing in z¯i. The marginal costs of the marginal exporter are lower than the
marginal costs of the marginal entrant if the market sizes are similar, as in Melitz (2003):
ξ0(z¯Xi , w0) =
(
Q1f
Q0fX
) 1
σ−1 1
τ1
ξ0(z¯∗i , w0) < ξ0(z¯∗i , w0) for Q0 ≈ Q1.
Consequently, the exporting cut-off knowledge level is higher than the zero cut-off know-
ledge level: z¯X > z¯∗. An increase in τ1 or a decrease in Q1 imply that the exporting
cut-off knowledge level z¯X increases: it is profitable to export to more distant destinations
and to smaller markets only for firms with lower marginal costs.
The marginal multinational firm is indifferent between exporting and foreign direct in-
vestment. The net total export profits are equal to the net total profits earned from FDI.
29
The organization of knowledge in multinational firms
The multinational cut-off z¯I is determined by the third zero cut-off profit condition.
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
ξ0(z¯I , w0)1−σ(Q0 +Q1τ 1−σ1 )− w0fX =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (
Q0ξ0(z¯I , qI0(z¯I), qI1(z¯I), w0, w1)1−σ+
Q1ξ1(z¯I , qI0(z¯I), qI1(z¯I), w0, w1)1−σ
)
− w0f I (1.38)
The total profits from FDI have to exceed the total profits from exporting plus the
difference in the fixed costs. Both total FDI and total export profits increase in the
knowledge level z¯. As the fixed costs of foreign direct investment are higher than the
fixed costs of exporting, firms have to have a higher knowledge level to profitably carry out
foreign investment: z¯I > z¯X . Domestic profits decrease in case of FDI as the headquarters
are no longer tailored to domestic needs, but balance domestic and foreign requirements.
Compared to a model with independent marginal costs of production, the productivity
cut-off is thus shifted upwards. Export profits decrease with τ1 and profits from FDI
decrease with w1, c1 and θ1, and increase with A1. Consequently, the productivity cut-
off z¯I varies with the characteristics of the host country.
Proposition 3. The productivity cut-off z¯I increases in the bilateral communication costs
θ1 between the host country and the multinational’s home country, in the foreign wages
w1 and the foreign knowledge acquisition costs c1, and decreases in the foreign labor
productivity A1 as well as the bilateral transportation costs τ1 between the home and the
host country.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.2.
The depressing effect of the bilateral communication costs θ1 on the tendency to invest
decreases in λ. A higher value of λ is associated with a more predictable production
process. The productivity cut-off z¯I is thus even higher in sectors with less predictable,
more complex production processes. This result is consistent with the findings in Bahar
(2013) who shows that firms in knowledge intensive sectors are less likely to conduct
foreign direct investment, and that given investment, high communication costs have a
negative effect on the location probability of knowledge intensive activities.
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Firms enter up to the point where the net value of entry is zero. The expected value
of the profits has to be adjusted for export and multinational profits. The free entry
condition is given by
w0f
e =
∫ z¯I
z¯∗
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
Q0ξ0(z¯, w0)1−σdG(z¯)
+
∫ z¯I
z¯X
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
Q1(τ1ξ0(z¯, w0))1−σdG(z¯)
+
∫ z¯max
z¯I
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (
Q0ξ0(z¯, q0(z¯), q1(z¯), w0, w1)1−σ
+Q1ξ1(z¯, q0(z¯), q1(z¯), w0, w1)1−σ
)
dG(z¯) (1.39)
The labor market clearing condition is modified to include the demand for labor to cover
the fixed costs of foreign activity and the demand for labor by foreign investors.
N0 =M0
(
f e + 11−G(z¯∗0)
(∫ z¯0,max
z¯∗0
f + C00(q0, q1, 1, w1)dG(z¯)
+
∫ z¯I0
z¯X0
fXdG(z¯) +
∫ z¯0,max
z¯I0
f IdG(z¯)
))
+M1
1
1−G(z¯∗1)
∫ z¯1,max
z¯I1
C01(q1, q0, w1, 1)dG(z¯) (1.40)
where C00(q0, q1, 1, w1) refers to the fraction of the costs of MNEs from country j = 0
that accrue in their home market and C01(q1, q0, w1, 1) denotes the fraction of the costs of
foreign MNEs that accrue in country j = 0. That is, C00(q0, q1, 1, w1) counts the number
of domestic employees of domestic MNEs, C00(q0, q1, 1, w1) = n∗0(1 + c0z∗0) + n∗h(1 + c0z∗h)
(with the ∗ referring to optimal choices as derived in subsection 1.2.1). C01(q1, q0, w1, 1)
analogously counts the number of employees in country j = 0 of foreign MNEs.
The goods market clearing condition corresponds to the above equation, with the con-
sumption basket adjusted for the available foreign goods.
1.2.4 Robustness
The model assumes that all managers have the same knowledge level, so every manager
can be approached with any problem from any location. Large multinational corporations
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may afford specialized divisions at their headquarters that are responsible for certain
countries only and that possess only specialized knowledge.
It is possible to accomodate this consideration in the model by allowing the firm to
choose eight endogenous variables: {zj, nj, zjh, njh}1l=0, where njh is the number of managers
responsible for production in country j and zjh is their knowledge level. A formal analysis
is provided in Appendix A.1.4.
Such a modification does not affect the main results: as in Proposition 1, production
knowledge increases in the communication costs with the headquarters θj and labor
productivity Aj and decreases in the knowledge acquisition costs cj. Domestic production
knowledge is independent of wages w0, and foreign production knowledge decreases in
wages w1. Unlike the above, the knowledge levels are independent of the production
quantity. The marginal costs increase in θj, wj and cj, and decrease in Aj.
If the headquarter divisions are fully specialized, the marginal costs of production are
constant and independent across countries, in line with the assumptions made in previous
papers (e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Tintelnot, 2012). Multinational firms
probably have specialized departments in their headquarters. Still, upper management
is responsible for worldwide operations. At least at some level of seniority, managers
thus have to be able to address issues brought up from anywhere in the corporation, as
captured by the assumption of non-tailored managerial knowledge.
1.3 Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis is based on the Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), a data
set with balance sheet information on virtually the universe of foreign affiliates of German
multinational firms from 1999 until 2010. The data set contains detailed balance sheet
information on every affiliate, including its sales, its number of employees and its financial
structure. Information on parent and affiliate sectors, mostly at the two digit level, is
also provided. From 2002 onwards, information on the sales and the number of employees
of the German investor is available.
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The data allow testing the following predictions of the model:
Testable hypotheses.
1. The foreign productivity of a given multinational firm increases in the size of the
foreign market Q˜j and the labor productivity A˜j and decreases in the bilateral com-
munication costs with Germany θ˜j, foreign wages w˜j and knowledge acquisition
costs c˜j.
2. The cut-off productivity level for investment in a foreign country increases with the
bilateral communication costs with Germany θ˜j, foreign wages w˜j and knowledge
acquisition costs c˜j, and decreases in market size Q˜j and foreign labor productiv-
ity A˜j.
The first hypothesis follows from Proposition 2 and the second hypothesis results from
Proposition 3 by associating productivity with inverse marginal costs 1
ξj
, as is standard
in the literature (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). A “∼” is used
to denote the empirical analog of a model parameter. The production quantity qj is an
endogenous model outcome, so market size is used to take into account the fact that
demand and thus qj will be higher in larger markets.
We use the natural log of sales over employees ln(sales/employees) to measure productiv-
ity. To be consistent with the level of analysis of the model, we aggregate the available
information on the parent-country level, taking the degree of participation of the parent
in the affiliate into account where applicable.
Recall that the model demonstrates that a firm’s marginal cost depends on z¯i, the know-
ledge level of the firm, which also determines firm selection across countries. To be
consistent with the model predictions, the empirical test of Hypothesis 1 focuses on
within-parent variation in performance across countries, thus taking into account the
fact that differences in z¯i may affect foreign performance. We estimate the following
regression equation:
yijt = β0 + β1Q˜jt + β2θ˜jt + β3c˜jt + β4w˜jt + β5A˜jt + αit + ijt (1.41)
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where yijt denotes the foreign labor productivity of firm i in country j and period t,
αit is a parent–year fixed effect, and ijt is a firm–country–year specific error term. The
parent–year fixed effects absorb the effect of z¯i, i.e., of parent characteristics that may
influence performance across destinations. The regression results uncover the relation
between deviations in the performance measure yijt from its parent–year specific mean
and deviations in the country characteristics x˜jt from their respective parent–year specific
means, abstracting from parent-specific differences. To account for correlations across
time, the standard errors are clustered at the level of the parent.
This approach helps to distinguish the predictions of the model from bias due to the
self-selection of firms across countries. Large markets with high labor productivity and
low factor costs are attractive investment destinations. The higher average productivity
of firms in such markets could result from more productive multinationals selecting into
those destinations. The empirical specification focuses on the performance of the same
multinational firm across different countries and thus tests the model in a clean fashion.
It is still necessary to interpret the resulting estimates βˆ with caution. The set of locations
is a choice variable on the part of the firm, and does not vary exogenously. It is difficult
to guarantee that our estimation conditions on all information available to the investor,
so the results may still be biased due to unobservable firm–country-specific variables.
One possibility for addressing this problem would be to analyze the effect of a large
and unexpected shock in one of the regressors in a country on the outcome variables
of firms which had already been active in that country before the shock occurred. We
have unfortunately not been able to find such a shock, and thus have to stick with more
suggestive empirical evidence. Estimating a Heckman selection model is an alternative
option. However, such a specification does not allow maintaining a strict focus on within-
parent variation across countries, as using firm–year fixed effects is not possible. In
addition, the strong distributional assumptions of the Heckman selection model are not
fulfilled in the data. These aspects are discussed in more detail in Appendix A.3.
To learn whether the selection pattern across countries is consistent with the predic-
tions of the model, we construct the cut-off productivity level by country for each two
digit parent sector group. The model predicts that firm performance across countries
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is interdependent and that foreign activity negatively affects domestic performance. We
therefore employ two different strategies to approximate the cut-off productivity level.
We employ the minimum domestic productivity of investors active in a country, which
is subject to the caveat just mentioned. We additionally construct the global produc-
tivity of a firm as the log of global sales over the global number of employees and use
the minimum worldwide productivity of investors in a country as measure for the cut-off
productivity level. The estimation equation is:
ysjt = γ0 + γ1Q˜jt + γ2θ˜jt + γ3c˜jt + γ4w˜jt + γ5A˜jt + δt + δs + υsjt (1.42)
where ysjt denotes the cut-off productivity level of firms in sector s in country j and
period t, δt, δs are a year and sector fixed effect, and sjt is a sector–country–year specific
error term. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
1.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi) is provided by the Bundesbank, the Ger-
man central bank. We use the information on outward foreign direct investment by
German companies. The database consists of a panel of yearly information on virtually
the universe of foreign affiliates of German firms from 1999 until 2010. By the German
Foreign Trade and Payment Regulation (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung), any resident who
holds shares or voting rights of at least 10% in a company with a balance sheet total of
more than 3 million euro is obliged to report information on the financial characteristics
of these affiliates to the Bundesbank. Until 2002, information on stakes of at least 10%
in a company with a balance sheet total of more than 5 million euro and stakes of at
least 50% in a company with a balance sheet total of more than 0.5 million euro had to
be reported (Lipponer, 2009). The same information has to be provided on branches or
permanent establishments abroad if their operating assets exceed the reporting threshold.
We clean the data so that all observations meet a uniform threshold: we keep affiliates
with a balance sheet total of at least 5 million euro and a degree of participation of at
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least 10%, or with a balance sheet total between 3 and 5 million euro, but parent stakes
of at least 50%.2
We drop observations on 20,016 affiliates of investors that are government institutions
or private households, agriculture or mining companies and housing enterprises.3 The
resulting data set contains 271,178 affiliate–year observations that correspond to 179,658
parent–country–year observations. Some affiliates are reported several times, because
multiple investors hold participating interests in them.
We augment the MiDi with information on country characteristics used as proxies for the
model parameters. An overview of the model parameters, the empirical analogs, and the
corresponding data source is given in Table 1.1.
237,251 observations are thus dropped from the sample.
3Government institutions and private households are dropped because they are not multinational
firms. Agriculture and mining companies are dropped because natural resources are decisive factors
for their investments, but ignored in the theoretical and empirical analyses. Housing enterprises are
dropped because they often report sales of zero, even though they are not small, which would lead to
measurement error in our analysis.
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We use GDP data from the IMF to measure differences in demand across countries.
We alternatively employ market potential calculated as the sum of GDP of all countries
weighted by their distance to the host country (e.g. Chen and Moore, 2010). The bilateral
communication costs between headquarter managers and foreign production workers are
difficult to capture. We employ a number of different measures to approximate them. We
focus on measures that approximate frictions in information and communication flows
between people and refrain as far as possible from measures which could also capture
differences in the flow of goods such as distance. The main measures are the duration
of a flight from Frankfurt to the main city of the host country, the linguistic distance
between German and the language(s) spoken in the host country, and the difference in
time of day in minutes. We calculate the linguistic distance as a function of the number of
common nodes of German and each language spoken by at least 20% of people in the host
country according to the classification of languages provided by Ethnologue (Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2009) and take the simple average in case of several languages.4 The flight time
is used to capture how quickly managers can travel to the affiliate and address potential
issues in the production process on site. Despite technological advances, face-to-face
communication is often indispensable to ensure successful production (e.g. UNCTAD,
2004). In principle, the flight time is correlated with geographic distance. However, there
are no direct flights for a number of destinations, so the flight time contains important
information on the accessibility of foreign countries beyond their geographic distance.
The linguistic distance is based on the intuition that the closer a language is to one’s
mother tongue, the easier it is for most people to learn it and to express themselves
precisely. Undoubtedly, international business communication likely often takes place in
English (and we thus use the share of the population speaking English as measure for
the communication costs in robustness checks below). Still, as a recent documentation
by the Secretariat General Translation Directorate of the European Court of Auditors
shows, non-native English speakers tend to develop their own English dialect that is
strongly influenced by their native languages and often difficult to understand by native
speakers (Gardner, 2013). The linguistic distance is therefore apt to capture frictions in
4Specifically, we use
√
7−# common nodes
7 , slightly modifying the formula used in Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009), as 7 is the number of linguistic nodes of German and thus the maximum number
of common nodes possible.
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communication despite the use of English in business contexts. The difference in time of
day captures the fact that personnel at either location may have to work unconventional
hours to facilitate communication if the affiliate is located in a different time zone. This
may increase costs for the firm. We use the difference in the time of day in minutes and
not the abosolute value of the deviation in time of day, because the time difference may
have an asymmetric effect. The working day at the affiliate location starts before the
parent’s working day if the time difference is negative, but ends after the parent’s working
day if the time difference is positive. This may affect affiliate performance because in the
former case, parents can be approached with problems at the same day, whereas affiliates
may have to wait until the next day to have their problems addressed in the latter case.
As robustness checks, we use the share of people speaking English and an indicator that
German is among the official languages of the host country. The share of people speaking
English is only available for a subset of countries and for a subset of years, but does not
vary greatly over time. We therefore assign the available information for each country to
all years and use the nearest value for each period.
Knowledge acquisition costs are measured using the expenditure per pupil as percent-
age share of GDP per capita and PISA maths and science scores. The former is an
input measure based on the idea that more public investment in education decreases the
marginal costs of schooling. The latter are output measures that take into account the
fact that large amounts of public funds per se do not imply that the educational system
works efficiently. PISA scores are internationally comparable measures of how well the
educational system is able to teach abilities to students. As they are only available for
a relatively small subset of countries and years, we prefer the former measure. We use
GDP per employee to measure labor productivity. This measure is imperfect, as it is
does not reflect differences in hours worked, but is available for a large number of coun-
tries. We use labor productivity per employee for OECD countries as robustness check.
To measure wages, we employ the compensation per employee provided by the OECD.
However, these measures are only available for the majority of OECD countries, and the
OECD countries are a non-representative sub-sample of all investment destinations of
German firms. We therefore stick to GDP per employee as labor productivity measure
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and omit wages in most regressions below.5 The omission of wages is defendable, as
wages are endogenously determined in general equilibrium and thus a function of the
other covariates. Finally, transport costs are measured using data on bilateral distance.
We take the logarithms of the covariates if their distribution in levels is skewed.
To take into account factors which may influence the variation in productivity across
countries but are not explicitly included in the model, we also include data on bilateral
trust and investment climate measures. We use data on bilateral trust from Germany
towards other countries from the Eurobarometer. As investment climate measures, we
use statutory tax rates as well as the indicators on the ease of enforcing contracts and of
registering property from the World Bank Doing Business Indicators and indicators on
the rule of law and government effectiveness from the World Governance Indicators. The
cost and time to start a business are used as additional controls in the regressions on the
cut-off productivity level.
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis.
5We have experimented with the Occupational Wages around the World Database by Freeman and
Oostendoorp provided via the NBER (Oostendorp, 2013), a standardized database on wages by sector
based on the ILO October Inquiries. However, its overlap with the MiDi database is even worse. Data
are available for only 20% of observations.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean SD
Foreign productivity 150, 570 5.583 1.189
Domestic productivity (firm level) 24, 357 5.803 1.150
Number of countries per parent (firm level) 54, 961 3.016 4.782
Log GDP 163, 890 13.269 1.533
Log market potential 163, 686 6.457 1.431
Log flight time 165, 349 5.154 .959
Time difference to Germany, minutes 165, 662 0.198 3.588
Linguistic distance 163, 805 0.803 0.232
Official language German 164, 992 0.139 0.346
Per pupil public expenditure on education, % of GDP p.c. 128, 653 22.978 3.982
PISA maths score 46, 329 492.354 38.925
PISA science score 46, 329 495.513 32.579
GDP per employee (in 1990 $ 1,000) 163, 071 3.806 1.581
Labor productivity per employee, OECD 123, 239 11.532 1.390
Log distance 164, 992 7.320 1.298
Log compensation per employee 113, 157 11.087 1.432
Bilateral trust from Germany, survey 1996 120, 875 2.548 0.421
Log costs to enforce a contract 114, 971 3.009 0.363
Log time to enforce a contract 114, 971 6.162 0.439
# of procedures to enforce a contract 114, 971 32.941 5.680
Log costs to register property 102, 230 1.074 1.010
Log time to register property 102, 645 3.416 1.050
# of procedures to register property 102, 645 5.323 2.201
Costs to start a business 114, 980 10.080 37.595
Time to start a business 114, 980 24.525 26.056
Statutory tax rate 164, 110 28.933 7.672
Summary statistics for regression sample. Variable definitions: see Table 1.1. The number of observations varies due to
differences in country coverage. Maximum possible number of observations: 165,760.
Figures 1.1 to 1.4 provide graphical evidence about the basic relations in the data. Each
dot refers to one country. The upper panel scatters the cut-off productivity level by
country, where the cut-off productivity level is measured using domestic productivity.
The lower panel scatters the average deviation of foreign productivities from the parent–
year specific mean. The average deviation of foreign productivities from the parent–year
specific mean is calculated as follows. We calculate the mean of foreign productivities
for each parent and year and substract it from the observed foreign productivities. We
obtain the deviation in the foreign productivity per country from the parent–year specific
mean. For every country, we calculate the average of these deviations. This implies that
the scatter plots indicate the relationship between country characteristics and the relative
performance of firms, i.e. whether firms tend to be more or less productive than average
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in countries with certain characteristics. The left figures scatter the respective variables
against log GDP, the right figures scatter the residuals from a regression of the variables
on GDP against log flight time. The relationship between performance and flight time
are therefore robust to GDP differences.
Figure 1.1: Cut-off parent productivity
vs. GDP, 2005
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Figure 1.2: Cut-off parent productivity
vs. flight time, 2005
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Figure 1.1 scatters the minimum domestic productivity of investors active in a country versus the natural log of country
GDP. Figure 1.2 scatters the residuals from a regression of the minimum domestic productivity on log GDP versus the
natural log of the flight time from the main city in the host country to Germany. For data confidentiality, only countries
where at least three investors are active are included.
Figure 1.3: Foreign productivity vs.
GDP, 2005, deviations from parent
mean
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Figure 1.4: Foreign productivity vs.
flight time, 2005, deviations from par-
ent mean
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Figure 1.3 scatters the average of the deviations of foreign productivity (ln foreign sales/foreign employees) in a country
from the parent specific mean versus the log of host country GDP. Figure 1.4 scatters the residual from a regression of the
average deviation of foreign productivity on log GDP versus the log of flight time between the host country and Germany.
For data confidentiality, only countries where at least three investors are active are included. Two outliers, the Bahamas
and Mauritius, commonly considered as tax havens, are dropped.
The model predicts that only more knowledge intensive and thus more productive firms
invest in more challenging destinations (cf. Proposition 3). Figures 1.1 and 1.2 cor-
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roborate the conjecture that firm selection is non-random across countries: the cut-off
productivity level as measured by the minimum domestic productivity level tends to be
higher in smaller markets, and lower in countries that are quicker to reach.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show that firms tend to be relatively more productive in countries that
are larger and that are more quickly accessible. The relationships are reversed compared
to the patterns displayed in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Larger and less remote countries attract
investors that are less productive in the home country, but foreign productivity tends to
be higher in larger and less remote countries given domestic productivity. The pattern is
consistent with higher z¯i firms’ being able to invest in more difficult destinations, but all
firms being more productive in larger markets with lower bilateral communication costs
with the home country.
To run the regressions in the next section, we aggregate direct and indirect participation
interests per affiliate and further restrict the sample to majority owned affiliates.6 The
relationships predicted by the model hold whenever the parent is actively involved in the
management of local production. This may not be the case when the majority of the
affiliate is owned by other shareholders. The results are largely robust if we abandon this
restriction. We report the regression results for the full sample in Appendix A.2.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Within-firm differences in performance across countries
Table 1.3 presents the main results on Hypothesis 1. The table displays the number of
parents and the number of country combinations contained in the regression sample along
with the coefficients. The number of country combinations denotes the number of distinct
combinations of countries that the investors included in the regression sample are active
in. The number is decisive because the regression results are driven by the variation
within firms across countries, so it is important to ensure that the number is sufficiently
624,060 observations are thus dropped from the sample.
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high. The number of country combinations often exceeds the number of parents, which
implies that parents change their set of investment destinations over time.
Table 1.3 shows nine specifications. The first specification (column 1) includes log GDP
and the measures of communication costs: log flight time in minutes, linguistic distance
and the time difference from Germany in minutes. The second specification (column 2)
adds knowledge acquisition costs measured by public expenditures on education per pupil
as share of GDP per capita and labor productivity measured as GDP per employee. The
third specification (column 3) also includes a measure for wages: the log compensation per
employee. We separate the first from the other specifications to make transparent whether
the measures of communication costs take up omitted country characteristics. The second
and third specification are separately displayed because the wage data are only available
for OECD countries, so the sample size decreases non-randomly once wages are included.
Due to the selectivity of the sample including wages and the associated decrease in the
number of observations, we omit wages from further regressions. Columns 4 to 9 include
other potential determinants of cross-country differences in productivity that might be
omitted variables in the main specification. These specifications will be detailed after
discussing the main regression results. Table A.1 presents the regression results if all
affiliates, including non-majority owned affiliates, are included in the regression sample.
The regression coefficients are quantitatively similar, but less significant, which indicates
that non-majority owned affiliates add noise to the sample. Table A.2 displays regression
results for columns 4-9 including wages. The results are largely robust, but the number
of observations is considerably lower. Recall that these regressions are based on a non-
random subsample of countries.
We expect that parents are more productive in larger and more proximate countries with
higher labor productivities and lower knowledge acquisition costs and wages.
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All signs of the coefficients are in line with the theoretical predictions. The estimated
coefficients are generally highly significant, often at the 0.1% level. Parents tend to be
relatively more productive in relatively larger countries. Higher communication costs—as
measured by longer flight times and higher linguistic distance—generally have a negative
impact on the outcome variables, though the effect is less significant once the sample
is reduced to OECD countries. Positive time differences increase productivity. It is
plausible to interpret this finding as an indication that a longer time lag between the
incidence of a problem at a foreign location and the reaction of the parent is productivity
decreasing. If affiliates work ahead of the parent, it is possible for them to send the issues
to the headquarters at the beginning of the headquarters’ office hours and have them
addressed the same day; if the working day at affiliate locations begins after the parent’s,
problems that arise later during the day have to be postponed until the next day. In
unreported regressions, we explore whether the relationship is non-linear, but do not find
robust evidence for a U-shaped relationship. Relatively lower knowledge acquisition costs
due to higher public investments in education and relatively higher labor productivity
increases foreign performance, whereas higher wages decrease foreign productivity.
These findings are robust to the inclusion of potential omitted variables. The coefficients
remain highly significant. Column 4 includes a measure of bilateral trust between Ger-
many and the host countries calculated based on the survey question in the Eurobarom-
eter from the year 1996 (see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012; Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2009). Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) consider trust as a form
of social capital and argue that higher levels of bilateral trust between a multinational
firm’s headquarters and the affiliate increase the firm’s productivity by allowing the firm
to decentralize more easily. The regression results confirm that higher bilateral trust in-
creases firm productivity. The impact of the communication cost measures is unchanged,
even though Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) find that trust is positively associated
with common linguistic roots. Communication costs and trust have distinct effects on
firm performance.
Columns 5 to 8 include statutory tax rates, the cost, time and number of procedures
required to register property and to enforce contracts as measures for differences in the
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investment climate across countries. The first three columns include the measures sepa-
rately, column 8 includes trust, tax rates and the time to enforce contracts and register
property. We choose time to enforce contracts and register property as investment cli-
mate measures because these indicators seem most comparable across countries and least
likely to pick up differences in the income per capita, which is used as reference to obtain
comparable costs measures in the Doing Business Indicators. Our findings are robust
throughout specifications, and the investment climate measures affect productivity in in-
tuitive ways. Higher taxation negatively affects foreign productivity. The cost and time
to enforce contracts does not have a significant effect, but the number of procedures is
positively associated with productivity. This finding is contrary to expectations, but may
reflect the fact that given the time and cost of enforcing contracts, a higher number of
steps in judicial proceedings need not reflect red tape, but may be attributable to the
demand for carefully finding a fair solution. This effect may be taken up by the coeffi-
cient of the time to enforce contracts in column 8. The number of procedures required to
register property has a similar effect. When it takes longer to register property, a firm’s
productivity in a country is negatively affected. Column 9 includes geographic distance in
the main specification, a common regressor in the gravity literature. The main regression
results are robust. Relatively more distant affiliates are predicted to be relatively more
productive.
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1.5.1.1 Robustness checks
Table 1.4 replicates the regression results when alternative variables are used as measures
for the model parameters.
We use the market potential instead of GDP (column 1), and the share of the population
speaking English (column 2) and an indicator for German as an official language of a
country (column 3) as alternative measures for linguistic distance. The baseline results
are robust and significant at least at the 5% level. The alternative measures have the
expected effects and are significant.
The results are likewise robust when PISA maths and science scores are employed as
an alternative measure for the knowledge acquisition costs (columns 4, 5). As predicted
by the model, lower knowledge acquisition costs, here measured using the output of the
education system, increase productivity. The sample size is considerably smaller as the
measures are only available for a subset of years.
We use labor productivity measures from the OECD as an alternative for GDP per
employee and reinclude wages as the sample is restricted to OECD countries anyways
(column 6). Labor productivity is calculated as the gross value added divided by the
number of employees. As in the main regressions, flight time is insignificant once the
sample is restricted to OECD countries. The size of the coefficient of linguistic distance
increases by almost 100%. Both labor productivity and wages are insignificant. This find-
ing is surprising, given that productivity is robustly significant in all other specifications.
This may result from a combination of factors: on the one hand, GDP per employee
is a coarse measure and may pick up effects of income per capita differences. On the
other hand, the labor productivity measure is only available for OECD countries, which
are relatively homogeneous. Thus, there may just be too little variation to estimate a
meaningful effect.
Finally, we use alternative measures for the quality of the investment climate from the
World Governance Indicators (columns 7, 8). We include the rule of law, a measure that
is also used in Nunn (2007) and government effectiveness. The baseline results are robust.
Linguistic distance is significant at the 15% and 10% level respectively. As Kaufmann,
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Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) point out, the World Governance Indicators are survey
measures, so the precision of the individual measures should not be overestimated. To
take this issue into consideration, we additionally run unreported regressions including
the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval for the measures instead of the
point estimates. Results are robust.
1.5.1.2 Relevance
To assess the relevance of our findings, Table 1.5 presents the effect of an increase in the
independent variables by one standard deviation on foreign labor productivity expressed
in standard deviations. For comparison, it also displays the coefficient from the main
regression (Table 1.3, column 2) and the coefficient range. The coefficient range is taken
as being from the second lowest to the second largest coefficient, to remove outlying
coefficients.
Table 1.5: Effect of covariates in standard deviations of dependent variable
Coefficient range
Variables Main coefficient Effect in SD Lower Upper
Log GDP 0.057 0.073 0.035 0.140
Log flight time -0.044 −0.035 −0.105 −0.015
Linguistic distance -0.071 −0.014 −0.286 −0.051
Time difference 0.020 0.060 0.014 0.042
Per pupil public expenditure 0.016 0.054 0.015 0.019
GDP per employee 0.207 0.275 0.144 0.234
Table lists coefficient from Table 1.3, column 2, the effect of an increase in the variable value by one standard deviation
on the dependent variable expressed in standard deviations and the coefficient range. The coefficient range is the second
lowest to the second largest coefficient to remove outliers. All coefficients are significant.
The labor productivity level in a country as measured by GDP per employee is the quan-
titatively most important influencing factor of productivity at the firm level. The impact
of market size, communication costs and knowledge acquisition costs on productivity dif-
ferences across countries is similar in magnitude. An increase in market size, or a decrease
in communication or knowledge acquisition costs by one standard deviation leads to an
increase in foreign productivity by around 0.05 standard deviations.
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1.5.2 Cut-off productivity levels
The regression results for the cut-off productivity level are shown in Table 1.6. The
minimum domestic productivity of investors per sector in a country and year is used as
cut-off productivity measure in the upper panel, and the minimum global productivity
of investors per sector, country and year is used in the lower panel. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2, the domestic productivity of the least productive investor in a country
decreases in market size as measured by log GDP. The cut-off productivity level increases
in the communication costs between the host country and the home country as measured
by log flight time and linguistic distance. These results confirm the predictions of the
model. The generally high significance levels, usually 0.1%, are reassuring, especially
given that the number of observations is considerably smaller than in the regressions at
the firm level. The signs and significance levels are robust to the inclusion of measures
for the fixed costs of investment. The effect of flight time is still positive, but turns
insignificant if distance is included. The effect is significant at the 0.1% level once the
costs of starting a business are controlled for. The other covariates do not have robust
effects. Tables A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A.2 demonstrate that the regression results are
robust to the inclusion of additional regressors and largely robust to using alternative
measures for the covariates, similar to the robustness checks in the previous subsection.
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Table 1.6: Regression results for the cut-off productivity level
Domestic productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6
Log GDP −0.161∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.168∗ −0.165∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗
(0.017) (0.028) (0.059) (0.031) (0.028) (0.046)
Log flight time 0.155∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.032 0.442∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) (0.114) (0.088)
Linguistic distance 0.443∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.097) (0.092) (0.106) (0.111) (0.109)
Time difference to Germany 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.001
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
GDP per employee −0.003 0.048 −0.015 0.015 0.111∗
(0.035) (0.056) (0.040) (0.039) (0.051)
Per pupil public expenditure, 0.007 0.031∗ 0.006 0.002 0.035∗
% GDP p.c. (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Log compensation per employee 0.027 0.027+
(0.025) (0.018)
Log costs of starting a business −0.027 0.066∗∗
(0.030) (0.022)
Log time to start a business 0.010 0.049+
(0.034) (0.030)
Log distance 0.138 −0.066
(0.071) (0.053)
Constant 7.728∗∗∗ 6.410∗∗∗ 4.961∗∗∗ 6.574∗∗∗ 6.438∗∗∗ 4.318∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.558) (0.907) (0.637) (0.540) (0.734)
R-squared 0.308 0.325 0.394 0.330 0.327 0.394
Observations 11, 469 8, 280 4, 708 8, 000 8, 280 4, 527
Sector dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Global productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6
Log GDP −0.113∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.144∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.139∗
(0.016) (0.031) (0.054) (0.035) (0.031) (0.053)
Log flight time 0.154∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.098 0.547∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.053) (0.058) (0.055) (0.154) (0.125)
Linguistic distance 0.202+ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗ 0.409∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.118) (0.101) (0.125) (0.134) (0.123)
Time difference to Germany −0.001 0.003 0.023+ 0.005 0.002 0.025
(0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
GDP per employee 0.083 0.136∗ 0.078+ 0.096 0.143
(0.044) (0.063) (0.052) (0.049) (0.068)
Public expenditure per pupil, 0.013+ 0.035∗ 0.006 0.010 0.034∗
% GDP p.c. (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
Log compensation per employee −0.004 −0.007
(0.025) (0.019)
Log costs of starting business −0.028 0.021
(0.027) (0.025)
Log time to start business 0.023 0.070∗
(0.033) (0.032)
Log distance 0.106 −0.175∗
(0.114) (0.080)
Constant 2.347∗∗∗ 4.191∗∗∗ 3.166∗∗ 4.538∗∗∗ 4.172∗∗∗ 3.365∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.527) (0.815) (0.591) (0.518) (0.784)
R2 0.316 0.356 0.460 0.361 0.357 0.466
Observations 14, 476 10, 309 5, 512 9, 939 10, 309 5, 291
Sector dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Dependent variable: cut-off productivity - min(ln (domestic sales/domestic employees)) by country and sector group.
Covariate definitions: see Table 1.1.
52
The organization of knowledge in multinational firms
1.6 Discussion
The results on within-parent across-country differences in firm performance and the cut-
off productivity levels of foreign destinations obtained in the empirical analysis are con-
sistent with the model predictions. A given investor exhibits superior performance in
large markets characterized by relatively low bilateral communication costs between the
home country and the host country, comparatively low knowledge acquisition costs, and
relatively high labor productivity. The cut-off productivity levels decrease in market size
and increase in bilateral communication costs. This evidence is indirect: the data do not
contain information on the allocation of knowledge across countries which are the focus of
the model mechanism. It is therefore a key concern with respect to the empirical results
whether they can really be attributed to the organization of knowledge in multinational
firms.
Two recent papers study the relation between the geographical distribution of estab-
lishments and firm performance using U.S. data on national multi-establishment firms.
Giroud (2013) finds that investment in a plant increases after a new airline route between
the firm’s headquarter and the plant location is introduced. Kalnins and Lafontaine
(2013) demonstrate that greater distance of the establishment from the headquarters
is associated with shorter establishment survival. Both articles attribute their findings
to monitoring problems and information asymmetries between firm headquarters and
establishments.
This chapter proposes an alternative explanation to rationalize these empirical findings:
new airline routes and lower distance decrease communication costs between headquar-
ters and plants, which renders plants more productive and increases firms’ investment
incentives. At the same time, one could argue in the vein of Giroud (2013) that the empir-
ical results in this chapter are driven by monitoring problems within multinational firms.
The effect of flight time can be rationalized using a model that features monitoring prob-
lems between production workers and headquarter managers, variation in cross-border
monitoring costs, and heterogeneity in firms’ monitoring technology, for example along
the lines of Qian (1994). If monitoring costs are higher, a firm has to pay higher wages
53
The organization of knowledge in multinational firms
to implement the optimal effort level, so marginal costs of production are higher. Thus,
such a model would likewise generate lower within-firm productivity in countries with
higher cross-border monitoring costs. (A formal analysis of such a model is sketched in
Appendix A.4.)
Neither of the two mechanisms is susceptible to a direct test with the data available.
While we do not deny that monitoring is an important factor for efficient production, we
are convinced of the empirical relevance of the mechanism based on the organization of
knowledge proposed in this chapter. Higher bilateral trust is likely to decrease monitoring
costs. We find that communication costs are relevant even if bilateral trust is controlled
for. In addition, we approximate communication costs not only by flight time, but also
using linguistic distance. At least with respect to routine tasks, it is difficult to claim
that monitoring problems are less easily mitigated if the linguistic distance between the
home country and the host country is larger. A supervisor’s assessment of a worker’s
performance depends on observing what the worker does, not what the worker claims to
do.
Finally, our knowledge-based mechanism is consistent with empirical evidence on sec-
toral differences in the geographical concentration of foreign direct investment (Bahar,
2013, c.f. section 1.2.3.2) and explains home country labor market effects of multina-
tional activity. Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall (2007) provide evidence that both foreign
owned firms and domestic multinational firms tend to pay higher wages than domestic
non-multinational firms using Swedish establishment level data. As domestic knowledge
increases in overall firm knowledge (∂z0
∂z¯
> 0, cf. Appendix A.4) and multinational firms
exhibit higher knowledge levels than non-multinational firms, our model is consistent with
these findings. If monitoring were the only driver behind the empirical patterns presented
in the previous section, the opposite should be the case: to overcome higher cross-border
monitoring costs, firms would have to dispose of a better monitoring technology. Firms
with better monitoring technology are able to implement optimal effort levels with lower
wage payments. Multinational parents are therefore unambigously predicted to pay lower
wages than their domestic counterparts in the home country according to a monitoring
based model, which is at odds with the empirical evidence.
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter studies the organization of knowledge in multinational firms. Multinational
firms are predicted to optimally allocate more knowledge to foreign countries charac-
terized by higher bilateral communication costs with the home country, higher labor
productivity, lower wages and lower knowledge acquisition costs. The distribution of
productivities across countries within German multinational firms is shown to be consis-
tent with these predictions, as is the pattern of cut-off productivity levels. In addition,
both the home and host country multinational wage premiums generated by the model
are in line with the available empirical evidence.
The chapter offers relevant insights for the design of investment promotion policies. Cre-
ating well-paid, relatively knowledge intensive new jobs is one of the main targets of
investment promotion efforts (Javorcik, 2012). The results of this chapter generally sup-
port the presumption that employment in multinational affiliates is likely to be more
knowledge intensive and better paid than employment in domestic firms. In their efforts
to reap these benefits, countries tend to focus on investing in targeted information cam-
paigns and a good investment climate in terms of administration, governance and the
education of their workforce. As this chapter demonstrates, targeted foreign language
training and good communication infrastructures may be equally relevant to foster FDI
inflows, as they facilitate multinational enterprises’ task of efficiently organizing across
countries.
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Chapter 2
Knowledge transmission costs and
the organization of
multi-establishment firms∗
2.1 Introduction
Knowledge is a crucial input in many production processes and an important determinant
of productivity. A large literature studies the diffusion of knowledge across space and
its impact on macroeconomic growth and performance (for a survey, see Keller, 2004).
Despite the surge of innovation in the communication sector, the spatial transmission
of knowledge is still limited, suggesting that a sizeable fraction of knowledge is tacit in
nature (Keller, 2004). Notwithstanding, many microeconomic studies treat knowledge as
a public good within the firm that is available at negligible costs in all divisions, including
spatially separate ones (see e.g. Markusen, 1984; Markusen and Maskus, 2002, for a
survey). Comparatively few papers analyze costly communication within firm boundaries
to date, but these papers consistently find that communication costs matter: for example,
within-firm communication costs rationalize the development of firm-specific expressions
and languages (Cremer, Garicano, and Prat, 2007), and are an important influencing
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Manfred Antoni.
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factor of the international expansion of multinational firms (Bahar, 2013; Keller and
Yeaple, 2013). Disregarding communication costs inside the firm may thus hamper the
understanding of firm organization and growth.
The second chapter of this thesis studies the impact of knowledge transmission costs
on the organization of multi-establishment firms, central players in today’s economies.
Multi-establishment firms make up only a small share of the population of firms, but
account for disproportionate shares of output and employment (Bernard and Jensen,
2007). In the data from German Social Security Records used in this chapter, only 10%
of firms consist of several establishments, but almost half of observed employees work
for them. Given their economic importance, understanding the organization, investment
and remuneration decisions of multi-establishment firms is crucial to correctly assess the
effect of economic and labor market policies.
For this purpose, this chapter constructs a model of the organization of multi-establishment
firms. The model is based on three assumptions. First, both labor and knowledge are
required for production. Knowledge is defined in a broad sense and refers to all compe-
tencies necessary to take decisions on the production process, including knowledge about
technology and about management. Second, knowledge is only useful in production if it is
learned by a firm’s employees, which is costly. Third, communication between employees
within the firm is possible, but also costly. Employees can thus leverage on potentially
different knowledge sets. Multi-establishment firms consist of headquarters and produc-
tion establishments that may be located at the same place as the headquarters or at
a different location. Multi-establishment firms can allocate firm knowledge centrally at
the headquarters or decentrally at the different production establishments. In choosing
among these alternatives, they face a trade-off between communicating across space or
building costly local knowledge capacities. The optimal amount of knowledge allocated
to the single establishments within a company is heterogeneous and increases with higher
bilateral cost of communication with the company headquarters and lower local factor
input costs.
We demonstrate that the allocation of knowledge within multi-establishment firms af-
fects the remuneration and the span of control of their employees, i.e. the number of
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employees at lower hierarchical layers that an employee is responsible for.1 Both the
remuneration and the span of control increase in knowledge. To test the model implica-
tions empirically, we hypothesize that the observed remuneration and the observed span
of control of a firm’s employees increase in the bilateral costs of communication between
an establishment and the headquarters. As factor input costs have a direct effect on
the remuneration in addition to the indirect effect via knowledge, the effect of factor
input costs on knowledge is only testable via the span of control. The span of control is
predicted to decrease in wages and knowledge acquisition costs.
We construct a novel data set with linked employer-employee data from the German
Social Security Records and information on the affiliation of establishments to firms
using record-linkage techniques. The data are particularly apt to test the question of
interest. Germany is the forth largest economy in the world and has multiple economic
centres.2 The data contain comprehensive and reliable information from administrative
sources on the location, sector and employees’ characteristics of a large sample of multi-
establishment firms with varying location patterns. We find evidence that the organiza-
tion of German multi-establishment firms is in line with model predictions. In particular,
the remuneration increases in the costs of communication between an establishment and
the headquarters, as predicted by the model.
The chapter is based on the literature of firms as communication networks and knowledge
hierarchies (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000; Radner, 1993). This lit-
erature analyzes how a firm’s organizational structure adjusts to knowledge acquisition
costs and communication costs between agents. More specifically, we build on the frame-
work proposed in Garicano (2000). Garicano (2000) characterizes firms as knowledge
hierarchies that endogenously emerge in a set-up with knowledge and labor as produc-
tion inputs, and demonstrates that the allocation of knowledge within an organization
is affected by within-firm communication costs, knowledge acquisition costs and sector
1The term “remuneration” refers to the wages earned by a firm’s employees. We use the term
remuneration to distinguish firm level wages from the level of wages in the local labor market that is
exogenous to the firm.
2To illustrate, 18% of the population of France and 13% of the population of the UK lived in their
largest cities in 2012. In Germany, the 12 largest cities need to be taken together to account for 15% of
the population (Eurostat, 2013).
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characteristics. The model framework has been applied to various settings, for exam-
ple labor economics (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006) and international economics
(e.g. Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Many implications have been con-
firmed empirically (Garicano and Hubbard, 2007; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012).
Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) and Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)
add unit constraints in management input to the model framework in order to explain
labor market effects of exporting.
We extend the knowledge hierarchy framework to a setting where firms are active at
several locations and consist of multiple establishments and headquarters. In our set-
up, the firm as a whole as well as each establishment are structured as Garicano-type
knowledge hierarchies: employees are assigned to different hierarchical layers with dif-
ferent knowledge levels that imply different remuneration levels. The model features
within-establishment heterogeneity in remuneration due to the endogenous emergence of
hierarchical layers. Knowledge allocation is also heterogeneous between establishments:
the firm allocates more knowledge to an establishment if communication costs between
the establishment and firm headquarters are higher, or if local wages and knowledge
acquisition costs are lower. Observationally equivalent employees at the same hierarchi-
cal layer but distinct locations are thus endowed with different competencies, so their
remuneration varies.
The chapter contributes to different discussions in the literature. A few recent studies pro-
vide evidence on the importance of geography for the organization of multi-establishment
firms. Giroud (2013) demonstrates that new airline routes between headquarters and
establishments increase establishment productivity and investment. Kalnins and La-
fontaine (2013) show that headquarter proximity increases establishment survival rates.
This chapter relates to the literature by demonstrating that spatial proximity affects the
organizational structure of multi-establishment firms through its impact on communica-
tion costs inside the firm.
The chapter also adds to the discussion on employer wage premiums. A large litera-
ture has demonstrated that observationally equivalent workers receive different remu-
neration at different employers, and that the levels of remuneration tend to increase in
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employer size (e.g. Bayard and Troske, 1999; Troske, 1999). Card, Heining, and Kline
(2013) highlight the increasing relevance of establishment heterogeneity for explaining the
rise in aggregate wage inequality. This chapter features endogenously arising inequality
in remuneration of observationally equivalent workers within firms. Firm organization
helps interpret employer wage premiums. Similarly, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)
demonstrate that a single-firm knowledge hierarchy model is useful to understand the
effect of exporting on wages.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section analytically studies the problem of
firm organization and derives comparative statics results on the impact of communication
costs and factor input costs on firm organization. Section 2.3 describes the data used
in the empirical analysis and presents descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 outlines the
empirical strategy and section 2.5 presents the results. Section 2.6 discusses how the
insights in this chapter help to understand the role of establishment heterogeneity for
wage inequality. The last section concludes.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Set-up
The theory section studies the optimal organization of an exemplary multi-establishment
firm. Demand for establishment output and establishment locations are taken as given.
The analysis determines the optimal organizational structure of each establishment and
of the headquarters as well as the impact of firm organization on employees’ remuneration
and their span of control across locations.
The firm is assumed to consist of headquarters located at j = 0 and two production
establishments. We assume that one of these two establishments is situated at the same
location as the headquarter, and the other at a geographically distinct location j = 1. Lo-
cations are heterogeneous with respect to local wages wj, knowledge acquisition costs cj,
labor productivities Aj and the bilateral communication costs with the headquarters θj.
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There is a sufficient number of agents that the firm can hire and that are ex-ante identical.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of time. Production is assumed to be a problem
solving process based on labor and knowledge. Knowledge captures any competencies
required to produce, including both expertise about technology and the capability to take
decisions on the production process. For each unit of labor employed in production, a
mass 1 of problems are realized. The problems are distributed according to a distribution
function with exponential density:
f(z) = λe−λz (2.1)
where z = [0,∞) is the domain of possible problems and λ > 0 denotes the problem
arrival rate. Higher λ is associated with a more predictable production process: the
mass of the problem probability distribution is concentrated close to zero. This density
is chosen for analytical tractability. To transform labor into output, the problems that
arise in production have to be solved.
The firm endogenously chooses the amount of knowledge it would like to acquire. Know-
ledge is modelled as an interval. The firm is able to solve all problems that are realized
within its knowledge interval. As the mass of the problem probability distribution is
largest close to zero, it is optimal for each firm to choose zero as lower bound of the
knowledge interval. The firm additionally determines the upper bound Z¯ of the know-
ledge interval. Labor productivity Aj denotes the maximum amount of output that can
be produced using one unit of labor input. The output qj from one unit of labor input is
calculated as the value of the cumulative distribution function:
qj = Aj(1− e−λZ¯) (2.2)
Knowledge can be communicated among the firm’s employees, but communication is
costly. As is standard in the literature (Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000,
e.g.), the costs of communication are born by the receiver of the message. The receiver
of the message spends η units of time listening to the sender if both are located at the
same place, where 1 > η > 0. It is possible to communicate across space. This possibility
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comes at an increase of the cost of communication by θj, so the receiver of a message at
location 0 from location 1 has to spend θ1η < 1 units of time listening to the sender.3 To
capture frictions in communication across space, it is assumed that θ1 ≥ θ0 = 1.
Each employee is remunerated for working for the firm. The employees receive a location
specific wage wj for each unit of time. They are also compensated for their knowledge
z. To acquire knowledge they have to spend a location specific amount cjz of time for
studying. Total remuneration per employee is thus wj(1 + cjz). For expositional clarity,
the term “remuneration” always refers to the payments that employees receive from their
employer, whereas wages denote the local equilibrium wage that is exogenous to the firm.
Garicano (2000) demonstrates that the optimal organizational structure in the described
setup is an endogenously emerging hierarchy. The organization consists of a number of
hierarchical layers L with n`L employees per layer. Knowledge levels z`L are homogeneous
within layers, but distinct between layers. Only the employees at the lowest layer ` = 0
spend their time in production. The employees at higher layers ` = 1, ..., L − 1 spend
their time listening to and solving problems sent by lower layers of the hierarchy. The
employees only communicate with other employees in adjacent hierarchical levels: the
employees from layer ` − 1 send unsolved problems to employees in layer `, who solve
those problems realized within their knowledge interval and send the remaining problems
to employees at layer `+ 1 (or, if ` = L− 1, the headquarters). The employees at lower
layers learn the solutions to more common problems and the employees at higher layers
learn solutions to problems that are less likely to occur.
In Garicano (2000), neither knowledge gaps nor knowledge overlaps occur between the
knowledge intervals at two different layers. Knowledge gaps are sub-optimal because
it is always rational to learn the solution to more frequent problems first. Knowledge
overlaps are also not optimal as identical knowledge at two layers in the organization
increases costs, while the knowledge remains unused by one of the two layers. In our
set-up, it can be optimal to have knowledge overlaps between the headquarters and
one of the two establishments due to asymmetries in communication costs between the
3Intuitively, the communication costs η and θ1η are required to be smaller than one because it is not
optimal to communicate if communication requires more time than the generation of new problems.
62
Knowledge transmission costs and multi-establishment firms
establishment and the headquarters as well as local factor input costs, as long as the
redundant headquarter knowledge is used to address problems that arise in the other
establishment. In principle, knowledge gaps between one of the two establishments and
headquarters emerge whenever the marginal costs of closing the knowledge gap exceed
the marginal benefit of doing so. To increase analytical tractability, we assume that
knowledge gaps must not occur. This assumption does not affect the insights that we
obtain. The optimal organizational structure including knowledge gaps is analyzed in
Appendix B.1.4.
The problem of the firm is to determine the optimal amount of overall knowledge Z¯
as well as the optimal design of the firms’ organizational structure. The organizational
structure consists of the number of hierarchical layers Lj at each of its locations, the
number of employees n`L,j in each of the layers ` = 0, ..., L − 1 and the knowledge level
of the employees z`L,j, as well as the knowledge assigned to the headquarters [ZH , Z¯H ].
Given the insight derived in Garicano (2000) that higher layers learn solutions to problems
that occur less frequently in the production process, it is evident that Z¯H = Z¯, i.e. the
knowledge of the headquarters is most specialized.
We assume that the firm is headed by a single CEO endowed with one unit of time (as
in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). As argued by Kaldor (1934), the assumption
of a fixed amount of managerial input helps to rationalize equilibrium heterogeneity in
the optimal size of establishments. The assumption seems appropriate with view to real
world firms. Most firms are led either by a single CEO, managing director or owner-
entrepreneur, and firms exhibit heterogeneity in their organizational structure. Without
this assumption, all firms would choose the same optimal organizational structure in-
dependent of their size: given the knowledge acquisition costs and the communication
costs, there is a unique cost-minimizing design of the firm’s organization that can be repli-
cated for firms of any arbitrary size by choosing the appropriate number of headquarter
managers (that may infinitesimally small, if necessary).4
4Heterogeneity in the optimal organization emerges in the absence of above constraint if the overall
knowledge of the firm is not endogenized and the heterogeneity in the level of overall knowledge across
firms is assumed ex ante, as in Chapter 1.
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For simplicity, we further assume that the headquarters consist only of the CEO. This
assumption is not crucial for the main implications of the chapter, but simplifies the
analysis, as demonstrated in Appendix B.1.3. The number of employees hired in the
production establishments is endogenously determined.
Finally, Assumption 1 ensures that the knowledge levels z`L,j are positive ∀` = 1, ..., L−1.
Assumption 1. The parameters η, λ and cj are such that cjλ ≤ η1−η ∀j.
2.2.2 Cost minimization problem
The cost minimization problem of the firm is analyzed in two steps. First, the optimal
number of layers of the establishments, the optimal number of employees per layer and
the knowledge level of employees at the establishments are determined. In doing so,
the knowledge level of the headquarters [ZH , Z¯H ], the cost of headquarter services pj
and demand for output qj are taken as given. Afterwards, the knowledge level of the
headquarters is endogenized.
The firm faces the following cost minimization problem at each production location j.
The decision on the number of layers of each establishment is a discrete decision.
Cj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj) = min
Lj≥0
CL,j(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj) (2.3)
The firm chooses the number of layers Lj with the minimum costs to produce a given
amount of output at the production location. That is, the optimal number of layers yields
minimal average costs with respect to total establishment output.
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Given the number of layers, the firm optimally chooses the number of employees per layer
and their knowledge level.
CL,j(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj) = min{nlL,j≥0,zlL,j≥0}L−1l=0 ,dj≥0
(
L−1∑
l=0
nlL,jwj(1 + cjzlL,j) + pjdj
)
(2.4)
s.t. n0L,jAj(1− e−λZ¯H ) ≥ qj (2.5)
L−1∑
`=0
z`L,j ≥ ZH (2.6)
L−1∑
`=0
z`L,j ≤ Z¯H (2.7)
nlL,j = n0L,jηe−λ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,j (2.8)
dj = n0L,jηθje−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j (2.9)
where dj denotes the amount of CEO time employed in production at location j.
The firm minimizes the total remuneration per layer and the costs of headquarter inputs.
It is constrained to produce at least qj units of output per establishment (Equation 2.5)
and to assign at least a total knowledge of ZH to the establishment (Equation 2.6) in
order to rule out knowledge gaps between the establishment and the headquarters. In
addition, establishment knowledge is limited to overall firm knowledge Z¯H (Equation 2.7).
The number of employees per layer has to be sufficient to answer all problems that are
sent (Equation 2.8). The number of employees at layer `, n`L,j is calculated as the mass
of problems generated in the lowest layer n0L,j times the probability that the solution to
the problem is not contained in the knowledge sets up to layer `, e−λ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,j , times the
communication costs η. If problems are sent to the headquarters, this calculation has to
be adjusted for the possibility that headquarters are not at the same location by inflating
communication costs with θj (Equation 2.9).Finally, all choice variables are restricted to
be positive.
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Using (2.8) and (2.9), the Lagrangian equation is given by:
Lj = dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
l=0 z
l
L,jwj(1 + cjz0L,j) +
L−1∑
l=1
dj
θj
eλ
∑L−1
k=l z
k
L,jwj(1 + cjzlL,j) + pjdj
+ φj
[
ZH −
L−1∑
l=0
zlL,j
]
+ χj
[
L−1∑
l=0
zlL,j − Z¯H
]
+ ξj
[
qj − Aj(1− e−λZ¯H ) dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
l=0 z
l
L,j
]
.
The multiplier ξj denotes the marginal costs of production. φj denotes the marginal costs
of increasing ZH . ψj does not have an intuitive interpretation.
To endogenize [ZH , Z¯H ], the firm solves
min
ZH ,Z¯H ,{pj}Jj=0
w0(1 + c0(Z¯H − ZH))
+
1∑
j=0
(
Cj(dj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj), ZH , Z¯H , pj)− pjdj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj)
)
(2.10)
s.t. Z¯H ≥ ZH (2.11)
1 =
1∑
j=0
dj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj) (2.12)
The first summand corresponds to the costs that arise for remunerating the CEO. The
second summand denotes the sum of the costs that accrue at the production estab-
lishments, where the costs for headquarter knowledge employed in local production are
deducted because they are an intra-firm transfer. The firm chooses the cost minimizing
amount of overall and CEO knowledge subject to the constraints that CEO knowledge
has to be positive and CEO time has to be used. The former constraint has to be slack
in optimum: if CEO knowledge is zero, the CEO is useless. The latter constraint has to
be binding, as otherwise costly CEO capacity would remain unused.
Appendix B.1.1 provides a formal derivation of the optimal organizational structure.
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2.2.3 Optimal organizational structure
The optimal amount of headquarter time employed at each establishment is determined
by the quantity constraint (2.5):
dj =
ηθjqje
−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j
Aj(1− e−λZ¯H )
(2.13)
The number of employees at layers ` = 0, ..., L − 1 is determined via Equations (2.8)
and (2.9):
n0L,j =
qj
Aj(1− e−λZ¯H )
n`L,j =
qjηe
−λ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,j
Aj(1− e−λZ¯H )
The span of control s`L,j denotes the number of employees in layer ` − 1, ` ≥ 1 that an
employee in layer ` is responsible for. It is determined by the knowledge levels:
s`L,j =
n`−1L,j
n`L,j
= eλz
`−1
L,j (2.14)
To determine establishment knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish whether the know-
ledge constraint (2.6) is binding or slack. The knowledge constraint is binding for at least
one of the establishments. Otherwise, the overlap of knowledge at the two production
locations and the headquarters would never be used in production and is thus superflu-
ous. If the knowledge constraint is binding, establishment knowledge is determined as∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j = ZH . If the constraint is slack, the knowledge level of the establishment is
determined by the following equi-marginality condition:
pj =
cjwj
λθj
eλz
L−1
L,j . (2.15)
The marginal cost of using headquarter services is equal to the marginal costs of saving
headquarter services and employing more knowledge locally in the establishment.
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The knowledge levels in the different layers relate recursively as
z`−1L,j =
1
λ
ln
(
λ
cj
(
1 + cjz`L,j +
cj
λ
))
∀` ∈ (2, ..., L− 1); (2.16)
z0L,j =
1
λ
ln
(
ηλ
cj
(
1 + cjz1L,j +
cj
λ
))
(2.17)
Finally, the marginal costs of production are given by
ξj =
wj(1 + cjz0L,j + 1λcj)
Aj(1− e−λZ¯H )
(2.18)
if the knowledge constraint is slack, and by
ξj =
wj(1 + cjz0L,j + 1λcj)− ηλe−λ
∑L−2
l=0 z
l
L,jwjcj + ηθjpje−λZH
Aj(1− e−λZ¯H )
(2.19)
if it is binding.
The upper bound of headquarter knowledge is determined by
eλZ¯H = 1 +
1∑
j=0
λqjwj
Ajw0c0
(
1 + cjz0L,j +
cj
λ
)
. (2.20)
The lower bound of headquarter knowledge ZH is determined by the constraint
1∑
j=0
dj = 1. (2.21)
2.2.4 Comparative statics
Unless location characteristics are homogeneous, the optimal organizational structure is
heterogeneous across establishments.
Local wages and knowledge acquisition costs have ambiguous effects on the optimal
amount of knowledge at location j = 0 because they affect both the cost of produc-
tion in the establishment and the cost of using the headquarters. θ0 is fixed to 1 by
definition: as the headquarters is located at j = 0, employees in the establishment at
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j = 0 can communicate with the headquarters at cost η. We therefore focus on the
establishment at j = 1 in the following.
Proposition 1. Given the number of layers L1, the optimal knowledge level of estab-
lishment j = 1 is increasing in the mark-up on bilateral communication costs between
the headquarters and the establishment θ1 and decreasing in wages w1 and knowledge
acquisition cost c1.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.2.
Intuitively, higher bilateral communication costs between the headquarters and the es-
tablishment θ1 entail an incentive to assign more knowledge to the establishment to save
on headquarter time. Local knowledge acquisition is more costly if local wages w1 or
knowledge acquisition costs c1 are higher, so the optimal level of knowledge decreases.
Proposition 2. Given the number of layers L1, the difference in knowledge levels z`L,1 − z`−1L,1
is increasing in the mark-up on bilateral communication costs between the headquarters
and the establishment θ1 and decreasing in wages w1. The effect of knowledge acquisition
cost c1 is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.2.
The intuition for this result works as follows. Allocating more knowledge to a group of
employees implies that their remuneration increases. The number of employees per layer
is lower at higher hierarchical layers. It is therefore optimal to increase the knowledge
levels at higher layers overproportionally, as this cushions the increase in production
costs. Factors that increase the overall knowledge level thus increase differences in the
remuneration of employees within the establishment, whereas factors that dampen the
overall knowledge level dampen differences in the remuneration.
Output is the main determinant of the number of hierarchical layers. By analogy to
Proposition 2 in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), the number of hierarchical layers
is increasing in output. Given output, the number of layers is weakly increasing in
the knowledge acquisition costs, but does not depend on wages, labor productivity or
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bilateral communication costs, as these shift total costs, but do not affect the allocation
of knowledge among layers.
As the implications on the number of layers are not testable with the data at hand due
to the lack of information on output, we neglect considerations concerning the number
of layers in the following. Instead, we test the predictions on the optimal allocation of
knowledge through their effect on the remuneration and the span of control of employees,
two observables in our data set.
The remuneration of an employee is wj(1 + cjz`L,j). It is increasing in the bilateral
communication costs as the knowledge level is increasing in the communication costs.
Wages and knowledge acquisition costs exert a direct positive effect on remuneration and
an indirect negative effect via knowledge. The effect of wages and knowledge acquisition
costs on knowledge is therefore not testable via the observed remuneration of an employee,
whereas the effect of communication costs is testable.
The effect of factor input costs are testable via the span of control: the span of control
sj = eλz
`−1
L,j is determined by the knowledge levels. It is increasing in the communication
costs and decreasing in wages and knowledge acquisition costs due to their corresponding
effects on knowledge levels.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Data construction
We construct a novel data set that combines linked employer-employee data at the es-
tablishment level from the German Social Security System with information on the af-
filiation of establishments to firms. We use a cross-section for the year 2007. The data
set contains information on the daily earnings, occupation, part-time or full time status
and sociodemographic characteristics of each employee, and the sector, district and total
number of employees of each establishment at the reference date 30 June. The data ad-
ditionally identify establishments that belong to the same firm and distinguish between
establishments with and without headquarter function.
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We assemble the data from three distinct sources: the Integrated Employment Biogra-
phies (IEB) and the Establishment History Panel (BHP) provided by the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB), and the 2008 wave of the Dafne data base provided by
Bureau van Dijk. As the Dafne data base builds on balance sheet data, the informa-
tion contained is subject to a small time lag. We choose to use the cross-section for
the year 2007 because it therefore has the highest overlap between the Dafne and the
establishment level data.
The Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) are based on records from the German
Social Security System. They contain information on all employees subject to social insur-
ance contributions since 1975 and are updated annually. That is, the data cover nearly all
private sector employees in Germany, but do not cover civil servants and self-employed
workers. The IEB contain information on birth year, gender, nationality, education,
occupation, full time or part-time status and daily earnings of each employee. Jacobeb-
binghaus and Seth (2007) and vom Berge, König, and Seth (2013) provide a detailed
description of the structure of the data.5 The data set, or sub-samples from it, have
been used in many recent labor market studies, amongst others by Card, Heining, and
Kline (2013), Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender (2012), Dustmann, Ludsteck, and
Schönberg (2009) and von Wachter and Bender (2006).
The earnings information is very accurate because it is relevant for social security con-
tributions, but earnings are right censored at the highest level that is subject to social
security contributions.6 We impute the earnings information for censored observations fol-
lowing Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009) and Card, Heining, and Kline (2013).
A detailed description of the imputation procedure is provided in Appendix B.2.1. In-
formation on education is not reported for all periods for every individual, but can be
inferred from other observations on the same individual. We follow imputation procedure
1 in Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Völter (2005) and impute missing values for the edu-
cation variable based on past and future information. We restrict the sample to regular
5The paper by vom Berge, König, and Seth (2013) focuses on the Sample of Integrated Labor Market
Biographies (SIAB), a 2% random sample drawn from the IEB.
6The limit varies from year to year. Values are listed on the homepage of the Research Data Centre of
the Institute for Employment Research: http://fdz.iab.de/de/FDZ_Individual_Data/integrated_
labour_market_biographies/SIAB_Working_Tools.aspx.
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full time employees to ensure comparability across employees, i.e., we drop employees in
apprenticeship training, part-time employment, or with marginal employment.
The Establishment History Panel (BHP) is a panel data set that contains information
on the sector, number of employees and location of all establishments with at least one
dependent employee on 30 June of each year. The data has been collected since 1975.
Following the regulations of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA), an estab-
lishment is defined as the aggregation of all employees in a municipality that are working
for the same company in the same sector.7 Sectors are defined based on the Classification
of Economic Activities of the German Statistical Office for the year 2008. The location
of establishments is provided at the district level. Germany is divided into 412 districts
with around 200,000 inhabitants on average. German districts are roughly compara-
ble to counties in the US. A detailed description of the data set is provided by Gruhl,
Schmucker, and Seth (2012).
For data confidentiality reasons, we are only allowed to use information on establishment
location at the district level in our empirical analysis, but have restricted access to the
full address of establishments reported to the BA for data linkage. We link the Estab-
lishment History Panel and the 2008 wave of the Dafne data base using record-linkage
techniques (Herzog, Scheuren, and Winkler, 2007). We use the company name and the
legal form in the matching process. We exploit a German regulation that requires estab-
lishments to register the name of the company that they belong to in their own name
when they first apply for an establishment identifier.8 With this procedure, we are able
to identify at least one establishment for about 50% of all firms in the 2008 wave of
the Dafne data base. We assume that the establishment located at the firm’s official
address is the headquarter establishment. In the model, the headquarters decides on
problems arising at any of the production locations, so it empirically corresponds to the
highest management unit. To identify the establishment where also the headquarters is
located, we use the address information at the BA through the Institute for Employment
7That is, if a company has several plants in one and the same municipality, all plants in the same
sector are assigned the same establishment identifier. Plants in different sectors have distinct identifiers.
8Establishment identifiers are issued centrally by the BA and used for the social security notifications
of German employers.
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Research and match establishment zip code information with the zip code in the firms’
official address provided in the Dafne data base. For a subset of firms, more than one
establishment is located within the zip code area of the firm’s official address. We drop
these firms, because we otherwise would have to choose the headquarters discretionarily
among the establishments.
Finally, we link the matched establishment-firm data and the IEB based on unique es-
tablishment identifiers provided in the IEB and the BHP.
2.3.2 Variable definition
Hierarchical layers. As demonstrated by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), a
change in the number of layers leads to non-linear adjustments in the knowledge levels
and thus in the remuneration per layer. This implies that only workers in establishments
with the same number of layers are comparable. The layers are crucial to map and inter-
pret the data. We use the occupation information in our data to construct hierarchical
layers (similar to Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). Higher layers acquire the
knowledge to solve problems that occur less frequently in the production process: they
are characterized by higher levels of expertise or higher management responsibilities. The
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO 2008) from the International
Labor Organization (ILO) reflects these considerations and classifies occupations accord-
ing to the level of skill that they require. We use the “major groups” of the ISCO 2008
as basis for the hierarchical layers and assign them as follows:
Layer 3 1 “Managers”
Layer 2 2 “Professionals”
Layer 1 3 “Technicians and associate professionals”
Layer 0 4 “Clerical support workers”
5 “Service and sales workers”
7 “Craft and related trade workers”
8 “Plant and machine operators, and assemblers”
9 “Elementary occupations”
We drop groups 6 and 0 that refer to agricultural and armed forces occupations.
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We map the IAB classification used in our data into the ISCO 2008 classification using
official correspondence tables from the German Federal Employment Agency (BA). The
assignment of occupations to layers is often unique. Whenever more than one layer is
assigned to an occupation, we exploit information on the core area of the occupation
provided by the BA. The layer assigned to the core occupation and the mode layer for
the occupation coincide for more than 85% of the relevant occupations. In the remaining
cases, we match occupations based on the IAB description of occupations and the cor-
respondence tables. We provide a list of these cases and the respective criteria for the
assignment of these cases to the different layers in Appendix B.2.2.
The resulting classification is similar to the classification used by Caliendo, Monte, and
Rossi-Hansberg (2012). As plausibility check, we replicate their Tables 1 and 2. The
results are reported in Appendix B.2.3.
Covariates. We augment the data set using district level information from various
sources as empirical analogs of our model parameters. We approximate communication
costs using geographic distance and the dissimilarity of dialects. We use the average of
the great-circle distances between all municipalities in each district to all municipalities
in the respective other district. This way of measuring distance is convenient because it
assigns a positive distance to all non-headquarter establishments that are located in the
same district as the headquarter establishment. To measure dissimilarity of dialects, we
use the index on dialect similarity developed by Falck, Heblich, Lameli, and Südekum
(2012) multiplied by (-1).9 The measure is based on Georg Wenker’s famous linguistic
atlas. The atlas maps the pronunciation of 66 significant characteristics of the German
language. The dissimilarity of dialects within Germany is sizeable: some of the dialects
share as few as 11 traits. As Falck, Heblich, Lameli, and Südekum (2012) discuss in
detail, the similarity of dialects captures far more than the mere effect of geographic
proximity and is a meaningful measure of cultural similarity that facilitates economic
9The dissimilarity of dialects is measured at the district level, the same level of aggregation as our
data. The geographic delineation of districts in the land Sachsen and the land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
has changed since the publication of their paper. We map old to new districts and use a simple average
of the measure of dialect similarity for these districts.
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exchange. Dialect dissimilarity is thus perfectly apt to approximate communication costs
in our framework.
We use information on labor productivities and wages per hour at the district level
from the German national accounts. We approximate knowledge acquisition costs with
the average distance of the largest municipality to universities, including universities of
applied sciences. We obtain information on the location and establishment date of all
German universities from the Hochschulrektorenkonferenz, the association of universities
and other higher education institutions in Germany. Jäger (2013) demonstrates that
proximity to universities causally increases the probability that people decide to pursue
academic education in Germany. In addition, proximity to universities may help firms
train their employees by cooperating on targeted education measures.
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2.1: Distribution of log number
of employees, firm-level
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of log number
of employees, establishment-level
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Kernel density estimates of the log number of full-time employees at the firm and establishment level, separately for multi-
establishment and single-establishment firms. X-axis: log number of employees, y-axis: density. Data source: Match of
BHP and Dafne, 2007.
11% of the firms in our sample are multi-establishment firms, but they account for 50%
of employment.10 This phenomenon is reflected in Figure 2.1 which displays the distribu-
10The nature of the data does not allow to track the share of multi-establishment firms in the pop-
ulation of firms over time. IEB and BHP are panel data sets, but they are matched to a cross-section
of firm level data from the Dafne data base. This implies that firms that exit before 2008 or enter after
2008 are not observed, so information on the developments over time is subject to attrition bias.
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tion of size, as measured by the number of employees of multi-establishment and single-
establishment firms. The distributions are statistically different (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test).
At the establishment level shown in Figure 2.2, the distribution of sizes is much more
similar. Distributions are still statistically distinct. Both the mean number of employees
per establishment and the variance of establishment size are higher within the group
of multi-establishment firms than within the group of single-establishment firms, but
differences are considerably smaller than differences at the firm level.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of log remuner-
ation, layer 0
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of log remuner-
ation, layer 1
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of log remuner-
ation, layer 2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
2 4 6 8 10
x
Single-establishment firms Multi-establishment firms
Figure 2.6: Distribution of log remuner-
ation, layer 3
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
2 4 6 8 10
x
Single-establishment firms Multi-establishment firms
Kernel density estimates of log imputed daily remuneration per employee by layer, separately for multi-establishment and
single-establishment firms. Layer 0 comprises employees with job classification in ISCO groups 4, 5, 7-9; layer 1 comprises
employees with job classification in ISCO group 3; layer 2 comprises employees with job classification in ISCO group 2;
layer 3 comprises employees with job classification in ISCO group 1. Data source: Match of IEB, BHP and Dafne.
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The average log remuneration paid by multi-establishment firms is significantly higher
than the average log remuneration paid by single-establishment firms. The average log
remuneration at single-establishment firms is 4.508, the corresponding average at multi-
establishment firms is 4.637. The difference seems small, but corresponds to a disparity
of 12.50 Euros per day (4,500 Euro per year), around 12% of average daily remuneration
in our data. The distribution of the remuneration across layers by firm type corre-
sponds to this finding: as Figures 2.3 to 2.6 show, the distributions are pretty similar,
though the distribution of the remuneration is shifted rightwards for multi-establishment
firms compared to single-establishment firms. Distributions are statistically different
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
Table 2.1: Distribution of organizational structures, multi-establishment firms
Layer 0 Layers 0 & 1 Layers 0, 1 & 2 All layers Layers 0 & 3 Other
# of establishments 52,652 11,545 6,131 8,618 5,867 17,333
Share in total # 51.55% 11.30% 6.00% 8.44% 5.74% 16.97%
The table displays the distribution of establishment organizational structure within multi-establishment firms. Establish-
ments are classified as having layer 0 if they employ workers with job classification in ISCO groups 4, 5, 7-9; as having
layer 1 if they employ workers with job classification in ISCO group 3; as having layer 2 if they employ workers with
job classification in ISCO group 2; and as having layer 3 if they employ workers with job classification in ISCO group 1.
Organizational structures that are chosen by at least 5% of establishments are separately displayed.
The distribution of organizational structures across establishments within multi-establish-
ment firms is displayed in Table 2.1. Most establishments of multi-establishment firms
exhibit “regular” organizational structures in a sense that they employ a layer of produc-
tion workers and one to three layers of managers. Less than a quarter of establishments
choose different subsets of layers, such as workers in layer 0 and managers in layer 3.
44.8% of multi-establishment firms are active in only one sector, whereas 55.2% of multi-
establishment firms maintain establishments in different sectors.
Table 2.2 presents the average geographic distance between establishments and the head-
quarter establishment for different numbers of establishments per firm. Firms with fewer
establishments tend to have more proximate establishment networks: average distance
increases in the number of establishments.
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Table 2.2: Average distance of establishments by number of establishments
Firm size, # establishment 2 3 4 5
Mean distance 101.51 137.60 156.31 172.98
# establishments 16,829 6,683 3,805 2,559
The table displays the average geographic distance between establishments and the headquarters at district level for different
numbers of establishments per firm.
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics. The upper part of the table presents statistics at
the employee level. The lower part of the table displays statistics at the establishment-
layer level, the level of the regression analysis. Only multi-establishment firms are con-
tained in the regression sample. Following Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), we exclude
employess younger than age 20 and older than age 60 in the regressions.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics, multi-establishment firms
Employee level N Mean SD Min Med Max
Daily remuneration 3,681,744 111.891 44.417 13.694 107.232 2707.596
Log daily imputed remuneration 3,465,320 4.631 0.525 2.617 4.641 10.308
Age 3,681,744 41.054 10.207 14 41 76
Gender (1=female) 3,681,744 0.237 0.425 0 0 1
Education cat. 1 3,582,276 0.100 0.300 0 0 1
Education cat. 2 3,582,276 0.658 0.474 0 1 1
Education cat. 3 3,582,276 0.080 0.271 0 0 1
Education cat. 4 3,582,276 0.162 0.369 0 0 1
Indicator foreign 3,681,219 0.077 0.267 0 0 1
Tenure in days 3,681,744 3192.406 3051.591 0 2251 11868
Distance, district 2,266,412 106.089 149.252 0 20.372 811.698
Log distance , district 2,266,412 3.170 2.126 0 3.062 6.700
Dissimilarity of dialects, district 2,266,412 −53.047 16.409 −66 −66 −11
Average wages, district 3,681,744 21.620 2.805 13.663 21.655 28.574
Labor productivity, district 3,681,744 46.501 7.970 28.720 45.442 81.322
Mean distance to university, district 3,681,744 301.141 50.283 223.787 287.038 496.960
Number of establishments per firm 3,681,744 131.792 546.842 2 7 3352
Establishment-layer level N Mean SD Min Med Max
Average log daily imputed remuneration 167,269 4.557 0.483 2.617 4.547 7.010
Span of control 70,450 9.539 24.687 0.001 3 1197
Distance, district 99,256 159.761 168.962 0 90.483 811.698
Log distance, district 99,256 3.962 1.9854 0 4.516 6.700
Dissimilarity of dialects, district 99,256 −46.933 17.286 −66 −47 −11
Average wages, district 171,657 20.671 2.733 13.663 20.947 28.574
Labor productivity, district 171,657 44.421 7.862 28.720 43.954 81.322
Mean distance to university, district 171,657 304.652 53.474 223.787 288.715 496.960
Log mean distance to university, district 171,657 5.704 0.170 5.411 5.665 6.209
Number of establishments per firm 171,657 239.776 749.907 2 6 3352
The table displays summary statistics at the employee and the establishment-layer level. The sample is restricted to
multi-establishment firms. The number of observations varies because the remuneration is not imputed for employees with
job classification in ISCO 0 or 6, because education and nationality are missing for some observations, because dialect and
distance can only be assigned when the location of the firm’s headquarters is known and unambiguous and because the
span of control is only defined for higher layers. Information marked as “district” information is matched using information
on the location of the establishment at district level.
Comparing the statistics in the two different panels, we find that aggregating the indi-
vidual remuneration at the establishment layer level decreases the variance in the log
imputed daily remuneration. This is intuitive: the effect of extreme values is dampened
by taking the average. The average and median of the geographic distance and the dis-
similarity of dialects is higher in the lower panel, which indicates that establishments
that are proximate to the headquarters tend to be larger.
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2.4 Empirical strategy
The data allow to test two hypotheses derived from the model:
Testable hypotheses.
1. For a given establishment organizational structure, the remuneration of employ-
ees in layer ` of establishment j increases in the communication costs θ˜ij between
establishment j and the headquarters 0.
2. For a given establishment organizational structure, the span of control of employees
in establishment j increases in the communication costs θ˜ij between establishment j
and the headquarters 0 and decreases in wages w˜j and knowledge acquisition costs c˜j.
The tilde “∼” denotes the empirical analog of a model parameter.
The comparative statics only hold for a given number of layers. It is necessary to en-
sure that all establishments within the regression sample have the same organizational
structure. The downside of this requirement is that many observations are lost in the
empirical analysis. Furthermore, the comparative statics hold given the problem arrival
rate λ. This implies that they are most likely to hold within homogeneous groups of
establishments with similar production processes. For the purpose of our analysis, we
therefore include sector dummies in the pooled regressions.
To test Hypothesis 1, we study the effect of communication costs on the average remu-
neration of employees per layer, which theory predicts to be unambiguously positive. We
use district fixed effects in this set of regressions to capture the effect of wages and know-
ledge acquisition costs. As explained above, these variables affect remuneration. As they
exert both a direct effect on the remuneration and an indirect effect via knowledge, it
is not possible to test their effect on knowledge in the regressions using remuneration as
dependent variable. Using district dummies implies that the effect of labor productivity
on remuneration is not identified either.
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We specify the following regression equations:
y˜`ij = β0 + β1θ˜ij + αs + αj + uij (2.22)
y˜`ij = β0 + β1θ˜ij + αi + αj + uij (2.23)
y˜`ij denotes the average remuneration of employees in layer ` of firm i in the establish-
ment at j. As outlined above, we use bilateral distance and the similarity of dialects as
measures for observed communication costs θ˜ij. αj is a district fixed effect which cap-
tures differences in wages, knowledge acquisition costs, but also labor productivities as
well as other location-specific characteristics that may influence remuneration, but are
omitted in our theoretical analysis. αs is a sector dummy to capture differences across
production processes. We additionally run regressions with firm fixed effects αi. Firms
may be heterogeneous with respect to their overall knowledge level Z¯H that may influence
knowledge allocation at all locations. The firm fixed effect isolates within firm differences
in the dependent variable and the covariates across locations, so results are robust to
heterogeneity across firms.
In a second set of regressions, we focus on the span of control as outcome variable. The
span of control allows to test the effect of all model parameters on knowledge levels. We
analyze the impact of the model parameters on the span of control using
y˜`ij = γ0 + γ1θ˜ij + γ2w˜ij + γ3c˜ij + γ1A˜ij + αs + uij (2.24)
y˜`ij = γ0 + γ1θ˜ij + γ2w˜ij + γ3c˜ij + γ1A˜ij + αi + uij (2.25)
y˜`ij is the span of control of employees in layer ` in firm i at establishment j. θ˜ij, w˜`ij,
c˜`ij and A˜`ij are defined as above. As before, we run both pooled regressions with sector
fixed effects αs and regressions including firm fixed effects αi to take heterogeneity across
firms into account.
We exclude establishments with headquarter function from the analysis. We cannot
distinguish whether an employee of these establishments does or does not have responsi-
bilities for the whole firm. Results including establishments with headquarter functions
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may thus be biased, as employees with establishment-level responsibilities should be re-
munerated differently than employees having firm-level responsibilities.
We run regressions separately for each layer. The theoretical model recommends this
strategy, as the effect of communication costs on knowledge levels at different layers is
not linear. Empirically, we have tested whether pooling layers within establishments is
admissible, i.e. we have tested whether coefficients are statistically different across layers.
The null hypotheses of equal coefficients were rejected at very high significance levels.
It is important to note that the regression results are conditional correlations and do not
suffice to establish causality between the location characteristics and the organization
of multi-establishment firms. Though the regressions control for heterogeneity between
firms, they do not take into account that both location and organizational structure of
the establishments are self-selected. Omitted variables that are relevant for the firm, but
unobservable to us may thus bias the results.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Remuneration
2.5.1.1 Bivariate correlations at employee level
Table 2.4 displays bivariate correlations between log observed remuneration per employee
and communication costs by layer. Communication costs are measured with bilateral
distance and the dissimilarity of dialects. We calculate log distance as the log of observed
distance plus 1 to be able to include single-establishment firms in Panel A. The model
predicts that higher communication costs exert a positive effect on knowledge in an
establishment given local wages and knowledge acquisition costs. The two covariates are
thus expected to have a positive influence on wages.
The left part of the table is based on observed log remuneration. The right part is based
on the residuals of a regression of log remuneration on district dummies, so it takes
regional differences in wages and knowledge acquisition costs into account.
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Table 2.4: Bivariate correlations, log individual remuneration and communication costs
Observed remuneration Residual remuneration
A. All establishments
Layer 0 1 2 3 Layer 0 1 2 3
Log distance 0.065∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ Log distance 0.070∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
Dialect 0.018∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ Dialect 0.031∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
B. Establishments of multi-establishment firms
Layer 0 1 2 3 Layer 0 1 2 3
Log distance -0.148∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ Log distance -0.041∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ -0.005
Dialect -0.102∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ Dialect -0.049∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ -0.036
C. Establishments of multi-establishment firms without headquarter function
Layer 0 1 2 3 Layer 0 1 2 3
Log distance -0.132∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ Log distance -0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ -0.005
Dialect -0.095∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ Dialect -0.044∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗
D. Manufacturing establishments of multi-establishment firms without headquarter function
Layer 0 1 2 3 Layer 0 1 2 3
Log distance -0.139∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ Log distance 0.035∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
Dialect -0.097∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ Dialect 0.024∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
The table displays bivariate correlations between log observed remuneration at the individual level per layer and communi-
cation costs, measured using log distance and the dissimilarity of dialects. We calculate log distance as the log of observed
distance plus 1 to be able to include single-establishment firms in Panel A. The left part of the table uses log observed
remuneration in levels. The right part of the table uses the residual from a linear regression of log observed remuneration
on district dummies. Panel A includes all establishments. Panel B includes only establishments of multi-establishment
firms. Panel C drops establishments with headquarter function. Panel D only uses establishments in the manufacturing
sector. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The first panel (A) displays correlations between the remuneration and communication
costs for all establishments, whether they belong to single- or multi-establishment firms.
Both distance and the dissimilarity of dialects exert a positive effect on observed and
residual remuneration that is significant at the 0.1% level. Panels B to D gradually re-
strict the sample, first to multi-establishment firms, then only to establishments without
headquarter function and finally to establishments without headquarter function in the
manufacturing sector. For these panels, results differ between the two dependent vari-
ables. For observed remuneration, distance and dialect have a significantly negative effect
once only establishments of multi-establishment firms are included in the sample. For
residual remuneration, effects are significantly positive—consistent with expectations—
for layer 1 and 2 throughout panels and for all layers in the lowest panel. The correlations
for imputed remuneration are similar and are displayed in Table B.6 in section B.2.4 of
the Appendix.
These results highlight important patterns in the data. Bivariate correlations flip signs
in the left part of the table once only multi-establishment firms are used in the analysis.
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This observation is a strong indication that multi-establishment firms are a non-random
sub-sample of all firms and that they tend to pay higher remuneration, consistent with
what we saw in Figures 2.3 to 2.6. The positive coefficient of distance in Panel A is likely
to be upward biased: distance is zero for single-establishment firms and is likely to take up
the (omitted) general difference in remuneration between single and multi-establishment
firms. The differences in coefficients estimated on observed and residual remuneration
in Panels B to D are consistent with non-random location of multi-establishment firms.
Distant locations seem to have relatively low wages and knowledge acquisition costs
levels, but given wages and knowledge acquisition costs, employees tend to earn a higher
remuneration. Last, the results in the right part of panel D are most consistent with
model predictions. The size of the effects for layers 1 to 2 increases between the panels C
and D. This implies that differences in sector characteristics as captured by λ in the
model may affect patterns of remuneration: results are stronger if a homogeneous sample
of establishments is chosen.
2.5.1.2 Regressions at the layer level
Table 2.5 displays results of regressions of the average log imputed remuneration per
layer on measures of communication costs and district dummies for different organiza-
tional structures. Exemplarily for all layers, results on the highest layer within each
organizational structure are reported. The table displays two types of results: results
without firm fixed effects, but including sector dummies, and results including firm fixed
effects, but not sector dummies, as prescribed by the model.
We find that results are consistent with model predictions in regressions without firm
fixed effects, except for organizations with all layers where coefficients are insignificantly
different from zero. Both distance and dissimilarity of dialects exert a positive effect
that is significant at the 1% level for organizations with layer 0 and layers 0 and 1
and at the 5% level for organizations with layers 0 to 2. Quantitatively, an increase
in distance by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in remuneration
by 0.126-0.158 standard deviations. The effect of an increase in the dissimilarity of
dialects by one standard deviation is similar despite the difference in coefficient sizes, as
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Table 2.5: Regression results for the average remuneration per layer
Layer 0 Layer 0 & 1 Layer 0, 1 & 2 All layers
Highest layer 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3
Log distance 0.033∗∗∗ 0.001 0.025∗∗ −0.001 0.034∗ 0.024+ −0.008 −0.001
(0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
R-squared 0.345 0.047 0.568 0.211 0.641 0.352 0.473 0.331
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y N Y
District dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector dummies Y N Y N Y N Y N
# firms 2,243 2,243 518 518 319 319 364 364
# observations 17,138 17,138 2,499 2,499 1,308 1,308 1,328 1,328
Dissimilarity of dialects 0.002∗∗ −0.000 0.002∗∗ −0.001 0.002∗ 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.345 0.047 0.568 0.212 0.641 0.350 0.472 0.331
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y N Y
District dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector dummies Y N Y N Y N Y N
# firms 2,243 2,243 518 518 319 319 364 364
# observations 17,138 17,138 2,499 2,499 1,308 1,308 1,328 1,328
The table displays the results of regressions of average log imputed daily remuneration per layer on measures of commu-
nication costs, district dummies and sector dummies or firm fixed effects by establishments grouped according to their
organizational structure. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
the variation in dissimilarity of dialects is larger than the variation in log distance by
one order of magnitude. Once firm fixed effects are included, coefficients are generally
insignificantly different from zero, except for establishments with layers 0 to 2. For these
establishments, the effect of distance is significantly positive at the 10% level and similar
in magnitude as the coefficient in the pooled regression. This finding is consistent with
ex-ante expectations.
Restricting the sample to manufacturing firms leaves less than 700 observations per group.
Results are generally insignificant, so we do not report them here.
The pattern of coefficients demonstrates that firms which invest in locations with higher
bilateral communication costs tend to pay higher remuneration. The effect is not robust
to the inclusion of firm fixed effects, except for establishments with layers 0 to 2, so it
is difficult to distinguish between communication costs and firm heterogeneity as driving
force of the positive coefficients in pooled regressions. The lack of significance in the fixed
effects regressions may be attributable to the small number of establishments that are
used in the analysis. On average, firms included in the sample have only 4 to 8 establish-
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ments, so a high degree of within-firm variation in remuneration between establishments
is required to obtain a strong effect in the fixed effects regression. Our current technique
to identify the headquarter establishment excludes all firms with several establishments
in the headquarter zip code area. This implies that particularly those firms with high
degrees of variation, i.e. with establishments that are very proximate and establishments
at more distant locations, are excluded from the sample. We therefore intend to improve
the procedure in future work. Alternatively, it is possible that firms are not able to
support high degrees of within-firm heterogeneity in remuneration for similar activities,
either due to institutional constraints such as union agreements or due to equity concerns
of their employees.
We next analyze the second establishment characteristic, the span of control.
2.5.2 Span of control
Analyzing the span of control allows to assess both the effect of differences in commu-
nication costs and the impact of other location characteristics such as local wages or
knowledge acquisition costs.
Table 2.6 presents the regression results. The table is structured similarly to Table 2.5.
Exemplarily, the regression results for the highest layer are displayed for each organi-
zational structure. We distinguish organizational structures by the number of layers to
obtain a larger sample for each regression. We tested whether pooling establishments
with the same number of layers, but a different set of layers (e.g. layers 0 and 1 or
layers 0 and 2) is admissible, and failed to reject the null of equal coefficients.
The regression results draw an inconclusive picture. The effect of distance and the dis-
similarity of dialects is significantly negative for establishments with two layers, but
significantly positive for establishments with three layers. It is insignificant in regressions
for establishments with all layers. Wages and labor productivity do not have a significant
effect. The knowledge acquisition costs are mostly insignificant, but exert a significantly
positive effect on the span of control of employees in the highest layer of establishments
with all layers, inconsistent with model predictions.
86
Knowledge transmission costs and multi-establishment firms
Table 2.6: Regression results for the span of control
2 Layers 3 Layers All layers
1 1 2 2 3 3
Log distance to HQ −0.822+ −0.783∗ 0.749∗ 0.547 −0.923 −1.200
(0.427) (0.390) (0.364) (0.519) (1.119) (1.425)
Hourly wages 0.158 0.232 0.181 −0.022 −0.249 0.140
(0.167) (0.179) (0.145) (0.081) (0.589) (0.633)
Hourly labor productivity 0.016 0.020 0.073 0.046 0.204 0.067
(0.055) (0.049) (0.050) (0.044) (0.239) (0.277)
Log average distance 1.592 3.136 1.689 1.691 17.124∗ 15.492∗
to university (1.802) (2.104) (1.530) (1.049) (8.050) (7.715)
Constant 5.981 −8.555 −21.340+ −10.250 −97.961∗ −78.202+
(10.804) (12.623) (11.733) (8.544) (46.293) (40.797)
R-squared 0.245 0.003 0.057 0.003 0.127 0.010
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y
Sector dummies Y N Y N Y N
# firms 937 937 525 525 364 364
# observations 4, 838 4, 838 2, 305 2, 305 1, 328 1, 328
Dissimilarity of dialects −0.052+ −0.054∗ 0.052+ 0.036 −0.084 −0.156
(0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.085) (0.101)
Hourly wages 0.192 0.270 0.159 −0.038 −0.227 0.154
(0.168) (0.185) (0.139) (0.086) (0.566) (0.604)
Hourly labor productivity 0.016 0.020 0.072 0.044 0.208 0.068
(0.055) (0.049) (0.050) (0.043) (0.245) (0.283)
Log average distance 0.534 2.216 2.768 2.423+ 15.567∗ 13.238∗
to university (1.863) (2.085) (1.765) (1.463) (7.675) (6.475)
Constant −5.709 −10.119 −21.780+ −9.879 −93.827∗ −77.426+
(11.510) (12.860) (12.069) (8.264) (46.702) (40.175)
R-squared 0.245 0.003 0.057 0.003 0.127 0.013
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y
Sector dummies Y N Y N Y N
# firms 937 937 525 525 364 364
# observations 4, 838 4, 838 2, 305 2, 305 1, 328 1, 328
Dependent variable: span of control, defined as sj = n`−1L,j /n
`
L,j . Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Overall, it is thus difficult to draw conclusions based on the regressions on the span of
control. We have explored restricting the sample to manufacturing establishments and
thus to a more homogeneous group of firms, and report the results of these regressions
in Table B.7 in section B.2.4 of the Appendix. A larger average distance to universities
is associated with a lower span of control for establishments with two layers in these
regressions, as predicted by the model. The sample size is very small however, with
less than 150 firms per group. Significance levels are thus even lower than in the main
regressions.
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2.6 Discussion
The results in the previous section demonstrate that knowledge transmission costs matter
not only at the macro level and internationally, but also at the firm level and within
countries. The evidence indicates that multi-establishment firms adapt the organizational
structure of each single establishments to the communication costs with the headquarters
as well as to local factor input costs. These findings help to understand the structure
of multi-establishment firms’ investment, which is of major importance as these firms
account for a significant share of the economy, as argued in subsection 2.3.3 and by
Bernard and Jensen (2007).
In addition, the results in this chapter contribute to a better understanding of the het-
erogeneity in remuneration of observationally equivalent workers at different employers,
so-called employer wage premiums. Despite a large body of literature, the causes and
mechanisms behind these premiums are still little understood. At the same time, the well-
documented increase in wage inequality across countries and long-term consequences of
inequality call for research on the wage setting process to assess the need and scope of
policy interventions (e.g. Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg, 2009; Card, Heining, and
Kline, 2013). In line with Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), this chapter argues that
understanding the organization of firms and the function of individual employees within
firms is a fruitful avenue to comprehend some factors underlying the empirical evidence.
Table 2.7 displays summary statistics on the observed log imputed remuneration (Panel A)
and the residual remuneration (Panel B) from a regression of log imputed remuner-
ation on district dummies. Three interesting facts emerge, which underline that un-
derstanding firms’ organization may help understand variation in remuneration: first,
multi-establishment firms pay higher remuneration on average than single-establishment
firms (Panel A). Second, the between-variation in residual log remuneration (Panel B.1,
column 4) is larger than the within variation for all firms (Panel B.1, column 5), but
smaller than the within variation for multi-establishment firms. To put it differently, the
remuneration varies more strongly within multi-establishment firms than between them.
Third, this effect is reversed at the establishment level (Panel B.2). The variation between
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Table 2.7: Within and between variation in remuneration across firm groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm group N Mean SD overall SD between SD within
A. Observed log imputed remuneration
Overall 7,142,649 4.562 0.511 0.405 0.333
Multi-establishment firms 3,483,767 4.630 0.526 0.370 0.345
B. Residual log imputed remuneration (covariates: district dummies)
B.1. Firm level
Overall 6,869,943 0 0.391 0.354 0.301
Multi-establishment firms 3,386,088 0 0.390 0.292 0.313
B.2. Establishment level
Overall 6,869,943 0 0.391 0.369 0.290
Multi-establishment firms 3,386,088 0 0.390 0.371 0.291
The table displays summary statistics on variation between and within firms and establishments by firm groups. Panel A
displays the mean of the observed log imputed remuneration for all and multi-establishment firms as well as the measures
on the overall variance, the variance between firms and the variance within firms. Panel B displays the same measures for
the residuals from a regression of log imputed remuneration on district dummies. Panel B distinguishes variation between
and within firms from variation between and within establishments.
and within establishments is virtually identical for both the overall group of firms and the
group of multi-establishment firms. Variation between establishments plays a relatively
larger role than variation within establishments. We expect that a better understanding
of the organizational structure of firms helps to interpret these patterns.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter develops a model of the optimal organizational structure of multi-establishment
firms. The model postulates that the optimal organizational structure of establishments
within multi-establishment firms depends on the bilateral costs of communication between
an establishment and the headquarters of the firm as well as local factor input costs. Us-
ing a novel data set with linked employer-employee data on German multi-establishment
firms, we provide empirical evidence that is in line with theoretical predictions.
Notwithstanding technological progress in the communication sector, communication
costs matter. With the increasing importance of knowledge for today’s economies and
the ongoing innovations in communication technologies, knowledge transmission within
and across countries and firms thus remains a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Chapter 3
Multinational firms and tax havens∗
3.1 Introduction
Tax havens are typically small, well-governed states that impose low or zero tax rates on
foreign investors (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are
widely believed to use tax havens to avoid taxation. Sophisticated tax planning strategies
involving tax havens have received considerable attention in the media (e.g. Drucker, 2010;
The Economist, 2012; Lucas, Jopson, and Houlder, 2012), and tax havens have repeatedly
been in the focus of national and international policy measures. To name a few examples,
the OECD launched the “Initiative on Harmful Tax Competition” in 1998 to pressure
tax havens to abolish harmful tax provisions and practices. France announced plans to
introduce a 50% tax on income earned by French affiliates in tax havens in February
2010. The U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means held a background hearing on
the transfer pricing practices of U.S. taxpayers, with an emphasis on income reallocation
to offshore tax havens.1 Most recently, the United Kingdom Parliament Government
Accounts Committee held widely publicized hearings in 2012 concerning the use of tax
havens by foreign multinational firms operating in Britain, and partly as a consequence
∗This chapter is based on joint work with James R. Hines Jr. and Monika Schnitzer.
1The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation prepared a detailed report including six case studies
of the tax avoidance practices of large US firms (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010).
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the G-20 finance ministers in their February 2013 meeting pledged to take collective
action to develop measures to address tax base erosion and profit shifting.
What drives the policy interest is the concern that tax havens are widely used to avoid
tax obligations, particularly those due to high-tax countries. It is clear, however, that
corporations cannot use tax haven operations to avoid taxes easily and comprehensively,
as reflected in persistent significant corporate tax collections by high-tax countries and the
fact that many multinational firms choose not to have tax haven affiliates. Consequently
it may be the case that substantial tax avoidance opportunities through the use of tax
haven operations are selectively available only to certain firms, industries, or activities.
The purpose of the final chapter of this thesis is to identify factors associated with a
firm’s demand for tax haven operations, using data on German multinational firms. The
evidence indicates that, among manufacturing firms, those that are larger and more
productive are the most likely to have tax haven affiliates. Notably, manufacturing firms
whose non-haven foreign operations are located in high-tax countries are more likely than
others to have tax haven affiliates. These patterns are consistent with a simple model of
profit reallocation, in which some firms find that the benefits of being able to reallocate
income from high-tax jurisdictions exceeds the cost of establishing tax haven affiliates -
whereas other multinational firms, with fewer profits to reallocate or fewer taxes to save,
do not. Among firms in service industries tax haven use is less closely associated with
high foreign tax rates, quite possibly reflecting the more limited scope for taxable income
reallocation among firms in service industries. Much of the available evidence on the
determinants of tax haven use by multinational firms comes from studies of U.S. firms,
whose tax treatment differs from those of firms based in almost any other major capital
exporting country. Income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms is subject to U.S.
taxation when repatriated, at which time U.S. taxpayers can claim credits for income
taxes paid to foreign governments. This system reduces the incentive to use tax haven
operations to avoid foreign taxes, since foreign tax reductions entail fewer foreign tax
credits, and therefore greater U.S. tax liability, when income is ultimately repatriated.
The system does, however, encourage the use of tax havens to the extent that they
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facilitate deferral of home country taxes, such as by serving as coordination centers to
direct foreign profits to new foreign investments.
Germany taxes only 5 percent of the active foreign business profits of its resident corpora-
tions.2 In this respect the German tax system is similar to those in the United Kingdom,
Japan, France, Canada, Italy, and most OECD countries, particularly the major capital
exporters. German firms consequently have strong incentives to avoid foreign taxes, since
foreign tax savings do not entail greater home country taxes when income is repatriated.
Furthermore, German firms do not have incentives to structure their foreign operations
in ways that avoid repatriating income. Therefore, the tax incentives for German firms
to establish tax haven affiliates are likely to differ from those of U.S. firms, and bear
strong similarities to those of other G-7 and OECD firms. To gauge the impact of foreign
taxation on tax haven investment by German firms, the chapter estimates a linear prob-
ability model of tax haven investment using the sizes of a firm’s foreign and domestic
activities, and the firm’s R&D intensity, as additional control variables. The empirical
strategy uses the panel nature of the data to account for the fact that the tax rates a
firm faces at its foreign locations may be endogenous to its decision to invest in a tax
haven: specifically, the estimation relies on statutory foreign tax changes subsequent to
a base year. The estimates indicate that a one percentage point higher foreign tax rate is
associated with a 0.3 percentage point greater likelihood of having a tax haven affiliate,
presumably reflecting the greater benefit of reallocating taxable income from high-tax
countries.
This chapter is related to two strands of the literature, one on the use of tax havens
by multinational firms, and the other on profit reallocation. Harris, Morck, Slemrod,
and Yeung (1993) use a five-year panel on 200 large U.S. manufacturing firms and find
that U.S. tax liabilities of U.S. firms holding affiliates in Ireland or one of the four low
tax “dragon” Asian countries are systematically lower than those of U.S. firms without
such activities. Hines and Rice (1994) analyze a cross-section of country level data
on the activities of U.S. multinational firms, finding that U.S. multinationals report
disproportionate shares of profits in tax havens, which suggests that income may be
2For details on the taxation of foreign profits of German multinational firms, please refer to Ap-
pendix C.2.
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reallocated for tax purposes. Grubert and Slemrod (1998) use a cross-section of data and
estimate a joint model of the investment and profit shifting decision of U.S. multinationals
in Puerto Rico which, due to its special status, can serve as a tax haven for U.S. firms.
They find that firms with intangible assets are more likely than others to invest in Puerto
Rico.
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006), who are closest to our analysis, use an affiliate-level
data set on U.S. multinationals’ foreign activities in four years between 1982 and 1999.
They estimate a logit model of tax haven investment given parent characteristics and
take into account the endogeneity of the foreign non-haven tax rate due to simultaneity
of a parent’s location decisions. They find a negative effect of the average foreign non-
haven tax rate on the probability of investing in a tax haven, interpreting their finding
as evidence of the impact of incentives induced by the ability to defer home country
taxation of unrepatriated foreign profits. Thus, it is particularly interesting to compare
the U.S. evidence with the tax haven investment behavior of firms that are subject to a
tax exemption regime, as German firms are, which have clear incentives to use tax haven
operations to reallocate taxable income.
The literature on international profit shifting is vast, and for brevity, we will restrict our
review to a few recent examples for the different strands of the literature. That taxes
matter for profit shifting of international firms has been documented by Huizinga and
Laeven (2008), amongst others. They use a cross-section of European MNEs and find
evidence for substantial profit shifting between different countries in Europe, which fits
international profit shifting incentives that arise from tax differences both between the
parent and host country and among different affiliate locations. Weichenrieder (2009)
analyzes a panel data set of German inbound and outbound FDI and identifies empirical
patterns that are consistent with profit shifting in both cases.
With respect to different profit shifting strategies, Clausing (2001, 2003, 2006) provides
empirical evidence that taxes exert a substantial impact on transfer prices and intra-firm
trade flows of U.S. firms. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) offer evidence from a panel data
set of European firms that MNEs prefer locating intangible assets at low-tax locations,
arguably doing so because they are able to choose favorable transfer prices for intangible
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assets. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) report similar findings with respect to patent location
within MNEs. Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg, and Winner (2010) compare the debt-to-asset
ratios of domestically and foreign owned European firms and identify a gap in the ratios
which is systematically related to corporate tax rates. Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber,
and Wamser (2009) provide further evidence on tax-motivated choice of capital structure
using a panel data set of German MNEs. Using the same data, Buettner and Wamser
(2013) analyse the use of intrafirm-loans for profit shifting, but find that they have rather
small tax revenue effects. Weichenrieder and Mintz (2010) as well as Wamser (2011)
show, using data on German MNEs, that firms tactically locate their direct and indirect
affiliates and strategically use ownership chains in a way that facilitates tax avoidance.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we present our theoretical model and derive
the hypotheses for our empirical analysis. Section 3.3 describes the data used in the
analysis and provides descriptive statistics; section 3.4 outlines our empirical approach.
Section 3.5 summarizes our regression results, section 3.6 provides some robustness checks
and section 3.7 discusses the implications. The last section concludes.
3.2 Incentives to establish tax haven operations
In this section we lay out a stylized theoretical framework to describe the incentives of
a multinational firm to invest in a tax haven and to derive the empirical predictions to
be tested later on. For this purpose, we study a multinational firm that can invest in
a range of countries i = 0, ..., n, including a tax haven, which is denoted as country 0.
Starting a foreign affiliate involves fixed set-up cost ci. Let ρi denote before-tax profits
earned in country i by the affiliate once it is installed. Reported profits are taxed at rate
τi in country i. Without loss of generality we assume that τ0 = 0, i.e. there is no taxation
in the tax haven.
Firms can reallocate an amount ψi of their actual profits in country i to a country that
taxes reported profits at a lower tax rate, most notably to the tax haven country, for
example by adjusting their transfer prices. This is possible only at some cost. Firms
may need to set up additional facilities to make transfer prices seem plausible, inefficient
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relocation of production and intra-firm trade may be needed to arrange income reallo-
cation, and transaction costs are incurred, like legal expenses. We assume that income
reallocation gets increasingly expensive as the amount reallocated increases relative to
income earned in country i. Following Hines and Rice (1994), these income reallocation
costs are assumed to be (a/2)(ψi2/ρi).3 Parameter a captures how much the cost of
income reallocation increases with the amount reallocated. Note that a is a firm-specific
parameter because income reallocation costs vary with firm-specific characteristics such
as the R&D intensity of a firm. As indicated above, firms with more R&D activities
and larger intangible assets have been shown to be more easily able to reallocate income
due to the lack of comparable market prices. The reported profit in country i, pii, after
incurring fixed cost ci, is thus
pii = ρi − ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
. (3.1)
Consider now the option of setting up an affiliate in a tax haven at cost c0. To save on
notation, we set ρ0 = 0 and let c0 capture the net cost of investing in a tax haven, after
deducting any profits that arise genuinely in this country. Note that due to anti-deferral
regulations, firms may have to incur considerable fixed costs to set up a tax haven affiliate
that may be used for profit reallocation purposes.4 For c0 < 0, the multinational has an
interest in investing in a tax haven country, and does so, independent of investments in
other countries. This interest could arise from plans to reallocate income from the home
country. However, since our data set contains information on parent firms from only one
home country it is not possible to gauge the impact of this tax incentive empirically.
Thus, we focus on multinationals that invest in non-haven countries as well.
In order to evaluate the incentive to invest in a tax haven, consider first the situation of
a multinational with a tax haven affiliate. The firm chooses in which other countries to
locate affiliates and how much of their profits to reallocate to the tax haven. Thus, the
investor’s maximization problem, given that it has a tax haven affiliate, is
3For simplicity, we assume that the cost of reallocating income to a tax haven and to another non-
haven country are equal. This assumption does not affect the main intuition of the model, but renders
notation far more tractable.
4For details on the anti-deferral regulations, please refer to Appendix C.2.
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max
di,ψi
n∑
i=1
di
[
ψi + (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
)− ci
]
(3.2)
with di ∈ {0, 1}, s.t.
ρi − ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n . (3.3)
The following proposition describes the solution to this maximization problem.
Proposition 1. Suppose the investor has a tax haven affiliate. Then the optimal amount
of profit shifting is
ψ∗thi =
τiρi
a(1− τi) if τi ≤ 1−
√
1
2a+ 1 (3.4)
and
ψ¯i =
ρi
a
(√
2a+ 1− 1
)
otherwise. (3.5)
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
For ease of presentation, in the following we restrict consideration to cases in which the
parameter condition in Equation (3.4) is satisfied such that condition (3.3) holds for the
optimal ψ∗thi , and discuss deviations only when necessary for the results.
Let countries be numbered such that country i = 1 yields the highest after-tax profit,
including the fixed cost of setting up the affiliate, and country i = n yields the lowest
profit. Then the multinational chooses di = 1 for all countries i = 1, ..., n˜, where n˜ is
determined by the condition
ψn˜ + (1− τn˜)(ρn˜ − ψn˜ − a2
ψ2n˜
ρn˜
)− cn˜ ≥ 0
> ψn˜+1 + (1− τn˜+1)(ρn˜+1 − ψn˜+1 − a2
ψ2n˜+1
ρn˜+1
)− cn˜+1 . (3.6)
Consider now the multinational’s situation if it has no tax haven affiliate. In this case,
profit-shifting has to be directed to the country charging the lowest tax rate among those
in which the multinational holds an affiliate.5 Let τ denote the minimum of all tax rates
5We assume for simplicity that the multinational shifts profits to one country only. Giving up this
assumption would yield computation far more complicated, but would not affect our results qualitatively.
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charged in countries in which the multinational invests. In Appendix C.3, we derive the
optimal amount of profit shifting ψ∗nthi and we describe the optimal number of countries
nˆ in which to set up a foreign affiliate. It is straightforward to show that n˜ ≥ nˆ, since the
profits realized from each country are potentially larger if it is possible to reduce taxes
by reallocating income to a tax haven.
For the multinational, investing in a tax haven is worth the set up cost c0 if and only if
it results in higher net profits. This incentive is captured in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. Let Incth denote the net benefit (“Incentive”) from investing in a tax
haven. Then investing in a tax haven is optimal if and only if this incentive is positive,
i.e.
Incth ≡
nˆ∑
i=1
ρiτ(2τi − τ)
2a(1− τi) +
n˜∑
i=nˆ+1
[
(1− τi)ρi + τi
2ρi
2a(1− τi) − ci
]
− c0 > 0. (3.7)
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
To determine the impact of tax rates we have to distinguish the tax rates in countries
in which the multinational is active independent of a tax haven investment versus those
that only are attractive with a tax haven. Simple inspection of Incth yields the following
comparative statics.
dIncth
dτi
= ρiτ(2− τ)2a(1− τi)2 > 0 ∀i = 1, ..., nˆ . (3.8)
Thus, the higher are the tax rates in countries in which the multinational is active even
without a tax haven investment, the more profitable it becomes to invest in a tax haven.
Furthermore,
d2Incth
dτidρi
= τ(2− τ)2a(1− τi)2 > 0 ∀i = 1, ..., nˆ . (3.9)
This shows that the effect of a foreign tax rate is sensitive to the profitability of the
respective affiliate, with higher profits increasing the effect of the foreign tax rate. In
addition,
d2Incth
dτida
= − ρiτ(2− τ)2a2(1− τi)2 < 0 ∀i = 1, ..., nˆ . (3.10)
97
Multinational firms and tax havens
Thus, the more difficult profit-shifting is for the multinational, the less sensitive will be
its reaction to foreign tax rate changes.
It is instructive to evaluate the effect of tax changes in countries in which the multinational
is active only in case of a tax haven investment.
dIncth
dτi
= −ρi + τi(2−τi)ρi2a(1−τi)2 < 0 ∀i = nˆ+ 1, ..., n˜ ∀τi ≤ 1−
√
1
2a+ 1 , (3.11)
dIncth
dτi
= 0 ∀i = nˆ+ 1, ..., n˜ ∀τi > 1−
√
1
2a+ 1 . (3.12)
This result has the notable implication that a multinational may in fact be tempted to
invest in a tax haven following a tax reduction in a country in which it has not been
present so far. This counterintuitive situation can arise if this tax reduction makes an
investment in this country attractive and hence adds to the potential base for profit
shifting.
Inspection of Equation (3.7) further shows that firms in industries with lower fixed costs
c0 of establishing tax haven affiliates are more likely than others to have haven affiliates.
Note that the fixed cost c0 should be interpreted as the net cost of establishing a tax haven
affiliate to use for tax avoidance purposes. If a tax haven affiliate would be profitable in
the course of ordinary business activity that does not include any tax-motivated income
reallocation, then c0 would be negative. Hence firms in industries in which tax haven
operations can serve the dual function of facilitating profit reallocation and generating
ordinary business returns effectively face lower costs of engaging in profit reallocation
through havens, and are therefore likely to do more of it.
We can summarize these results in the following two empirical predictions, based on
Equations (3.8) and (3.10), respectively: (i) The larger the tax rate in a foreign non-
haven country in which the multinational holds an affiliate, the stronger is the incentive
and hence the more likely is it for a multinational to invest in a tax haven. (ii) The less
costly it is to shift profits to a tax haven country, the stronger is the influence of foreign
taxation on a multinational firm’s tax haven investment.
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Testing Prediction (i): When attempting to identify the effect of foreign tax rates on
the tax haven decision, we need to take into account that the multinational is potentially
engaged in several countries and that therefore the tax rates of all these countries matter.
As Equation (3.9) shows, they do so to a different extent, however, depending on the
profitability of the individual affiliates. We capture this by investigating the impact
of the average non-haven tax rate, where all the foreign tax rates are weighted by the
profitability of the individual affiliate. If the multinational has not invested in a tax
haven, this average foreign tax rate is determined by the tax rates in countries i = 1, ..., nˆ
and is given by ∑nˆ
i=1 τiρi∑nˆ
i=1 ρi
. (3.13)
In our empirical analysis we encounter the difficulty that we are not able to observe the
actual profits ρi in country i, only reported after-tax profits (1 − τi)pii. These reported
profits are distorted due to taxation and income reallocation. In case of a tax haven
investment they are given by
(1− τi)pii = (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
) = (1− τi)
[
1− τi(2− τi)2a(1− τi)2
]
ρi . (3.14)
Inspection shows that this distortion is the higher the higher the country’s tax rate τi.
Thus, we require appropriate proxies to capture the effect of an affiliate’s profitability
on the decision to invest in a tax haven. We will proxy the affiliate’s profitability by the
number of employees, as discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.
Furthermore, we need to account for the fact that the average foreign tax rate we observe
is potentially affected by the very fact whether the multinational holds a tax haven
affiliate. The tax haven investment may make it profitable to invest in foreign countries
i = nˆ+ 1, ..., n˜, that would not have been attractive destinations for investments without
the income reallocation opportunities created by the tax haven investment. Consider a
change in tax rates ∆i ≥ 0 in countries i = 1, ..., n˜ such that the investor chooses to
invest in a tax haven after this change in tax rates, but would not do so before. Both an
increase in the tax rates at locations i = 1, ..., nˆ where the multinational already holds
an affiliate and a decrease in the tax rates at locations i = nˆ + 1, ..., n˜ which become
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attractive only after tax haven investment could render tax haven investment optimal.
The average non-haven tax rate for the investor changes from the status quo described
in Equation (3.13) to the new average non-haven tax rate
∑n˜
i=1(τi + ∆i)ρi∑n˜
i=1 ρi
. (3.15)
Taking the difference between (3.15) and (3.13) yields the observed change in the non-
haven average tax rate which can be rewritten as
∑nˆ
i=1 ∆iρi∑n˜
i=1 ρi
+
∑n˜
i=nˆ+1 ρi
(∑n˜
i=nˆ+1(τiρi+∆iρi)∑n˜
i=nˆ+1 ρi
−
∑nˆ
i=1 τiρi∑nˆ
i=1 ρi
)
∑n˜
i=1 ρi
. (3.16)
In our empirical analysis we are interested in identifying the effect of exogenous changes
in tax rates in countries i = 1, ..., nˆ, i.e. countries in which the multinational would invest
even without a tax haven affiliate. This exogenous change in tax rates is captured by
the first term. As shown in Equation (3.8) above, investing in a tax haven is positively
influenced by an increase in the tax rates of the countries in which the multinational
already holds affiliates. Thus, when estimating the impact of foreign tax rates, higher
tax rates in countries in which a multinational firm would invest under any circumstances
should stimulate greater demand for tax haven affiliates.
The second term captures the change in the observed non-haven tax rate that is due to
endogeneity of the multinational’s investment decision. Evaluating the numerator of the
second term we find that the observed change in the average non-haven tax rate exceeds
the change of interest if the new affiliates the multinational opens due to the tax haven
investment are located in countries that exhibit on average higher tax rates than the
previous average tax rate, and conversely.
This has important implications for the interpretation of the causal effects of tax changes.
In particular, OLS results overestimate the true effects, as captured by the IV estimates,
if the tax rates at the firm’s new locations increase the firm’s average foreign non-haven
tax rate, and underestimate the true effects if the tax rates faced at the new locations
are lower than the previous average foreign non-haven tax rate.
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Analogously, if the multinational firm decides to stop being active in the tax haven, the
observed change in the average foreign non-haven tax rate may differ from the causal
change because of subsequent adjustments in its non-haven locations. Leaving the tax
haven after changes in foreign non-haven tax rates may be optimal if the fixed costs of
investing there c0 have to be paid in every period, or else if part of the fixed costs can be
recovered upon exit.
To account for this potential endogeneity of the observed tax rate, we employ an in-
strumentation strategy that holds the locations of the multinationals’ foreign non-haven
affiliates fixed to the ones of the starting period of our sample and restricts attention to
changes in observed tax rates for these locations only.
Testing Prediction (ii): The second prediction relates the impact of foreign taxation
on tax haven investment to the cost of shifting profits. Average foreign tax rates and
values of the shifting cost parameter are likely to differ between firms, and may vary
systematically between industries. Industries may differ in average values of the shifting
cost parameter a, reflecting differences in the importance of intangible assets and other
business features that facilitate profit reallocation; and industries may also differ in the
extent to which a varies among firms in the industry. Differentiating (3.10) with respect
to a indicates that:
d3Incth
dτid2a
= ρiτ(2− τ)
a3(1− τi)2 > 0 (3.17)
Since the expression in (3.17) is positive, it follows that the effect of a on dInc
dτi
is nonlinear,
and more specifically, that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of a produces a
greater average value of dInc
dτi
. Consequently, industries in which firms have very different
costs of profit reallocation should be expected to display greater average sensitivity of
tax haven demand to non-haven tax rates than do other industries, even though average
costs of profit reallocation do not differ.
The second prediction cannot be tested directly with the available data, since it is not
possible to measure firm-specific income reallocation costs. Instead, we use firm-fixed
effects in the baseline econometric analysis to control for differences in marginal costs of
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income reallocation and distinguish firms by industrial sectors in an attempt to proxy for
cost differences that vary with industry.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
Our analysis is based on the Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi) provided by the
Bundesbank, the German central bank. We use the information on outward foreign
direct investment by German companies. The database consists of a panel of yearly
information on the foreign affiliates of German firms for the period from 1996 until 2008.
By the German Foreign Trade and Payment Regulation (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung),
any resident who holds shares or voting rights of at least 10% in a company with a
balance sheet total of more than 3 million euro is obliged to report information on the
financial characteristics of these affiliates to the Bundesbank (Lipponer, 2009).6 The
same information has to be provided on branches or permanent establishments abroad
if their operating assets exceed 3 million euro. The comprehensiveness of these data
suggests that they can be used to draw a very reliable picture of the foreign investment
of German companies.
The MiDi data include information on parent companies only for the years 2002 to 2008,
so the analysis is restricted to these years. During the 2002-2008 period, the MiDi
contains 173,312 affiliate-year observations. Some affiliates are reported several times,
because multiple investors hold participating interests in them. We focus our analysis on
directly held foreign affiliates and thus abstract from more complex incentive structures
that may exist in multi-level holding chains.7 This limits the analysis to 117,585 affiliate-
year observations.
For consistency across parents, we delete 218 observations for which the degree of partic-
ipation of the parent is smaller than the reporting requirement of 10%. In addition, we
drop observations on parents in a number of sectors, including government institutions
6The reporting thresholds have changed several times in the past. We only refer to the reporting
threshold as of 2002 that is relevant to us.
7For an in-depth discussion of the complex determinants of ownership chains, see Weichenrieder and
Mintz (2010).
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and private households. We drop observations on parents in the financial sector, because
they are subject to special balancing requirements, and the reporting requirements for
these companies changed during the period of analysis. We delete the sectors housing
enterprises and other real estate activities, as they report neither sales nor employees,
which we will use as size measure in our analysis. Similarly, we drop the sector holding
companies as reported sales and employees are very often zero, even though these com-
panies are not small.8 We later remove this restriction as a robustness check and find
that our results are unaffected.
We finally obtain a sample of 54,367 affiliate-year observations that correspond to 19,165
parent-year observations. The observations are distributed evenly across years with a
minimum of 2,639 observations and a maximum of 2,875 observations.
We augment the MiDi with information on statutory tax rates mainly from the Inter-
national Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and information on GDP from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). We use the definition of tax havens derived by
Hines and Rice (1994) which is widely accepted in the literature and was only recently
used by Dharmapala and Hines (2009).9 Alternatively, we could have used the definition
propagated by the OECD (OECD, 2000). We chose Hines and Rice (1994)’s tax haven
definition to derive results which are comparable to the literature, in particular the study
by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006). Further, no OECD member countries appear on the
OECD’s tax haven list, which thereby omits a number of tax havens popular with Ger-
man firms, such as Switzerland. Very few investors in the MiDi data hold branches or
affiliates in the island states on the OECD tax haven list. Using the OECD’s tax haven
definition would also preclude using a linear probability model, because the model may
not yield accurate coefficients given the low incidence of investment in those tax havens
(see also Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers, 2010).
Table 3.1 presents descriptive evidence on the use of tax havens by sectoral group. For
comparative purposes, information on financial firms is provided in addition to informa-
8In addition, we delete 331 affiliate-year observations for parents which are not classified holdings,
but are de facto holdings after consultations with the statistical department of the Bundesbank.
9For a list of tax havens, please refer to Appendix C.1.
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Table 3.1: Choice of tax havens, by sectoral group
Parent sector Manufacturing Service Financial
Total number of parent years 11,603 6,733 2,506
of which with tax haven affiliate 1,976 1,337 932
of which
internationally active parents 75.81% 52.43% 57.19%
with more than one t.h. affiliate 22.87% 18.03%
non tax non tax non tax
haven haven haven haven haven haven
Number of affiliate years 33,203 2,829 14,427 1,768 7,897 2,294
of which
in manufacturing sector 51.19% 32.63% 12.08% 4.81% 3.89% 0.74%
in service sector 46.69% 63.56% 82.20% 90.16% 15.35% 18.09%
in financial sector 1.38% 3.39% 4.76% 4.58% 79.84% 81.17%
other 0.75% 0.42% 0.96% 0.45% 0.92% –
Mean number of affiliates per parent 3.77 1.43 4.07 1.32 3.75 2.46
Choice of haven Manufacturing Service Financial
aff. par. aff. par. aff. par.
years years years years years years
Big havens: more than 1 million inhabitants
Hong Kong 459 410 233 219 164 104
Ireland 226 215 78 61 252 188
Lebanon 12 12 . . 8 8
Liberia . . 16 16 . .
Panama 19 19 20 20 3 3
Singapore 517 467 204 185 203 127
Switzerland 1,368 1,242 880 814 359 312
Small havens: less than 1 million inhabitants
Bermuda . . 13 13 23 19
British Virgin Islands 21 17 11 11 22 20
Cayman Islands . . 3 3 233 127
Cyprus 22 22 60 17 8 8
Channel Islands . . 19 19 89 28
Luxembourg 124 114 163 151 864 587
Malta 38 38 39 30 16 10
Other 23 21 29 27 50 32
Total 2,829 2,577 1,768 1,586 2,294 1,573
. denotes tax havens where fewer than three affiliate-years or parent-years are observed, so the exact number of investments
must not be reported for confidentiality reasons.
Manufacturing firms: firms classified NACE 1500-3700, service firms: firms classified NACE 5000-9300, with the before
mentioned sample restrictions, financial firms: firms classified NACE 6500-7000.
If a parent invests in several tax havens, it is counted multiple times (once per tax haven).
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tion on firms in the manufacturing and service sector which are analyzed later on. On
average, a tax haven affiliate is held in 20.4% of parent-years (17.9% excluding financial
companies). This figure seems low by international standards: Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2006) report that tax haven investment is observed for 37.8% of parent-years in their
sample of U.S. multinationals. This difference reflects, in part, the inclusiveness of the
MiDi data, in that the size thresholds for reporting are much lower than in the U.S. data
analyzed by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006), resulting in a higher proportion of small
firms and those with relatively small foreign operations.10
The proportion of firms owning tax haven affiliates is higher for service firms (19.9%)
than for manufacturing firms (17.0%), and a larger proportion of service firms own a tax
haven affiliate but are not internationally active in non-haven countries. About a fifth
of both manufacturing and service firms that are present in tax havens own more than
one tax haven affiliate, and the mean number of tax haven affiliates is also approximately
equal. In contrast, 37.2% of financial firms hold affiliates in tax havens, and they own on
average twice as many tax haven affiliates as do manufacturing and service firms.
The share of affiliates in tax havens that are in the service sector is disproportionately
high. For manufacturing firms, the share of service affiliates in tax havens is about
17 percentage points higher than their overall share of affiliates in the service sector,
and for service firms, it is eight percentage points higher. Also for financial companies,
investment in service affiliates is more common in tax havens than in non-haven countries.
The lower panel of Table 3.1 reports the number of affiliate-year and parent-year obser-
vations by tax haven and sectoral group of the parent firm. It shows that the preferred
tax haven destination varies by sectoral group. Manufacturing firms clearly prefer the
big tax havens. More than 90% of observations are accumulated there; about 48% in
Switzerland alone. The island tax havens, in particular Bermuda, the Cayman Islands
and the Channel Islands, are very rare investment destinations. Switzerland is similarly
popular among service firms; about half of their tax haven affiliates are located there.
10The summary statistics provided by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) are based on 81,604 affiliate-
years and their regressions use 8,435 parent-years, so crude calculations imply a mean of 9.7 affiliates per
parent. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) use the same data set and report that U.S. parents own between
7.5 and 7.8 affiliates on average in the years 1982, 1989 and 1994. In contrast, parents in our sample
average only 2.8 foreign affiliates (4.0 affiliates if indirectly held affiliates are included).
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Service firms more extensively use the small havens, where almost a fifth of tax haven
affiliates are located, most prominently 9% in Luxembourg. For financial companies,
Luxembourg is distinctly the most popular destination with 38% of affiliate-year obser-
vations in tax havens. The Cayman Islands are their fourth most important tax haven
destination: 10% of affiliate-year observations in tax havens are located there. Evidently,
the attractiveness of tax havens strongly depends on sector characteristics.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide local polynomial plots of the relationship of tax haven invest-
ment and foreign non-haven taxation for manufacturing and service firms in the pooled
sample.11 The x-axis shows the average of the statutory tax rates faced by a parent
firm’s foreign affiliates in non-haven countries weighted by the number of employees of
the respective affiliate, which is the measure of foreign non-haven taxation that we will
use in our empirical analysis.12 The variable on the y-axis is tax haven use, which is a
binary variable that is equal to one whenever a parent invested in at least one tax haven
in a given year. Both for service firms and for manufacturing firms, the cross-sectional
relationship of taxation and tax haven use is increasing up to a level of around 30%. The
increase for manufacturing firms is steeper, and the maximium tax haven use is higher
than for service firms. Counterintuitively, the relationship seems to be decreasing above
the level of 30% for manufacturing firms, with a resurge for high value of taxation. This
picture may stem from the cross-sectional nature of the data, or else from the investment
pattern of newly entering multinational firms. For the tax rates of the U.S. and France,
the two most popular investment destinations for German firms among entrants, fall ex-
actly into this range, so the apparent decrease in tax haven use for high tax rates may
result from emerging multinational firms with few foreign locations.13
11Observations in the lowest and highest percentile of the average foregin non-haven tax rate are
excluded.
12The number of employees of the affiliate is adjusted by the degree of participation of the parent in
the affiliate.
13We explored an empirical specification including a quadratic term of the foreign non-haven tax rate,
but a quadratic relationship is not robustly supported by the data.
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Figure 3.1: Manufacturing firms
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Figure 3.2: Service firms
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Table 3.2 provides an overview of the main variables used in our regression analysis for
the full sample and the two subgroups we are going to consider. The variables will be
explained in detail in the next section. The proportion of firms investing in a tax haven
is lower (around 14%) than for the full data and equal across sectoral groups, because
firms investing only in a tax haven drop from the regression sample. As firms with zero
sales or employees drop, the average size of the firms used in our regressions is slightly
higher than the average size of all firms in the sample. The statistics of the average
foreign non-haven tax rate and the instruments for the regression sample are similar.14
The third columns for every group report mean difference tests of the main regressors
by the dependent variable. Firms that invest in a tax haven are on average significantly
larger, both domestically and internationally. In addition, they face significantly higher
average foreign tax rates, which is consistent with the incentives discussed earlier.
144.1% of manufacturing firms and 8.6% of service firms drop because only investment in tax havens
is observed. 4.0% of the remaining manufacturing firms and 18.0% of service firms drop due to their
zero number of employees. Table C.1 in Appendix C.4 presents the corresponding summary statistics
for the full data.
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3.4 Empirical strategy
As outlined in section 3.2, a multinational firm’s decision to invest in a tax haven depends
on the taxation it faces at its foreign non-haven locations, its marginal cost of reallocating
taxable income and the fixed cost of tax haven investment. The probability of tax haven
investment should increase as foreign non-haven tax rates rise, with this effect being
strongest for firms with low costs of reallocating profits.
We specify the following linear probability model:
yjt = β0 + β1τjt + β2pjt + β3p2jt + β4nhjt + β5nh2jt + αi + γt + ujt (3.18)
The dependent variable yjt is a dummy which is equal to one if a firm j holds at least
one affiliate in at least one tax haven in a year t. Our independent variables are τjt, the
average of the statutory tax rates faced by j’s non-haven affiliates in t weighted by the
number of affiliate employees, pjt, the natural log of the size of company j in period t
and its square, p2jt, nhjt, the natural log of the size of j’s foreign non-haven activities in
t and its square, nh2jt, αi, the firm-specific costs of reallocating profits across countries,
and γt, a year fixed effect.
The coefficient of main interest is β1. It captures the effect of the taxes levied on profits
of a multinational’s foreign non-haven affiliates on the probability that it invests in a
tax haven. Equation (3.9) implies that greater firm profitability increases the impact
of non-haven tax rates on the likelihood of investing in a tax haven affiliate. Thus, we
use a weighted, not a simple average of the foreign non-haven tax rates. We cannot use
before-tax profits as weights, as our data contain only after-tax profits which are doubly
distorted due to taxation and profit reallocation. Instead, we use the number of employees
of the affiliate, adjusted by the degree of participation of the parent, to approximate the
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relative importance of an affiliate for a multinational group.15 As indicated above, we
expect β1 > 0.
In principle, the probability of tax haven investment is also influenced by taxation in the
multinational’s home country. As we use a panel data set of German multinational firms,
this effect cannot be gauged explicitly due to lack of sufficient variation. Still, changes
in home country taxation are indirectly taken into account through the year fixed effect.
Other independent variables include parent size and the size of the parent’s non-haven
activities, capturing the impact of size on profitability. Recent literature on foreign direct
investment suggests that larger firms with bigger international activities can be expected
to be more productive than their smaller competitors (e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple,
2004; Tomiura, 2007; Yeaple, 2009; Chen and Moore, 2010). Consequently, these firms
are better able to overcome the fixed and variable costs associated with setting up an
affiliate in a tax haven and its subsequent use for income reallocation.
We use the number of employees to measure parent size and the size of the company’s
foreign non-haven activities, reduced according to the share of participation interests
where applicable. The advantage of this size measure is that it is less likely to be affected
by profit reallocation activities than are alternatives such as sales. For example, foreign
affiliates may be permitted to use the distribution network of the parent company in
exchange for a small fee to sell their products directly to customers, so sales and profits
accrue abroad.16 As the distribution of the size variables is strongly skewed to the right,
the regressions use the natural log of employees as a size measure. Thus, observations
for which the size variables are zero drop from our regression sample. Following Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2006), regressions include the size measures both linearly and squared.
15As an alternative to the number of employees, we considered using assets or sales as firm level
weights. None of these measures is similarly satisfactory however. We observe only fixed and intangible
assets, not fixed assets separately, so this variable is very likely influenced by tax-avoidance behavior.
As pointed out below, a similar concern can be raised against the use of sales. We consider it least likely
that the number of employees will be systematically distorted due to taxation. Nonetheless, we will use
GDP as weights in our instrument.
16For an illustrative example, see the case study “Alpha Company” in the report prepared by the
Joint Committee on Taxation for the public background hearing by the House Committee on Ways and
Means in July 2010 (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010).
110
Multinational firms and tax havens
The variable cost of using a tax haven should vary with firm-specific characteristics such
as the R&D intensity of a firm. The location of intangible assets, licence arrangements and
royalty payments have been shown to be used as income reallocation tools (e.g. Dischinger
and Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012).17 A firm with larger intangible assets
should have greater discretion in choosing transfer prices due to the lack of comparable
market transactions. Thus, and as also shown in Equation (3.10), the response to changes
in foreign taxation should vary across firms depending on their marginal cost of income
reallocation. These firm specific characteristics are, however, unobservable.
We take two measures to address this issue. On the one hand, we conduct our analysis
separately for the group of manufacturing firms (NACE 1500-3700) and for the group of
service firms (NACE 5000-9300, with the before mentioned sample restrictions),18 because
the latter have a systematically smaller R&D intensity than the former. Using sector-
level data from the Innovation Survey of the Center for European Economic Research
(Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW) for the years 1996-2008, we find
that the average R&D intensity for the manufacturing sector is twice as high as the
R&D intensity for service sectors. At the same time, the descriptive evidence provided
in section 3.3 shows that the proportion of service firms owning tax haven affiliates
and the share of service firms’ affiliate-years observed in tax havens are higher than the
corresponding statistics for manufacturing firms. This could point to lower fixed costs of
tax haven investment for service firms, so not only taxation, but also parent size could
have a differential impact on tax haven investment by manufacturing and service firms.
In addition, the share of service affiliates of manufacturing parents located in tax havens
is disproportionately higher than the share located in non-haven countries. Overall, there
is thus reason to believe that the processes governing tax haven investment by service
firms and by manufacturing firms may differ significantly, which suggests that they should
be analyzed separately. We report the results of a full-sample analysis in Appendix C.4
in Table C.2.
17In addition, a variant of this type of strategy is part of all six case studies of the report by the
Joint Committee on Taxation prepared for the public hearing before the House Committee on Ways and
Means (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010).
18This implies that we do not consider parent firms in agriculture, mining, electricity and water
supply, and construction in our analysis.
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On the other hand, the empirical analysis uses firm-fixed effects to capture the influence
of firm-specific differences in the marginal cost of income reallocation, at least to the
extent that they are approximately constant over the sample period. Fixed effects also
account for unobserved firm-specific characteristics such as the degree of tax sensitivity,
that is, the importance that a firm assigns to the amount of its tax payments, which
may render firms ex ante more or less likely to invest in tax havens.19 Likewise, the
data provide information on the sector of the affiliates mostly at the two-digit NACE
Rev. 1 level, so particular incentive schemes for firms in sub-sectors cannot be taken into
account, and we do not have information on the sub-national location of firms, so we
cannot account for local taxation. The use of firm-fixed effects controls for time-invariant
aspects of these firm attributes.
In estimating Equation (3.18), it is necessary to take into account that the average foreign
non-haven tax rate is endogenous because entry in a tax haven may have a feedback
effect on the optimal location decisions of a firm, as shown in section 3.2. To address
this issue, we use an instrumentation strategy based on the initial location decisions of
the firm. We fix the location decisions of the firm in the year 2001, the year prior to our
analysis period and instrument the observed average foreign non-haven tax rate with a
hypothetical average foreign non-haven tax rate had the firm sticked to these location
decisions. The instrument thus only captures changes in firms’ foreign non-haven taxation
that result from changes in tax rates, not from changes in location decisions. To counter
any endogeneity that may be left on the intensive margin, we use GDP instead of the
number of employees as weights when calculating our instrument.20 Our instrumentation
strategy thus eliminates the endogeneity in the observed average foreign non-haven tax
rate by leveraging the insights drawn from our theoretical analysis: with the endogeneity
stemming from firms adjusting their non-haven investment due to tax haven investment,
our instrument abstracts from any changes in the average foreign non-haven tax rate that
19This issue has already been raised, but not addressed in Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006, p. 514).
20Earlier studies indicate that GDP correlates very closely with foreign investment and foreign prof-
itability, both in an aggregate cross section (e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994) and in a firm-level panel (e.g.
Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006).
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may be induced due to firms investing or ceasing to invest in a tax haven after 2001.21
In sum, we estimate our regression equation in four different ways:
- pooled linear probability model,
- pooled linear instrumental variables model,
- linear fixed effects model,
- linear fixed effects model with instrumental variables.
The linear fixed effects model with instrumental variables is our preferred specification
because it takes all sources of endogeneity into account. Nevertheless, we report the
results of all four specifications, because they offer evidence of the factors that drive a
firm’s decision to invest in a tax haven beyond that available from only the fixed effects
IV regression. By comparing pooled and instrumental variables estimates, it is possible
to assess the bias due to endogeneity of the foreign location decisions. Juxtaposing the
results of pooled and fixed effects specifications facilitates a balanced assessment of the
influence of taxation, abstracting from unobservable differences in costs of using tax haven
operations.
We use a linear probability model because otherwise it would be difficult to address the
endogeneity issues satisfactorily in a limited dependent variables framework.22 Using logit
or probit would yield more accurate marginal effects at different points of the distribution
of the covariates. In the logit framework, using firm fixed effects would be possible, but it
is more problematic to use instruments.23 In the probit framework, we could conduct an
21Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) use the competitors’ average foreign non-haven tax rate as instrument
for the average foreign non-haven tax rate of a firm. Results based on an instrumentation strategy similar
to theirs are reported in Appendix C.6.
22As far as possible, we have replicated our results using logit, probit, fixed effects logit and IV probit,
see section 3.6.1 below.
23Purely practically, one could construct an IV variant of fixed effects logit by plugging in the predicted
values from an OLS first stage regression in place of the endogenous variable and run a fixed effects logit
second stage regression. We refrain from doing so because this approach may not produce consistent
estimates, as conditional expectations do not pass through non-linear functions (see Wooldridge (2002,
p. 235-237) and Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 190-192)). Alternatively, a control function approach could
be employed. This type of estimation strategy is subject to strong assumptions however, in particular
concerning the independence of the full distribution of the error and the instrument.
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instrumental variables analysis (though under very strong distributional assumptions),
but would not be able to use firm fixed effects.
We generally use standard errors clustered at the level of the parent. For the fixed ef-
fects instrumental variables regression, we use bootstrapped standard errors, as clustered
standard errors cannot be estimated. As recommended by Efron and Tibshirani (1998),
the bootstrap estimates are based on 200 replications.
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 presents the regression results. The first four columns in the table present
results for the sample of manufacturing firms and columns 5-8 present results for the
sample of service firms. The odd-numbered columns present the results if no instrument
is used, and the even-numbered columns contain the IV estimates.24 The F-test for
exclusion of the instrument in the first stage regression is rejected at high significance
levels in all cases. The absolute value of the F-statistic is higher than the threshold of
ten recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997) to obtain unbiased estimates, and higher
than the thresholds proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002) to assume standard errors are
unbiased.
The average foreign non-haven tax rate is estimated to have a significantly positive effect
on the probability of a manufacturing firm’s investing in a tax haven throughout regres-
sions. The coefficient in the 2SLS regressions is about twice as high, and significantly
so, as the coefficient in the pooled OLS regression, which does not take the endogeneity
of the average foreign non-haven tax rate into account. Likewise, the coefficient in the
fixed effects IV specification is slightly higher than in the simple fixed effects regressions,
though the difference is not significant. This suggests that the true effect of the average
foreign non-haven tax rate is underestimated if its endogeneity due to simultaneity is
not taken into account. As explained in section 3.2, this finding indicates that multi-
24Regression results for the full sample are reported in Appendix C.4 in Table C.2. The effect of
the tax rate is estimated to be significantly positive both in the OLS and the 2SLS specification, and
insignificant if fixed effects are included.
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Table 3.3: Regression results
Manufacturing firms Service firms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Ave. foreign 0.566∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.175∗ 0.347∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ -0.085 0.171
n.h. tax rate (0.096) (0.156) (0.094) (0.172) (0.162) (0.211) (0.124) (0.202)
Parent size -0.061∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.013 -0.014 0.024 0.016 -0.002 -0.010
(0.021) (0.025) (0.003) (0.027) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014)
Parent size, 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
squared (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign non- -0.051∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.037∗ -0.051∗∗
haven size (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.030) (0.020) (0.024)
Foreign n.h. size, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant 0.022 -0.117 0.070 0.007 -0.103 -0.176∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.118
(0.062) (0.086) (0.069) (0.080) (0.075) (0.093) (0.053) (0.074)
# of observations 10662 8533 10662 8533 5052 3751 5052 3751
# of parents 2321 1696 2321 1696 1270 832 1270 832
R-squared overall 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.008 0.09
R-squared within – – 0.02 0.02 – – 0.02 0.03
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instrument N Y N Y N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 4064.39∗∗∗ – 465.73∗∗∗ – 1872.06∗∗∗ – 717.80∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
parent firm or bootstrapped with 200 replications.
Regression sample: column 1-4 manufacturing firms, i.e. firms classified NACE 1500-3700; column 5-8 service firms, i.e.
firms classified NACE 500-9300, except NACE 65xx, 70xx, 7490, 75xx, 95xx. Dependent variable: dummy variable which
denotes whether a parent owns at least one affiliate in at least one tax haven in a given year. Independent variables: see
Table 3.2.
nationals expand their activities in a way such that their average foreign non-haven tax
rate (weakly) decreases following tax haven investment. Given that some of the largest
and most popular investment destinations of German firms, such as the United States or
France, also have the highest statutory tax rates, this is consistent with multinationals’
investing in more sizeable and profitable markets first.
The estimates suggest that the magnitude of the tax effect is rather modest. The 0.347
coefficient estimate in column 4 of Table 3.3 implies that increasing a firm’s average
foreign tax rate by one percentage point is associated with a 0.3 percent greater likelihood
of holding a tax haven affiliate. Greater domestic and foreign activities are associated
with higher likelihood of tax haven investment, and the estimated coefficients on the size
variables are largely unaffected by the use of the instruments. The effect of parent size
turns insignificant in specifications that include fixed effects.
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As the regression results in the columns 5-8 of Table 3.3 show, the estimated effect of the
average foreign non-haven tax rate on tax haven investment by service firms varies with
the estimation approach. It is positive and significant in the pooled OLS specification;
larger and significant when estimated with 2SLS; and the point estimates of the tax coef-
ficients in the regressions for service firms in columns 5 and 6 are almost identical to the
point estimates of the tax coefficients in the corresponding regressions for manufacturing
firms presented in columns 1 and 2. The tax coefficients in the fixed effects regressions
for service firms reported in columns 7 and 8 are statistically zero.
The probability of tax haven investment by service firms is generally unaffected by the
size of the parent company. Levels of foreign activity outside of tax havens are estimated
to have nonlinear and significant effects on tax haven operations, similar to the effects
found for manufacturing firms.
Our preferred estimates come from the fixed effects IV specification. They show that
manufacturing firms are more likely to invest in tax havens if they face higher tax rates
in their foreign non-haven locations, even if unobservable differences in the cost of in-
come reallocation are taken into account. In contrast, we do not find a clear tax effect
for service firms in our preferred framework. This difference may reflect a combination
of factors: that service firms have higher costs of reallocating profits, or exhibit lower
variability in these costs. Manufacturing firms may rely to a greater average extent than
service firms on the returns to intangible property, the location of which may be more
readily reallocated for tax purposes than are other forms of income, but the distribution
of which is highly skewed, with some manufacturing firms earning significant fractions of
their profits from intangible property, and others very little. These factors would imply
that foreign non-haven tax rates should affect tax haven demand by manufacturing firms
more heavily than service firms, even though service firms are at least as likely as man-
ufacturing firms to establish tax haven operations in the first place. The 2SLS estimates
appear to pick up the effect of omitted differences in the costs of income reallocation.
A further indication in this direction is that the sector-level R&D intensities that are
used in subsequent regressions to proxy for the costs of reallocating taxable income in
section 3.6.3 are positively correlated with average foreign non-haven tax rates, with a
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slightly higher correlation coefficient for service firms than for manufacturing firms (0.129
for service firms vs. 0.102 for manufacturing firms).
A further interesting finding is that parent size is a significant determinant of tax haven
use by manufacturing firms only. Together with the relatively higher prevalence of tax
haven investment by service firms described in section 3.3, this evidence is in accord with
a much lower fixed cost of tax haven investment by service firms. The German anti-
deferral provisions imply that a multinational does not only need to formally establish
a company in a tax haven (often referred to as “letterbox company”), but has to locate
some productive activity there.25 Our evidence suggests that this could be more costly
on net for manufacturing than for service firms.
3.6 Robustness checks
The following two subsections present estimated coefficients from specifications that mod-
ify the basic econometric framework; from this evidence it appears that the results re-
ported in section 3.5 are largely robust. The estimates in subsection 3.6.3 attempt to
shed light on the firm characteristics captured by the firm fixed effects. Subsection 3.6.4
summarizes results of robustness checks that address endogeneity of non-haven size and
non-random sample selection of service firms as potential purely econometric interpreta-
tions of our results.26 On closer inspection, none of these issues appears to explain our
results.
25For details on the German anti-deferral regulations, please refer to Appendix C.2.
26Overall, only 75 percent of service firms are used in the regression. 8.6 percent of firms drop because
they only invest in a tax haven. 18.0 percent of the remaining observations on service firms drop as the
observed size measure is zero. In contrast, only 5 percent of observations on manufacturing firms with
non-haven investment drop for this reason.
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3.6.1 Simple modifications of baseline specification
To test whether our results are driven by the specific setup of our baseline econometric
analysis, we explore a number of variations, none of which substantially affects our main
findings. The results of these robustness checks are tabled in Appendix C.4.
First, we re-estimate the linear probability model using the GDP weighted average foreign
non-haven tax rate at the locations in the period a firm enters the sample as instrument
instead of the locations in 2001.27 The advantage of our baseline instrumentation strategy
is that the locations as of 2001 are exogenous to any changes in location decisions, be
they haven or non-haven, that occur during the period of analysis from 2002 to 2008. At
the same time, we only use firms that invest abroad in 2001 already, which may induce
sample selection bias. Such issues do not seem to affect our results, though (see Table C.3
in Appendix C.4).
In addition, we re-estimate the linear probability model after restricting our sample to
those firms that do not hold a tax haven affiliate in 2001. This implies that our sample is
selected endogenously based on the realization of the dependent variable, so the behavior
may not be representative for the full sample. We nevertheless do so to exclude that our
results are driven by firms that hold a tax haven affiliate in 2001 already. For manufac-
turing firms, the sign pattern of the coefficient remains robust, but the tax coefficient
decreases in absolute value and is insignificant in the fixed effects specification. Parent
size is insignificant throughout specifications, and non-haven size is less significant than
before. For service firms, coefficients are mostly insignificant throughout specifications
(see Table C.4 in Appendix C.4). Whereas our model helps explain manufacturing firms
decision to invest in a tax haven, the variables seem not to affect service firms’ tax haven
investment. Note though, that the restriction imposed on the data implies that only
part of the variation in the dependent variable is used, because the effect of covariates
on firms’ decision to disinvest from a tax haven is not analyzed.
Further, we re-estimate our baseline equation using limited dependent variable models
as far as possible: probit, logit, IV probit and fixed effects logit. The IV probit model
27We use locations as of 2001 if the firm enters the sample before 2002.
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rests on the assumption that the endogenous variable is normally distributed conditional
on the instrument and parameters are only consistent if the error term is homoskedastic.
As it is uncertain whether these assumptions are valid in our case, the results have to
be interpreted with caution. The sign pattern of the coefficients is largely robust. The
average marginal effects of the average foreign non-haven tax rate are almost identical
to the marginal effects estimated using the linear probability model, except for the fixed
effects logit average marginal effect being insignificant for manufacturing firms. Thus, the
findings largely confirm our previous results (see Tables C.5 and C.6 in Appendix C.4).
Next, we re-include the sector holding companies in our analysis. We dropped this sector
before because holding companies usually report zero sales and employees even though
the actual companies are not small, and as the sector comprises firms with the same
administrative structure, but activities that actually belong to various other sectors. To
address the diversity of the sector, we assign parents the sector of the corporate group,
using a variable specifically created to address this issue in our data set. After dropping
financial companies, government institutions and private households, we obtain a sample
of 21,104 parent-year observations in the manufacturing sector and 11,783 parent-year
observations in the service sector.28 Our findings both for manufacturing firms and
for service firms are robust, though the significance level of the tax coefficient in the
fixed effects IV specification for manufacturing firms is only 10.1% (see Table C.7 in
Appendix C.4).
3.6.2 Sensitivity to choice of tax havens and tax rates
The descriptive statistics in section 3.3 show that Switzerland is by far the most important
tax haven for German firms. This is not surprising given its geographical, linguistic
and cultural proximity to Germany. It is nonetheless potentially worrisome that the
findings could be driven by the dominance of this single tax haven, but as it happens, the
results are largely robust to dropping all affiliates located in Switzerland (see Table C.8
in Appendix C.4).
28Note that only two thirds of observations on manufacturing firms and only half of observations on
service firms are usable in our regressions because the reported number of employees is zero.
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The main analysis uses statutory corporate tax rates to capture incentives for income re-
allocation and thus tax haven use. This may not correctly capture tax differences because
profits may not be taxed in full at this rate. To address this concern, we alternatively
use the effective tax rates collected by Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer
(2010). As these data are available for the year 2004 only, we can only test the robust-
ness of the pooled specifications. We obtain coefficients of the same sign and significance
and similar magnitude as before, though the difference between the OLS and 2SLS tax
coefficient does not persist for manufacturing firms (see Table C.9 in Appendix C.4).
3.6.3 Sector-level R&D intensities as proxy for the marginal
cost of profit shifting
A firm’s R&D intensity is a factor that is particularly likely to influence the marginal
cost of income reallocation. We use firm-fixed effects in our main econometric analysis
to capture firm-specific differences in the marginal costs of income reallocation, because
we do not have a firm level measure of R&D activities.
In order to shed light on the question of the extent to which the marginal costs of
income reallocation play a role for tax haven investment, we use sectoral data on R&D
intensity, which are provided by the Center for European Economic Research (Zentrum
für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW) based on its annual Innovation Survey. We
include the industry R&D intensities as well as an interaction term of industry R&D
intensity and average foreign non-haven tax rate in our pooled regressions. We refrain
from doing so in the regressions with firm fixed effects because the firm fixed effects
capture firm level heterogeneity with regard to the R&D intensity, so the firm fixed
effects and the sectoral R&D data are collinear.
We cluster the standard errors on industry level and drop firms assigned to different
sectors in different years to avoid artificial variation.29 Our findings are presented in
Table 3.4.
29639 manufacturing firms and 322 service firms are dropped for this reason.
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Table 3.4: Regression results including sector R&D intensity
Manufacturing Services
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Average foreign nh. 0.561∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗
tax rate (0.080) (0.200) (0.188) (0.214) (0.106) (0.078) (0.164) (0.136)
Parent size -0.058∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.053∗ 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.010
(0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Parent size, squared 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-haven size -0.051∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.051∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Non-haven size, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
squared (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Sector R&D intensity -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.033∗∗ 0.010 0.017 0.008 -0.009
(0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.017)
Interaction tax R&D 0.027 0.107∗∗ -0.021 0.054
(0.036) (0.044) (0.031) (0.062)
Constant 0.004 0.038 -0.140 -0.006 -0.034 -0.043 -0.190∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.084) (0.121) (0.108) (0.052) (0.045) (0.056) (0.055)
# of observations 9916 9916 7962 7962 3860 3860 2858 2858
# of sectoral groups 23 23 23 23 14 14 14 14
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Instrument N N Y Y N N Y Y
F-Statistics tax – – 3121.24∗∗∗ 1595.31∗∗∗ – – 1463.28∗∗∗ 1911.39∗∗∗
F-Statistics int. – – – 3093.64∗∗∗ – – – 915.84∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of parent
industry. P-values of R&D intensity for service firms in columns 5-8 are 11.9%, 15.2%, 22.7% and 59.5%.
Dependent variable: dummy variable which denotes whether a parent owns at least one affiliate in at least one tax haven
in a given year. Independent variables: see Table 3.2; sector R&D intensity: calculated as expenditures on innovation over
total sales by sector; Interaction tax R&D: interaction of sector R&D intensity and firm-level average foreign non-haven
tax rate.
The estimates for manufacturing firms are largely unaffected by the inclusion of the
R&D intensity, which has an insignificantly negative coefficient in the OLS and 2SLS
specifications in columns 1 and 3. The interaction of R&D intensity and the average
foreign non-haven tax rate is positive, and, in the 2SLS specification, significantly so.
Given the same average foreign non-haven tax rate, firms in sectors with higher R&D
intensity and thus lower costs of profit reallocation are more likely to invest in tax havens.
The base effect of the sector R&D intensity is negative. This implies that lower cost of
profit reallocation do not increase tax haven investment per se, but only if taxation
renders profit reallocation sufficiently lucrative.
For service firms, neither the base effect nor the interaction of R&D intensity with the tax
rate are significant, and the other coefficients are largely unaffected by their inclusion.
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Taken together, these observations are evidence in favor of the interpretation that fixed
costs of tax haven investment are higher for manufacturing firms than for service firms,
so the former react more strongly to differences in taxation and the marginal costs of
profit shifting. Service firms’ tax haven investment in contrast is largely unaffected by
(sectoral) differences in the marginal cost of profit shifting; together with the observation
that the tax coefficient is insignificant in the fixed effects specification, this points to low
fixed costs of tax haven investment, or else to business opportunities of certain service
firms in tax havens.
3.6.4 Further robustness checks
A comparison of Equations (3.6) and (C.10) in Appendix C.3 shows that investing in a
tax haven renders investing at other foreign non-haven locations more attractive for a
multinational firm, because it can thereby enlarge its base of income available to real-
locate. Therefore, not only the average foreign non-haven tax rate, but also non-haven
size, may be endogenous. We use a modified version of our instrumentation strategy
to address this issue and report the corresponding regression results along with a more
detailed description of the approach in Appendix C.5. The estimation results for manu-
facturing firms are largely consistent with estimated tax effects obtained earlier. Results
for service firms are generally consistent with previous insights, but more difficult to in-
terpret, largely due to the fact that the sample becomes very small (32 firms), so results
obtained from instrumental variable estimations may suffer from bias.
To ease comparison of our findings to the earlier findings by Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2006), we replicate Tables 3.3 and 3.4 using an instrumentation strategy similar to
theirs, based on the competitors’ average foreign non-haven tax rate. We report the
regression results in Tables C.11 and C.12 in Appendix C.6.
Finally, we explore whether and in how far regression results for service firms may be
driven by sample selection. Almost a fifth of observations on parent firms in services drop
from the regression sample because the number of parent or non-haven employees is zero,
so size is not defined. The regression results for service firms may consequently reflect
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this aspect of sample selection, and possibly produce estimates of behavioral parameters
that are not representative of the entire sample.
The reason for observed zero employees is not clear. We exclude the sector holding
companies and housing and real estate where such a figure may (and does frequently)
occur. Zero observed sales are a result of the reporting requirements. Sales are surveyed
in million euros, so they are zero for any firm with a turnover of strictly less than 500,000
euros. This implies that a reported figure x disguises possible true sales values ranging
from 1, 000, 000x − 500, 000 to 1, 000, 000x + 500, 000, except for 0 which disguises the
interval [0; 499, 999].
We exploit this insight to impute the sales variables based on a model for grouped data
developed in the statistical literature by Heitjan and Rubin (1990) in order to use all
the observations. The use of imputed data does not appear to produce major changes in
the coefficient and significance patterns. A detailed description of the procedure and the
results (based on the instrumentation strategy similar to Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006))
are reported in Appendix C.6.
3.7 Discussion
Table 3.5 lists the effect of an increase of the independent variables by one standard
deviation according to our estimates on the probability of investment in a tax haven,
expressed in standard deviations of the dependent variable.
The left part of the table shows the implied effects for manufacturing firms and the right
part for service firms.
The implied economic effect of a change in the average foreign non-haven tax rate by
one standard deviation is equal for manufacturing and service firms according to the
pooled estimation. If unobservable firm-specific differences are taken into account in the
fixed effects specification, the effect becomes smaller in both cases, but is still larger
and significant for manufacturing firms. The tax coefficient in the sample of service
firms is insignificant. It appears likely that the estimates of tax effects in the pooled
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Table 3.5: Economic significance
Manufacturing firms Service firms
IV FE IV IV FE IV
Ave. foreign n.h. tax rate 0.16 0.05 0.17 0.03
Parent employees 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.01
Foreign non-haven employees 0.35 0.21 0.28 0.25
The table contains the effect of an increase in one of the independent variables by one standard deviation at the mean of all
independent variables on the probability of tax haven investment, expressed in standard deviations. The mean probability
of tax haven investment for manufacturing firms is 0.140, for service firms 0.139, and the corresponding standard deviations
are 0.348 and 0.346 respectively. Manufacturing firms’ mean average foreign non-haven tax rate is 0.299, service firms’
mean average foreign non-haven tax rate is 0.293, and the corresponding standard deviations are 0.056 and 0.058. Mean
parent size is 5.932 for manufacturing firms and 4.618 for service firms, with standard deviations of 1.407 and 2.128. Mean
non-haven size is 4.679 for manufacturing firms and 4.097 for service firms, with standard deviations 1.666 and 1.790
respectively.
Statistically significant effects are printed in bold.
specification reflect the impact of omitted firm-specific characteristics, which are relatively
more important for service firms than for manufacturing firms. Our findings are consistent
with either high marginal costs of income reallocation by service firms, or - compared
to manufacturing firms - relatively little variability in the cost of income reallocation,
either of which would be consistent with small effects of foreign tax rates on tax haven
investment. These influences may also drive that we do not find a clear effect of taxation
in the full sample (see Table C.2 in Appendix C.4).
Similarly, parent size plays a smaller role for service firms than for manufacturing firms:
the coefficients are smaller and insignificant throughout. This may point to smaller costs
of setting up a tax haven affiliate for service firms, so the productivity thresholds are
lower. The effect of non-haven size is comparable across sectoral groups.
How do these findings compare to earlier research? Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) show
that for U.S. firms, higher foreign non-haven taxation is associated with a lower prob-
ability of tax haven investment. Our results for German manufacturing firms contrast
with their findings, as the decision of German manufacturing firms to invest in a tax
haven is positively influenced by higher foreign non-haven taxation. As Desai, Foley,
and Hines (2006) use a different instrumentation strategy based on the location decisions
of a firm’s competitors in the same industry as a given firm, one may object that our
findings are not directly comparable. We report the results of estimations based on an
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instrumentation strategy similar to their instrumentation strategy in Appendix C.6, and
obtain qualitatively similar results.
3.8 Conclusion
Tax haven operations can facilitate tax avoidance by multinational firms, but the evidence
suggests that these opportunities are limited. Less than 20 percent of German non-
financial multinational firms do have affiliates in tax havens, reflecting that the available
tax savings are less than the costs of establishing the affiliates. Furthermore, even among
the firms with tax haven operations, some undoubtedly choose their locations for normal
business reasons unrelated to tax savings. Despite the apparently limited appeal of using
tax haven operations to avoid taxes, the evidence is consistent with tax motivations of
some firms, particularly those in manufacturing industries. Larger firms, and those with
other foreign operations located in high-tax countries, are more likely than others to have
affiliates in tax havens. Research-intensive firms that may have greater tax avoidance
opportunities than others are the most likely to have tax haven operations.
The model implies that high foreign tax rates encourage tax haven investment, but that
this effect is dampened by firm-specific marginal costs of income reallocation. Further,
the model indicates that the relationship between non-haven taxation and the incentive to
invest in a tax haven is complex and composed of two opposite effects. Higher tax rates at
the locations where a firm is already present before investing in a tax haven increase the
probability of investing in a tax haven, as expected. In contrast, the opposite relationship
holds for tax rates at locations that become attractive investment venues only for firms
that also have tax haven investments: the attractiveness of tax havens increases as tax
rates fall in these potential investment locations. This mechanism may in part explain
the persistence of tax haven investment despite falling tax rates elsewhere.
There appear to be significant differences between the tax haven investment patterns of
service and manufacturing firms. High foreign tax rates are associated with tax haven
investments of manufacturing firms, which is consistent with tax havens being used to
reallocate taxable income from jurisdictions in which it is taxed more heavily. At the
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mean, an increase in the average foreign non-haven tax rate of one percentage point in-
creases the probability that a manufacturing firm invests in a tax haven by 0.3 percentage
points. This effect is robust to controlling for unobservable firm-specific differences. Tax
haven investment by service firms is not significantly influenced by taxation if unobserv-
able firm-specific characteristics are taken into account. This evidence is consistent with
service firms facing high marginal costs of income reallocation, and relatively little vari-
ability in these costs, which together depress the effects of foreign tax rate differences.
Still, tax haven investment is relatively more common among service firms than among
manufacturing firms, reflecting the attractiveness of tax haven locations for ordinary
business activities in service industries. This suggests that policy measures that raise
the cost of income reallocation may discourage tax haven investment. At the same time,
such policy measures may encourage firms to shift real activities to tax havens.
Given the increasing share of service industries in Western economies, the tax avoidance
activities of service firms, and their consequences, offers a fruitful area for further research.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Theory
A.1.1 Cost minimization
A.1.1.1 Parameter restriction (Assumption 1)
For simplicity of exposition, we focus on the case of a domestic firm. Assume that the
firm chooses not only the allocation of knowledge within the firm, but also the overall
knowledge level z∗ subject to the constraint that its overall knowledge cannot exceed the
knowledge draw, z∗ ≤ z¯.
The firm correspondingly solves the following modified cost-minimization problem:
min
zh,z∗
q0w0
A0(1− e−λz∗)
(
(1 + c0(z∗ − zh)) + A0θ0e−λ(z∗−zh)(1 + c0zh)
)
s.t. z∗ ≤ z¯
where the number of production workers and headquarter managers as well as the pro-
duction knowledge are determined by the constraints (1.2) to (1.4).
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We need to derive a restriction which ensures that z∗ = z¯.
L = q0w0
A0(1− e−λz∗)
(
(1 + c0(z∗ − zh)) + A0θ0e−λ(z∗−zh)(1 + c0zh)
)
+ φ(z∗ − z¯)
A sufficient condition for z∗ = z¯ is φ > 0; φ ≥ 0 is necessary. φ ≥ 0 whenever
λ(1 + c0(z¯ − zh)) + c0 ≥ A0θ0c0eλzh .
Equation (1.13) implies
eλzh = c0e
λz¯
A0θ0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))
,
so
eλz¯ ≤ 1
c20
(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))(c0 + λ(1 + c0(z¯ − zh))).
Here, zh is restricted to be in the interval [0, z¯]. In either case,
eλz¯ ≤ 1
c20
(c0 + λ)(c0 + λ(1 + c0z¯)).
An analogous argument for a multinationally active firm yields that φ ≥ 0 whenever
e−λz¯
(
q0w0
A0
(λ(1 + c0(z¯ − zh)) + c0) + q1w1
A1
(λ(1 + c1(z¯ − zh)) + c1)
)
≥ c0
λ(1 + c0zh)
qjwjcj
Aj
+ qj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)w0c0
where j¯ denotes the country with zj¯ = z¯− zh and j denotes the country with zj ≥ z¯− zh,
and the left hand side takes into account that zj ≥ z¯ − zh.
Using Equation (1.12), this equation can be simplified to
eλz¯ ≤
q0w0
A0
(λ(1 + c0(z¯ − zh)) + c0) + q1w1A1 (λ(1 + c1(z¯ − zh)) + c1)
c0
(
q0w0c0
A0
+ q1w1c1
A1
) (c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)),
analogous to the condition for the domestic firm.
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Here, zh is restricted to be in the interval [0, z¯]. The condition yields
eλz¯ ≤
q0w0
A0
(λ+ c0) + q1w1A1 (λ+ c1)
c0
(
q0w0c0
A0
+ q1w1c1
A1
) (c0 + λ(1 + c0z¯)) for zh = 0
eλz¯ ≤
q0w0
A0
(λ(1 + c0z¯) + c0) + q1w1A1 (λ(1 + c1z¯) + c1)
c0
(
q0w0c0
A0
+ q1w1c1
A1
) (c0 + λ) for zh = z¯
The former of the two conditions is binding whenever c0 < c1.
A.1.1.2 Lagrangian equation and first order conditions
L =
1∑
j=0
njwj(1 + cjzj) + nhw0(1 + c0zh)
+
1∑
j=0
ξj
[
qj − njAj(1− e−λz¯)
]
+
1∑
j=0
φj [z¯ − zh − zj] + κ
 1∑
j=0
njAjθje
−λzj − nh

∂L
∂nj
= wj(1 + cjzj)− ξjAj(1− e−λz¯) + κAjθje−λzj = 0
∂L
∂zj
= njwjcj − φj − λκnjAjθje−λzj = 0
∂L
∂nh
= w0(1 + c0zh)− κ = 0
∂L
∂zh
= nhw0c0 −
1∑
j=0
φj = 0
∂L
∂ξj
= qj − njAj(1− e−λz¯) = 0
∂L
∂φj
= z¯ − zh − zj = 0
∂L
∂κ
=
1∑
j=0
njAjθje
−λzj − nh = 0
A.1.1.3 Comparative statics
Domestic production. By the implicity function theorem,
dzh
dx0
= −
d(1.13)
dx0
d(1.13)
dzh
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The sign of dzh
dx0
is given by −d(1.13)
dx0
because d(1.13)
dzh
= λθ0e−λ(z¯−zh)(2c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)) > 0.
d(1.13)
dz¯
= −λθ0e−λ(z¯−zh)(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)) < 0 ⇒ dzh
dz¯
> 0
d(1.13)
dθ0
= e−λ(z¯−zh)(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)) > 0 ⇒ dzh
dθ0
< 0
d(1.13)
dc0
= θ0e−λ(z¯−zh)(1 + λzh)− 1 < 0 ⇒ dzh
dc0
> 0
d(1.13)
dλ
= θ0e−λ(z¯−zh)((1 + c0zh)− (z¯ − zh)(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))) ⇒ dzh
dλ
ambiguous
d(1.13)
dq0
= d(1.13)
dA0
= d(1.13)
dw0
= 0 ⇒ dzh
dq0
= dzh
dA0
= dzh
dw0
= 0
dz0
dθ0
> 0 and dz0
dc0
< 0 by z0 = z¯ − zh. w0, A0 and q0 do not affect z0.
Note that dzh
dz¯
< 1 by λθ0e−λ(z¯−zh)(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)) < λθ0e−λ(z¯−zh)(2c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)).
This implies that dz0
dz¯
= 1− dzh
dz¯
> 0.
Domestic and foreign production. As the production knowledge and the number
of managers are a function of managerial knowledge, the comparative statics for the
managerial knowledge are derived first.
Managerial knowledge (4). By the implicit function theorem,
dzh
dxj
= −
d(1.12)
dxj
d(1.12)
dzh
d(1.12)
dzh
> 0 by the second order condition for a minimum. This implies
dzh
dz¯
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
)−1 (
−λ(1 + c0zh) qj¯
Aj¯
θj¯e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))
)
> 0
where the subscript j¯ refers to the country with binding knowledge constraint zj¯ = z¯−zh.
Concerning the other parameters, it is necessary to distinguish two possible cases.
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• The knowledge constraint zj = z¯ − zh is binding in the home country, slack in the
foreign country.
∂zh
∂A0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1
λ(1 + c0zh)
q0w0c0
A20
< 0
∂zh
∂A1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1
(−c0)q1w1c1
A21
> 0
∂zh
∂θ0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1
λ(1 + c0zh)q0e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)) < 0
∂zh
∂θ1
= 0
∂zh
∂w0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1
λ(1 + c0zh)(
q0θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))− q0c0
A0
)
> 0
∂zh
∂w1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1
c0
q1c1
A1
< 0
∂zh
∂c0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1 (
q1w1c1
A1
+ λ(1 + c0zh)
(
q0θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(1 + λzh)
−q0w0
A0
)
+ λzh
(
q0θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))− q0w0c0
A0
))
> 0
∂zh
∂c1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1
c0
q1w1
A1
< 0
∂zh
∂q0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1
λ(1 + c0zh)(
θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))− w0c0
A0
)
> 0
∂zh
∂q1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z0 = z¯ − zh
)−1
c0
w1c1
A1
< 0
∂zh
∂c0
> 0 follows from q1w1c1
A1
+λ(1+c0zh)
(
q0θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(1 + λzh)− q0w0A0
)
= −λ(1+
c0zh) λc0 and q0θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))− q0w0c0A0 < 0 by (1.12).
• The knowledge constraint zj = z¯− zh is binding in the foreign country, slack in the
home country.
∂zh
∂A0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1 −c20q0w0
A20
> 0
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∂zh
∂A1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1
q1w1c1
A21
< 0
∂zh
∂θ0
= 0
∂zh
∂θ1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1
λ(1 + c0zh)q1e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)) < 0
∂zh
∂w0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1
(
c20
q0
A0
+ λ(1 + c0zh)q1θ1e−λ(z¯−zh)(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))
)
< 0
∂zh
∂w1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1 −q1c1
A1
> 0
∂zh
∂c0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1 (
2c0
q0w0
A0
+ λ(1 + c0zh)q1θ1e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(1 + λzh)
+ λzh
(
q1θ1e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))− q1w1c1
A1
))
< 0
∂zh
∂c1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1 −q1w1
A1
λ(1 + c0zh) > 0
∂zh
∂q0
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1
c20
w0
A0
< 0
∂zh
∂q1
= −
(
∂(1.12)
∂zh
|z1 = z¯ − zh
)−1
λ(1 + c0zh)
(
θ1e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))− w1c1
A1
)
> 0
In principle, the knowledge constraint may be binding for both countries if θj¯Aj¯wjcj =
θjAjwj¯cj¯. We do not derive the comparative statics for this case, though, as changes in
the variables will lead to the occurrence of either of the other two cases.
Number of production workers (1).
∂nj
∂qj
= 1
Aj(1− e−λz¯) > 0
∂nj
∂Aj
= − qj
A2j(1− e−λz¯)
< 0
∂nj
∂z¯
= − qjλe
−λz¯
Aj(1− e−λz¯)2 < 0
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Production knowledge (2).
• The knowledge constraint zj = z¯ − zh is binding in the home country, slack in the
foreign country.
∂z0
∂xj
= −∂zh
∂xj
⇒ ∂z0
∂A0
> 0, ∂z0
∂θ0
> 0, ∂z0
∂w0
< 0, ∂z0
∂c0
< 0, ∂z0
∂q0
< 0
∂z1
∂A1
= −
w1c1
λw0(1+c0zh)A21θ1
+ c0w1c1∂zh/∂A1
λw0(1+c0zh)2A1θ1
−λe−λz1 > 0
∂z1
∂θ1
= 1
λθ1
> 0
∂z1
∂w1
= −
− c1
λw0(1+c0zh)A1θ1 +
c0w1c1∂zh/∂w1
λw0(1+c0zh)2A1θ1
−λe−λz1 < 0
∂z1
∂c1
= −
− w1
λw0(1+c0zh)A1θ1 +
c0w1c1∂zh/∂c1
λw0(1+c0zh)2A1θ1
−λe−λz1 < 0
∂z1
∂q1
= −
c0w1c1∂zh/∂q1
λw0(1+c0zh)2A1θ1
−λe−λz1 < 0
• The knowledge constraint zj = z¯− zh is binding in the foreign country, slack in the
home country.
∂z1
∂xj
= −∂zh
∂xj
⇒ ∂z1
∂A1
> 0, ∂z1
∂θ1
> 0, ∂z1
∂w1
< 0, ∂z1
∂c1
< 0, ∂z1
∂q1
< 0
∂z0
∂A0
= −
c0
λ(1+c0zh)A20θ0
+ c
2
0∂zh/∂A0
λ(1+c0zh)2A0θ0
−λe−λz0 > 0
∂z0
∂θ0
= 1
λθ0
> 0
∂z0
∂w0
= −
c20∂zh/∂w0
λ(1+c0zh)2A0θ0
−λe−λz0 < 0
∂z0
∂c0
= −
− 1
λ(1+c0zh)A0θ0 +
c0∂zh/∂c0+zh
λ(1+c0zh)2A0θ0
−λe−λz0 < 0 if zh < λ(1 + c0zh)
∂z0
∂q0
= −
c20∂zh/∂q0
λ(1+c0zh)2A0θ0
−λe−λz0 < 0
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Number of managers (3).
∂nh
∂Aj
= −
λe−λzjqjθj
∂zj
∂Aj
1− e−λz¯ < 0
∂nh
∂θj
=
qje
−λzj − λe−λzjqjθj ∂zj∂θj
1− e−λz¯
∂nh
∂wj
= −
λe−λzjqjθj
∂zj
∂wj
1− e−λz¯ > 0
∂nh
∂cj
= −
λe−λzjqjθj
∂zj
∂cj
1− e−λz¯ > 0
∂nh
∂qj
=
θje
−λzj − λe−λzjqjθj ∂zj∂qj
1− e−λz¯ > 0
∂nh
∂z¯
= − λe
−λz¯
(1− e−λz¯)2
∑
j
qjθje
−λzj − 11− e−λz¯
∑
j
λe−λzjqjθj
∂zj
∂z¯
< 0
A.1.2 Profit maximization
A.1.2.1 The effect of the parameters on marginal costs
• φj = 0, ξj = 1Aj(1−e−λz¯)
(
wj(1 + cjzj) + 1λwjcj
)
Effect of production quantity in country j on marginal costs in country j :
∂ξj
∂qj
= 1
Aj(1− e−λz¯)wjcj
∂zj
∂qj
< 0
Effect of production quantity in country j¯ on marginal costs in country j :
∂ξj
∂qj¯
= 1
Aj(1− e−λz¯)wjcj
∂zj
∂qj¯
> 0
Effect of other characteristics of country j on marginal costs in country j :
∂ξj
∂θj
= 1
Aj(1− e−λz¯)wjcj
1
λθj
> 0
∂ξj
∂wj
= 1
Aj(1− e−λz¯)
(
1 + cjzj +
1
λ
c0
1 + c0zh
wjcj
∂zh
∂wj
)
> 0
∂ξj
∂cj
= wj
Aj(1− e−λz¯)
(
zj + cj
1
λ
c0
1 + c0zh
∂zh
∂cj
)
> 0
∂ξj
∂Aj
= 1
Aj(1− e−λz¯)
(
− 1
Aj
wj
(
1 + cjzj +
1
λ
cj
)
+ wjcj
∂zj
∂Aj
)
< 0
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• φj¯ 6= 0, ξj¯ = 1Aj¯(1−e−λz¯)
(
wj¯(1 + cj¯(z¯ − zh)) + w0(1 + c0zh)Aj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)
)
Effect of production quantity in country j¯ on marginal costs in country j¯ :
∂ξj¯
∂qj¯
= 1
Aj¯(1− e−λz¯)
(−wj¯cj¯ + Aj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)))
∂zh
∂qj¯
< 0
Effect of production quantity in country j on marginal costs in country j¯ :
∂ξj¯
∂qj
= 1
Aj¯(1− e−λz¯)
(−wj¯cj¯ + Aj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)))
∂zh
∂qj
> 0
Effect of other characteristics of country j¯ on marginal costs in country j¯ :
∂ξj¯
∂θj¯
= 1
Aj¯(1− e−λz¯)
(
(−wj¯cj¯ + Aj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)))
∂zh
∂qθj
+ Aj¯w0(1 + c0zh)e−λ(z¯−zh)
)
> 0
∂ξj¯
∂wj¯
= 1
Aj¯(1− e−λz¯)
(
1 + cj¯(z¯ − zh) + Aj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)(1 + c0zh)
+ ∂zh
∂wj¯
(−wj¯cj¯ + Aj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)))
)
> 0
∂ξj¯
∂cj¯
= 1
Aj¯(1− e−λz¯)
(
wj¯(z¯ − zh) + w0zhAj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)
+ ∂zh
∂cj¯
(−wj¯cj¯ + Aj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)))
)
> 0
∂ξj¯
∂Aj¯
= 1
Aj¯(1− e−λz¯)
(
− 1
Aj¯
wj¯(1 + cj¯(z¯ − zh)
+ ∂zh
∂Aj¯
(−wj¯cj¯ + Aj¯θj¯e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh)))
)
< 0
The effects of wj, cj and Aj are mitigated by organizational adjustments. ∂ξj∂wj > 0,
∂ξj
∂cj
> 0
and ∂ξj
∂Aj
< 0 because by the envelope property, the minimum value function with variable
zh is at least as concave as the minimum value function with fixed zh.
A.1.2.2 The effect of the parameters on output and sales
Differentiating Equation (1.19) with respect to qj yields:
dpiI(·)
dqj
= σ − 1
σ
qj(z¯i)−
1
σQ
1
σ
j − ξj = 0 (F.O.C.)
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d2piI(·)
dq2j
= − 1
σ
σ − 1
σ
qj(z¯i)−
1
σ
−1Q
1
σ
j −
dξj
dqj
< 0 (S.O.C.)
We differentiate Equation (1.21) to determine how output varies with parameters xj:
dqj
dxj
= −
Qjσ
(
σ
σ−1ξj
)−σ−1
σ
σ−1
dξj
dxj
1 +Qjσ
(
σ
σ−1ξj
)−σ−1
σ
σ−1
dξj
dqj
To determine the sign of this term, note that its denominator is obtained by multiplying
the second order condition by −
(
1
σ
σ−1
σ
qj(z¯i)−
1
σ
−1Q
1
σ
j
)−1
. The denominator is thus the
product of two negative terms, so it is positive. The sign of dqj
dxj
given by − dξj
dxj
: output is
decreasing in the communication costs, in wages, and in the knowledge acquisition costs,
and increasing in the labor productivity.
The sales also vary inversely with marginal costs:
dp(qj)qj
dxj
= (1− σ)Qj
(
σ
σ − 1ξj
)−σ σ
σ − 1
(
dξj
dxj
+ dξj
dqj
dqj
dxj
)
= (1− σ)Qj
(
σ
σ − 1ξj
)−σ σ
σ − 1
dξj
dxj
1
1 +Qjσ
(
σ
σ−1ξj
)−σ−1
σ
σ−1
dξj
dqj
The sign of dp(qj)qj
dxj
is − dξj
dxj
by σ > 1.
The arguments of ξj, qj are omitted for simplicity of exposition.
A.1.3 General equilibrium
A.1.3.1 Closed economy
• Comparative statics: the marginal costs of production ξ
∂ξ
∂z¯
= − λe
−λz¯
A(1− e−λz¯)2 (w(1 + c(z¯ − zh)) + Aθwe
−λ(z¯−zh)(1 + czh))
+ 1
A(1− e−λz¯)(wc− λAθe
−λ(z¯−zh)w(1 + czh))
= − 1
A(1− e−λz¯)2 (λe
−λz¯w(1 + c(z¯ − zh)) + e−λz¯wc− Aθwce−λ(z¯−zh))
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< 0 by Assumption 1
∂ξ
∂q
= 0 by dzh
dq
= 0
∂ξ
∂c
= 1
A(1− e−λz¯)(w(z¯ − zh) + θAwe
−λ(z¯−zh)zh) > 0
∂ξ
∂w
= 1
A(1− e−λz¯)(1 + c(z¯ − zh) + θAe
−λ(z¯−zh)(1 + czh)) > 0
∂ξ
∂θ
= 1(1− e−λz¯)e
−λ(z¯−zh)w(1 + czh) > 0
∂ξ
∂A
= − 1
A2(1− e−λz¯)w(1 + c(z¯ − zh)) < 0
• Comparative statics: cut-off productivity level
dz¯∗
dxj
= −
dξj
dxj
dξj
dz¯∗
by the implicit function theorem
⇒ sgn
(
dz¯∗
dxj
)
= sgn
(
dξj
dxj
)
as dξj
dz¯∗
< 0
A.1.3.2 Open Economy
• Comparative statics: the profits from foreign direct investment
piI0(z¯i) =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (
Q0ξ0(z¯i, qI0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1)1−σ
+ Q1ξ1(z¯i, qI0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1)1−σ
)
∂piI0
∂z¯i
= −
(
σ
σ − 1
)−σ (
Q0ξ0(z¯i, qI0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1)−σ
∂ξ0
∂z¯
+ Q1ξ1(z¯i, qI0(z¯i), qI1(z¯i), w0, w1)−σ
∂ξ1
∂z¯
)
= −∂C
∂z¯i
≥ 0 by Assumption 1
Generally,
∂piI0
∂xj
= − ∂C
∂xj
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Correspondingly,
∂piI0
∂w1
= −
(
q1
A1(1− e−λz¯i)(1 + c1z1 +
1
λ
c1)
)
< 0 for z1 > z¯i − zh
∂piI0
∂w1
= −
(
q1
A1(1− e−λz¯i)(1 + c1(z¯i − zh))
)
< 0 for z1 = z¯i − zh
∂piI0
∂c1
= −
(
q1
A1(1− e−λz¯i)(w1z1 +
1
λ
w1)
)
< 0 for z1 > z¯i − zh
∂piI0
∂c1
= −
(
q1
A1(1− e−λz¯i)(w1(z¯i − zh))
)
< 0 for z1 = z¯i − zh
∂piI0
∂θ1
= −
(
q1
A1(1− e−λz¯i)w1c1
1
λθ1
)
< 0 for z1 > z¯i − zh
∂piI0
∂θ1
= −
(
q1
A1(1− e−λz¯i)w0(1 + c0zh)A1e
−λ(z¯i−zh)
)
< 0 for z1 = z¯i − zh
∂piI0
∂A1
= −
(
− q1
A21(1− e−λz¯)
w1(1 + c1z1 +
1
λ
c1)
)
> 0 for z1 > z¯i − zh
∂piI0
∂A1
= −
(
− q1
A21(1− e−λz¯)
w1(1 + c1(z¯i − zh))
)
> 0 for z1 = z¯i − zh
The effect of λ:
∂2piI0
∂θ1∂λ
= −
(
− q1z¯ie
−λz¯i
A1(1− e−λz¯i)2w1c1
1
λθ1
− q1
A1(1− e−λz¯i)w1c1
1
λ2θ1
)
< 0 for z1 > z¯i − zh
∂2piI0
∂θ1∂λ
= −
(
− q1z¯ie
−λz¯i
A1(1− e−λz¯i)2w0(1 + c0zh)A1e
−λ(z¯i−zh)
− (z¯i − zh)e−λ(z¯i−zh) q1
A1(1− e−λz¯i)w0(1 + c0zh)A1
)
< 0 for z1 = z¯i − zh
• Comparative statics: a multinational firm’s cut-off knowledge level z¯I
dz¯I
dxj
= −
dpiX
dxj
− dpiI
dxj
dpiX
dz¯I
− dpiI
dz¯I
by the implicit function theorem
⇒ sgn
(
dz¯I
dxj
)
= sgn
(
dpiX
dxj
− dpi
I
dxj
)
as dpi
X
dz¯I
− dpi
I
dz¯I
< 0
⇒ dz¯
I
dτ1
< 0, dz¯
I
dw1
> 0, dz¯
I
dc1
> 0, dz¯
I
dθ1
> 0, dz¯
I
dA1
< 0
139
Appendix: The organization of knowledge in multinational firms
A.1.4 Robustness
The cost minimization problem is given by
C(q0, q1, w0, w1) = min{nj ,zj}1j=0,nh,zh
1∑
j=0
(
njwj(1 + cjzj) + njhw0(1 + c0z
j
h)
)
s.t. njAj(1− e−λz¯) ≥ qj ∀j
zj ≥ z¯ − zjh ∀j
nh ≥
1∑
j=0
njAjθje
−λzj
nhj ≥ 0, zjh ≥ 0, zhj ≤ z¯
nj ≥ 0, zj ≥ 0, zj ≤ z¯ ∀j
• Both knowledge constraints are binding: zj = z¯ − zjh.
• The number of production workers is determined as before. The number of man-
agers responsible for production in country j is given by njh =
qjθje
−λ(z¯−zh)
1−e−λz¯ .
• Managerial knowledge levels are given by wjcj
Aj
= θje−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zjh)).
• The comparative statics follow from similar considerations as in the domestic case,
see Section A.1.3.1.
A.2 Additional regression results
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Table A.2: Regression results for the within-firm differences in productivity across coun-
tries, including wages
Alternative determinants, including wages
1 2 3 4 5 6
Log GDP 0.021 0.081∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.011)
Log flight time 0.059∗∗ −0.009 −0.038∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.035 0.076∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.035)
Linguistic distance 0.021 −0.080∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.094∗ −0.066 −0.076∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.045) (0.043) (0.053) (0.034)
Time difference to Germany 0.057∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Public expenditure per pupil, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
% of GDP p.c. (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
GDP per employee 0.211∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.013)
Log compensation per employee −0.033∗∗∗ −0.009 0.019∗ −0.005 0.005 −0.013∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
Trust, survey 1996 0.005 0.092+
(0.034) (0.050)
Statutory tax rate 0.004∗ −0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Log costs to enforce contract 0.172∗∗∗
(0.034)
Log time to enforce contracts 0.060+ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.027)
# procedures to enforce contracts 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002)
Log costs to register property 0.028∗∗
(0.010)
Log time to register property −0.073∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009)
# procedures to register property −0.007
(0.006)
Log distance −0.056∗∗
(0.022)
Constant 4.353∗∗∗ 3.666∗∗∗ 2.698∗∗∗ 3.945∗∗∗ 2.916∗∗∗ 3.682∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.159) (0.288) (0.234) (0.483) (0.162)
R2 0.132 0.136 0.144 0.143 0.148 0.137
Observations 87, 371 91, 600 62, 856 55, 385 52, 530 91, 600
# parents 6, 775 6, 867 5, 469 5, 182 5, 109 6, 867
# country combinations 8, 498 8, 628 6, 399 5, 821 5, 714 8, 628
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Dependent variable: foreign
productivity defined as ln foreign salesforeign employees . Covariate definitions: see Table 1.1. Sample based on majority owned foreign
affiliates.
Table A.3: Regression results for the cut-off productivity levels, additional regressors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Domestic productivity
Log GDP −0.178∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.048) (0.031) (0.030)
Log flight time 0.325∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.055) (0.064) (0.052) (0.052)
Linguistic distance 0.472∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.277∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗ 0.347∗∗
(0.126) (0.098) (0.107) (0.096) (0.105) (0.106) (0.115)
Time difference to Germany 0.045∗∗ 0.010 0.012 0.007 0.043∗∗ 0.013 0.012
(0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
(Continued on next page)
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Table A.3: Regression results for the cut-off productivity levels, additional regressors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GDP per employee 0.067 −0.007 0.043 −0.011 0.085 0.072 0.074
(0.055) (0.033) (0.043) (0.039) (0.068) (0.052) (0.054)
Public expenditure per pupil, 0.022 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.032∗ 0.013 0.012
% GDP p.c. (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Bilateral trust 0.063 −0.098
(0.093) (0.199)
Statutory tax rate 0.008 −0.000
(0.005) (0.004)
Cost of enforcing contracts 0.001
(0.001)
Time to enforce contracts −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
# of proc. to enforce contracts 0.026∗
(0.011)
Cost of registering property 0.001
(0.010)
Time to register property −0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
# of proc. to register property −0.003
(0.016)
Rule of Law −0.175∗
(0.068)
Government Effectiveness −0.182∗
(0.078)
R2 0.387 0.327 0.338 0.342 0.391 0.329 0.329
Observations 5, 280 8, 232 8, 200 7, 231 4, 627 8, 280 8, 280
Global productivity
Log GDP −0.153∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.031) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033)
Log flight time 0.219∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.151∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.054) (0.048) (0.050) (0.057) (0.051) (0.053)
Linguistic distance 0.597∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗ 0.262 0.435∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗ 0.385∗∗
(0.113) (0.130) (0.132) (0.116) (0.092) (0.128) (0.134)
Time difference to Germany 0.059∗∗∗ 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.056∗∗∗ 0.006 0.005
(0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP per employee 0.170∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.090 0.171∗∗ 0.127 0.120
(0.051) (0.039) (0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.069) (0.066)
Public expenditure per pupil, 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.028∗ 0.016 0.015
% GDP p.c. (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Bilateral trust 0.152 −0.043
(0.107) (0.120)
Statutory tax rate 0.014∗ 0.003
(0.007) (0.005)
Cost of enforcing contracts −0.000
(0.001)
Time to enforce contracts −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
# of proc. to enforce contracts 0.024∗
(0.009)
Cost of registering property 0.005
(0.011)
Time to register property −0.000 −0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
# of proc. to register property 0.017
(0.017)
Rule of Law −0.101
(0.079)
Government Effectiveness −0.087
(0.083)
R2 0.465 0.366 0.366 0.364 0.475 0.358 0.357
Observations 6, 237 10, 228 10, 184 8, 958 5, 442 10, 309 10, 309
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All regressions include a constant that is omitted
for space considerations.
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Table A.4: Regression results for the cut-off productivity levels, alternative regressors
Domestic productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6
Log GDP −0.159∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.039) (0.028) (0.029) (0.023)
Log flight time 0.212∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.053) (0.056) (0.035) (0.034) (0.052)
Linguistic distance 0.399∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.098) (0.096) (0.090)
Time difference to Germany 0.008 −0.017 0.009 0.018∗ 0.017∗ 0.010
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
GDP per employee −0.002 0.002 −0.002 0.082 0.079
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.042) (0.042)
Public expenditure per pupil, 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.042∗∗∗
% GDP p.c. (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009)
Linguistic distance, 0.401∗∗∗
off. language(s) to German (0.098)
Share of pop. speaking English 0.001
(0.001)
Log market potential −0.173∗∗∗
(0.031)
PISA Maths score −0.002∗
(0.001)
PISA Science score −0.002∗
(0.001)
Log productivity p. emp., OECD 0.017
(0.026)
Constant 7.761∗∗∗ 7.335∗∗∗ 6.795∗∗∗ 7.133∗∗∗ 7.131∗∗∗ 4.731∗∗∗
(0.531) (0.687) (0.461) (0.530) (0.538) (0.425)
R2 0.325 0.340 0.326 0.355 0.355 0.398
Observations 8, 293 6, 209 8, 280 3, 604 3, 604 5, 332
Global productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6
Log GDP −0.152∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.058∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.033) (0.027)
Log flight time 0.235∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.044) (0.043) (0.049)
Linguistic distance 0.409∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.328∗
(0.128) (0.120) (0.113) (0.134)
Time difference to Germany 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.018 0.017 0.034∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
GDP per employee 0.084 0.038 0.082 0.179∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.051) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048)
Public expenditure per pupil, 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.058∗∗∗
% GDP p.c. (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Linguistic distance, 0.410∗∗
off. language(s) to German (0.121)
Share of pop. speaking English 0.004∗
(0.002)
Log market potential −0.165∗∗∗
(0.036)
PISA Maths score −0.003∗
(0.001)
PISA Science score −0.003∗
(0.001)
Log productivity p. emp., OECD −0.023
(0.028)
Constant 4.305∗∗∗ 4.890∗∗∗ 3.251∗∗∗ 8.158∗∗∗ 8.168∗∗∗ 2.156∗∗∗
(0.550) (0.603) (0.436) (0.633) (0.661) (0.454)
R2 0.355 0.396 0.356 0.386 0.385 0.447
Observations 10, 337 7, 493 10, 309 4, 468 4, 468 6, 256
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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A.3 The Heckman selection model
One possibility for addressing the self-selection of firms across destinations is to estimate
a Heckman selection model.
The Heckman selection model consists of two equations, a selection equation and the
regression equation. The model does not allow using parent–year fixed effects. Instead,
we use parent sector dummies and include domestic productivity to take differences across
firms into account. This implies that the Heckman selection model is different from
the model estimated above. Whereas our regression above strictly compares differences
in the performance of one and the same firm across countries without taking the self-
selection of the set of countries into account, the Heckman selection model explicitly
models the investment decision of firms. At the same time, the Heckman selection model
does not recognize which observations belong to the same firm, so the results do not
cleanly distinguish between within-firm differences across countries and differences within
countries across firms.
The model is specified as follows:
y∗1ijt = η0 + η1P˜it + η2Q˜jt + η3θ˜jt + η4c˜jt + η5w˜jt + η6A˜jt + η7f˜ Ijt + αs + αt + u1ijt
y1ijt = 1(y∗1ijt ≥ 0)
y∗2ijt = θ0 + θ1P˜it + θ2Q˜jt + θ3θ˜jt + θ4c˜jt + θ5w˜jt + θ6A˜jt + αs + αt + u2ijt
y2ijt = y1ijty∗2ijt
where P˜it denotes domestic productivity, and f˜ Ijt denotes the fixed costs of investment
that are used as exclusion restriction.
The first two equations describe the self-selection of firms across countries. y∗1ijt denotes
the latent difference of the productivity level of firm i in country j in period t and the
firm-specific cut-off productivity level y¯∗1ijt. Only if the latent difference is positive, i.e., if
firm productivity is above the threshold y¯∗1ijt, does the firm decide to invest in a country.
In this case, we observe firm productivity y2ijt as described by the second set of equations.
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The Heckman selection model rests on strict assumptions on the unobserved error terms
u1ijt, u2ijt: they are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, so each is assumed to
have a normal density. It is possible to test whether this assumption is approximately
fulfilled in our sample by running an OLS regression of the investment decision and the
observed foreign productivities on the covariates and analyzing the resulting residuals.
Figures A.1 and A.2 present kernel density estimates of the distribution of the residuals.
Figure A.1: Kernel density, residual for-
eign productivity
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Figure A.2: Kernel density, residual in-
vestment equation
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Figures depict kernel density estimates of the residuals of an OLS regression of the foreign productivities and the investment decision on the
covariates, respectively.
It is evident that the assumption of normally distributed errors is defendable for the
distribution of foreign productivities. However, it is difficult to argue that the assumption
is fulfilled for the extensive margin: the distribution is not symmetric, it is uneven and
has mass far in the right tail. The assumptions of the Heckman selection model are thus
not fulfilled.
Correspondingly, it is not surprising that the regression results presented in Table A.5
are not stable. In the selection equation, the costs of starting a business, GDP and the
communication costs are consistent with expectations. Paradoxically, a shorter time to
start a business and higher labor productivity are predicted to depress the probability
of investment. The coefficient pattern in the regression equation is incoherent: the ef-
fects of GDP and communication costs are consistent with the theoretical predictions
in columns 3 to 5, but the signs flip in columns 1, 2 and 6. In addition, Mill’s ratio is
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significant at the 0.1% level in columns 1-3 and 6, but insignificant in column 5. Overall,
the Heckman selection model does not yield meaningful results.
Table A.5: Heckman selection model
1 2 3 4 5 6
Foreign productivity
Domestic productivity 0.312
∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Log GDP −0.028
∗∗ −0.006 0.261∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029)
Linguistic distance, −0.526∗∗∗ −0.819∗∗∗ −0.692∗∗∗ −0.436∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗
official language(s) to German (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.041) (0.044)
Log flighttime −0.221
∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ −0.060∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.024) (0.025)
Time difference to Germany 0.018
∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Total public expenditure on education, 0.131∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
share of GDP (0.008) (0.008)
GDP per employee 0.300
∗∗∗
(0.006)
Selection equation: investment decision
Domestic productivity 0.037
∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Log GDP 0.350
∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Linguistic distance, −0.760∗∗∗ −0.382∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ −0.381∗∗∗ −0.410∗∗∗
official language(s) to German (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Log flighttime −0.276
∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Time difference to Germany 0.004
∗∗∗ −0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total public expenditure on education, −0.070∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗
share of GDP (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per employee −0.025
∗∗∗
(0.004)
Cost of starting a business −0.005
∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time to start a business −0.001
∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −6.372
∗∗∗ −5.738∗∗∗ −4.739∗∗∗ −4.890∗∗∗ −3.902∗∗∗ −3.890∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044) (0.047) (0.054) (0.064) (0.065)
Mill’s ratio −0.574∗∗∗ −0.513∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ −0.152 −0.545∗∗∗
Number of observations 1,112,575 1,107,922 979,577 933,035 629,022 543,749
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Dependent variable: foreign productivity - ln (foreign sales/foreign employees), investment decision - 1 if in coun-
try.Covariate definitions: see Table 1.1.
A.4 Discussion: A monitoring based model
A multinational firm consists of nh managers in the headquarters in the home country,
and nj production workers in the home country j = 0 and the foreign country j = 1.
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Production workers input labor to the production process and the managers supervise
them.
As in Qian (1994), output depends on the effort level aj exerted by the production
workers in country j: qj = njajAj. Aj denotes the maximum amount of output that can
be produced with one unit of labor input and full effort aj = 1, and corresponds to the
labor productivity in j.
Exerting effort is costly. The cost of effort is described by the function g(a) with g′(a) > 0.
The managers supervise the production workers to ensure that they exert a sufficient
amount of effort. We assume that the managers exert full effort ah = 1 in supervision,
consistent with the literature. Production workers know that they are monitored at any
point in time with probability Pj.
The workers receive the firm specific wage wj if they are monitored and exert a sufficient
amount of effort aj ≥ a∗j or if they are not monitored, and nothing if they are supervised
and found to exert insufficient effort aj < a∗j . It is necessary to assume that they receive
the wage whenever they are not monitored because the firm would otherwise have an
incentive to claim that they are never monitored. If workers can prove whether they are
monitored or not, the first best solution is implementable (Qian, 1994).
The optimal wage is determined by the incentive compatibility constraint that
wj − g(a∗j) ≥ Pj · 0 + (1− Pj) · wj − g(aj) ∀aj < a∗j
This implies that wj = 1Pj g(a
∗
j). Wages increase in the optimal effort level a∗j and decrease
in the monitoring probability Pj.
The firm chooses the country and firm specific optimal monitoring probabilities Pj and
the optimal effort levels a∗j, j=0,1 to minimize the overall costs of production, which are
made up of factor input costs and monitoring costs. The costs θj to monitor a worker vary
by country. It is generally assumed that θ1 ≥ θ0, so foreign workers are more costly to
monitor. The monitoring costs are influenced by the firm specific monitoring technology
ψ, where lower ψ corresponds to a better monitoring technology. The cost minimization
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problem of a multinational firm is given by
C(q0, q1) = min{Pj ,a∗j}1j=0
1∑
j=0
njwj + nh + ψθjPjnj
s.t. njAja∗j ≥ qj ∀j
nh ≥
1∑
j=0
njPj
wj =
1
Pj
g(a∗j)
nh ≥ 0, Pj ∈ [0, 1] ∀j
nj ≥ 0, a∗j ≥ 0 ∀j
The remuneration of managers is normalized to 1.
The optimal effort levels are uniform across countries:
a∗j =
2g(a∗j)
g′(a∗j)
The optimal monitoring probabilities are given by
Pj =
(
g(aj)
1 + ψθj
) 1
2
The optimal monitoring probabilities thus decrease in the cross border monitoring costs
θj, and increase in better monitoring technologies ψ−1. Within firms, foreign workers con-
sequently receive higher optimal wages, and the marginal costs of production are higher in
countries with higher cross border monitoring costs. The mechanism is therefore suitable
for rationalizing the within-firm differences in productivity revealed in Section 3.5.
As foreign marginal costs increase in θj, only firms with better monitoring technolgies
ψ−1 are able to profitably invest abroad. Consequently, the remuneration of domestic
production workers of multinational firms is lower than the remuneration of production
workers of domestic firms, as P0 =
(
g(a∗0)
1+ψθ0
) 1
2 decreases in ψ. This implication is at odds
with the empirical evidence.
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In contrast, in the knowledge based model of the organization of multinational firms,
firms with higher overall knowledge level z¯ become multinationals. They are predicted
to pay higher domestic wages. As the following equations demonstrate, the knowledge
level of production workers in the home country z0 is increasing in the overall knowledge
level of the firm, independently from whether the constraint zj = z¯− zh is binding in the
home country (φ0 6= 0) or in the foreign country (φ1 6= 0).
dzh
dz¯
= −−λ(1 + c0zh)q1θ1e
−λ(z¯−zh)λw0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))
d (1.12)/dzh
> 0 for φ1 6= 0
⇒ dz0
dz¯
= c0
λ(1 + c0zh)
dzh
dz¯
> 0
dzh
dz¯
= −−λ(1 + c0zh)q0θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)λw0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))
d (1.12)/dzh
> 0 for φ0 6= 0
⇒ dz0
dz¯
= 1− dzh
dz¯
> 0 by dzh
dz¯
< 1;
dzh
dz¯
< 1 by
dzh
dz¯
= q0θ0e
−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))λ(1 + c0zh)
λq0θ0e−λ(z¯−zh)w0((c0 + λ(1 + c0zh))2 + λc0(1 + c0zh))− λ q0w0c
2
0
A0
= 1
λ
1
1 +
q0θ0e−λ(z¯−zh)w0c0(c0+2λ(1+c0zh))−
q0c20w0
A0
q0θ0e−λ(z¯−zh)w0(c0+λ(1+c0zh))λ(1+c0zh)
< 1 if q0θ0e−λ(z¯−zh)λ(1 + c0zh) > c0q1θ1e−λz1 ,
which is the case by d(1.12)
dzh
> 0.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Theory
B.1.1 Optimal organizational structure
Optimization problem at production locations. Given the number of layers, the
optimal number of employees and the optimal knowledge level per layer of the single
establishments are derived by differentiating the Lagrangian equation. The first order
conditions are:
∂Lj
∂z0L,j
= dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwj(1 + cjz0L,j)λ+
dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwjcj
− ξj dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jλAj(1− e−λZ¯H )− φj + χj = 0 (B.1)
∂Lj
∂z`L,j
= dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwj(1 + cjz0L,j)λ
+ dj
θj
eλ
∑L−1
k=` z
k
L,jwjcj +
∑`
k=1
dj
θj
eλ
∑L−1
m=k z
m
L,jλwj(1 + cjzkL,j)
− ξjAj(1− e−λZ¯H ) dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jλ− φj + χj = 0 (B.2)
∂Lj
∂dj
= 1
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwj(1 + cjz0L,j) +
L−1∑
`=1
1
θj
eλ
∑L−1
k=` z
k
L,jwj(1 + cjz`L,j) + pj
− ξjAj(1− e−λZ¯H ) 1
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j = 0 (B.3)
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∂Lj
∂ξj
= qj − Aj(1− e−λZ¯H ) dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j = 0 (B.4)
∂Lj
∂φj
= ZH −
L−1∑
`=0
z`L,j = 0 (B.5)
∂Lj
∂χj
=
L−1∑
`=0
z`L,j − Z¯H = 0 (B.6)
We use the following notation: ZL−1L,j denotes total knowledge at the establishment, i.e.,
ZL−1L,j =
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j. The constraint ZL−1L,j = ZH is binding for j = j¯ and slack for j = jˆ.
ZL−1L,j = Z¯H cannot be optimal, because otherwise, headquarter capacities would be used
without benefits in terms of output, so χj = 0 ∀j. Equation (B.4) determines dj. ξj¯
follows from Equation (B.3), ξjˆ follows from Equation (B.1) with φjˆ = 0. z0L,j follows
from Equation (B.5) for j = j¯ and from Equation (B.3) for j = jˆ after inserting ξjˆ. z1L,j
results from the difference of Equations (B.2) and (B.1). z`L,j, ` > 1, L− 1 > 1 results
from the difference of Equation (B.2) for ` and for `− 1. φj¯ results from Equation (B.1)
after substituting for ξj¯.
Optimization problem of the firm. The optimal organizational structure of the
firm is determined by differentiating the overall cost function with respect to ZH , Z¯H
and {pj}1j=0.
With κ denoting the multiplier for ∑j dj = 1, the first order conditions are given by:
∂LMNE
∂ZH
= −φH +
∑
j
φj −
∑
j
pj
∂dj
∂ZH
+ κ
∑
j
∂dj
∂ZH
= 0 (B.7)
∂LMNE
∂Z¯H
= φH −
∑
j
χj −
∑
j
ξjλe
−λZ¯HAj
dj
ηθj
eλZ
L−1
L,j −∑
j
pj
∂dj
∂Z¯H
+ κ
∑
j
∂dj
∂Z¯H
= 0 (B.8)
∂LMNE
∂pj
= κ∂dj
∂pj
− pj ∂dj
∂pj
= 0 (B.9)
∂LMNE
∂κ
=
∑
j
dj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj)− 1 = 0 (B.10)
pj = κ for ZL−1L,j > ZH follows from Equation (B.9). Note that
∂dj
∂pj
= 0 for ZL−1L,j = ZH ,
so pj¯ is undefined. Equation (B.7) defines κ. Z¯H follows from substituting for κ in
Equation (B.8). ZH is defined by the constraint (B.10).
152
Appendix: Knowledge transmission costs and multi-establishment firms
B.1.2 Comparative statics
Ad Proposition 1. We keep the following notation: the constraint ZL−1L,j ≡
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j =
ZH is binding for j = j¯ and slack for j = jˆ. Define:
γ1 =
1
ηθjˆ
wjˆcjˆe
λZL−1
L,jˆ + 1
ηθj¯
wjˆcjˆ
qjˆAj¯
qj¯Ajˆ
eλZHe−2λZ¯H > 0, (B.11)
γ3 =
1
ηθj¯
eλZH (1− e−λZ¯H )
(
wj¯cj¯(1 + e−λZ¯H )− w0c0
Aj¯
qj¯
(
1 +
L−1∑
`=1
1
η
e
λ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,j¯
))
, (B.12)
γ4 = −e−λZH
(
1 +
L−1∑
`=1
1
η
e
λ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,j¯
)
− 1
ηθj¯
wj¯cj¯
w0c0
e−2λZ¯H < 0, (B.13)
γ6 =
qjˆθjˆAj¯
qj¯θj¯Ajˆ
e
−λZL−1
L,jˆ
(
1 +
L−1∑
`=1
1
η
e
λ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,jˆ
)
+ 1
ηθj¯
qjˆAj¯
qj¯Ajˆ
wjˆcjˆ
w0c0
e−2λZ¯H > 0. (B.14)
In the following, we assume that γ3 > 0. This is the case whenever the marginal costs of
increasing ZH , wj¯cj¯
ηqj¯e
−λ
∑L−2
`=0 z
`
L,j
Aj¯(1−e−λZ¯H )
, is larger than the marginal benefit of increasing ZH ,
w0c0. If this assumption does not hold, κ ≤ 0, so the assumption does not seem to be
particularly strong.
We differentiate the optimum Equations (2.20), (2.21) and (2.15)—after substituting for
pj—with respect to the different model parameters xj. That is, for each model parameter
xj, we differentiate each of the equations and take both direct effects of the parameters
on the equations and indirect effects via dZ¯H
dxj
,
dz0
L,jˆ
dxj
and
dz0
L,j¯
dxj
into account. Substituting
for dZ¯H
dxj
yields a system of two linear equation in two unknowns,
dz0
L,jˆ
dxj
and
dz0
L,j¯
dxj
:
γ1
dz0
L,jˆ
dxj
= γ2 + γ3
dz0L,j¯
dxj
(B.15)
γ4
dz0L,j¯
dxj
= γ5 + γ6
dz0
L,jˆ
dxj
(B.16)
This implies:
dz0
L,jˆ
dxj
=
(
γ1 − γ3γ6
γ4
)−1 (
γ2 +
γ3γ5
γ4
)
(B.17)
dz0L,j¯
dxj
=
(
γ4 − γ6γ3
γ1
)−1 (
γ5 +
γ6γ2
γ1
)
(B.18)
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As
γ1 − γ3γ6
γ4
> 0 and γ4 − γ6γ3
γ1
< 0,
the signs of the derivatives are determined by γ2 and γ5, which vary with xj.
In the following, we list the expressions for γ2 and γ5 and derive the resulting implications
for
dz0
L,jˆ
dxj
and
dz0
L,j¯
dxj
. In doing so, we distinguish between locations j = j¯ with ZL−1
L,j¯
= ZH
and j = jˆ with ZL−1
L,jˆ
> ZH . As the knowledge acquisition costs c0 and the wages w0
additionally affect the costs that arise at the headquarters, we additionally distinguish
between j = 0 and j 6= 0 for the two model parameters.
B.1.2.1 Effect of communication costs
B.1.2.1.1 θjˆ
γ2 =
1
λθ2
jˆ
cjˆwjˆe
λzL−1
L,jˆ > 0 (B.19)
γ5 = − 1
λθj¯
e
−λZL−1
L,jˆ
qjˆAj¯
qj¯Ajˆ
< 0 (B.20)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dθjˆ
> 0,
dz0
L,j¯
dθjˆ
ambiguous.
B.1.2.1.2 θj¯
γ2 = − 1
λθ2
j¯
wj¯cj¯eλzL−1L,j¯ − w0c0Aj¯(1− e−λZ¯H )ηqj¯e−λZH
 < 0 (B.21)
γ5 = − 1
λθ2
j¯
Aj¯
qj¯
(
1
η
(1− e−λZ¯H )− qjˆθjˆ
Ajˆ
e
−λZL−1
L,jˆ
)
< 0 (B.22)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dθj¯
ambiguous,
dz0
L,j¯
dθj¯
> 0.
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B.1.2.2 Effect of wages
B.1.2.2.1 wjˆ, wjˆ = w0
γ2 =− 1
λθjˆ
c0e
λzL−1
L,jˆ − coAj¯(1− e
−λZ¯H )
ληqj¯θj¯e
−λZH
+ 1
λθj¯
eλZHe−2λZ¯H
wj¯
w0
(
1 + cj¯z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
cj¯
)
< 0 (B.23)
γ5 =−
ληqjˆθjˆ
Ajˆ(1− e−λZ¯H )
e
−λZL−1
L,jˆ
(
1 +
L−1∑
`=1
1
η
e
λ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,jˆ
)
− e
−2λZ¯H
(1− e−λZ¯H )2
(
ηqj¯θj¯
Aj¯
e−λZH +
ηqjˆθjˆ
Ajˆ
e
−λZL−1
L,jˆ
)
λ
qjˆ
Ajˆ
< 0 (B.24)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dwjˆ
ambiguous,
dz0
L,j¯
dwjˆ
> 0.
B.1.2.2.2 wjˆ, wjˆ 6= w0
γ2 = −
(
1
λθjˆ
cjˆe
λzL−1
L,jˆ +
qjˆAj¯
qj¯Ajˆ
1
ηθj¯
eλZHe−2λZ¯H
(
1 + cjˆz0L,jˆ +
1
λ
cjˆ
))
< 0 (B.25)
γ5 =
1
ηθj¯
Aj¯qjˆ
Ajˆqj¯
1
w0c0
e−2λZ¯H
(
1 + cjˆz0L,jˆ +
1
λ
cjˆ
)
> 0 (B.26)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dwjˆ
< 0,
dz0
L,j¯
dwjˆ
ambiguous.
B.1.2.2.3 wj¯, wj¯ = w0
γ2 =
1
θjˆ
wjˆcjˆ
w0c0
e
λzL−1
L,jˆ +
Aj¯
qj¯
λ
ηθj¯
e−2λZ¯HeλZH
qjˆwjˆ
Ajˆw0c0
(
1 + cjˆz0L,jˆ +
1
λ
cjˆ
)
> 0 (B.27)
γ5 = − 1
ηθj¯
Aj¯
qj¯
e−2λZ¯H
qjˆwjˆ(1 + cjˆz0L,jˆ +
1
λ
cjˆ)
Ajˆw
2
0c0
< 0 (B.28)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
wj¯
> 0,
dz0
L,j¯
wj¯
ambiguous.
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B.1.2.2.4 wj¯, wj¯ 6= w0
γ2 =
1
λθj¯
cj¯e
λzL−1
L,j¯ − 1
ηθj¯
eλZHe−2λZ¯H
(
1 + cj¯z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
cj¯
)
> 0 (B.29)
γ5 =
1
ηθj¯
e−2λZ¯H
1
w0c0
(
1 + cj¯z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
cj¯
)
> 0 (B.30)
⇒ z
0
L,jˆ
wj¯
ambiguous,
dz0
L,j¯
dwj¯
< 0.
B.1.2.3 Knowledge acquisition costs
B.1.2.3.1 cjˆ, cjˆ = c0
γ2 =− 1
λθjˆ
w0e
λzL−1
L,jˆ − w0Aj¯(1− e
−λZ¯H )
ληqj¯θj¯e
−λZH
+
w0c0Aj¯
ληqj¯θj¯
e−2λZ¯HeλZH
(
qjˆλ
Ajˆc
2
0
+
qj¯wj¯
Aj¯w0c
2
0
λ(1 + cj¯z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
cj¯)
)
< 0 (B.31)
γ5 =− λe
−2λZ¯H
(1− e−λZ¯H )2η
(
qj¯θj¯e
−λZH
Aj¯
+
qjˆθjˆ
Ajˆ
e
−λZL−1
L,jˆ
)
qj¯wj¯
Aj¯w0c
2
0
(
1 + cj¯z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
cj¯
)
< 0 (B.32)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dcjˆ
ambiguous,
dz0
L,j¯
dcjˆ
> 0.
B.1.2.3.2 cjˆ, cjˆ 6= c0
γ2 = − 1
λθjˆ
wjˆe
λzL−1
L,jˆ − 1
ηθj¯
Aj¯qjˆ
Ajˆqj¯
eλZHe−2λZ¯Hwjˆ
(
z0L,jˆ +
1
λ
)
< 0 (B.33)
γ5 =
1
ηθj¯
Aj¯
qj¯
e−2λZ¯H
qjˆwjˆ
Ajˆw0c0
(
z0L,jˆ +
1
λ
)
> 0 (B.34)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dcjˆ
< 0,
dz0
L,j¯
dcjˆ
ambiguous.
B.1.2.3.3 cj¯, cj¯ = c0
γ2 =
1
λθj¯
w0e
λzL−1
L,j¯ − w0Aj¯(1− e
−λZ¯H )
ληqj¯θj¯e
−λZH
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+
w0c0Aj¯
ηqj¯θj¯
eλZHe−2λZ¯H
 qj¯wj¯
Aj¯w0c
2
0
+
qjˆwjˆ(1 + cjˆz0L,jˆ +
1
λ
cjˆ)
Ajˆw0c
2
0
 > 0 (B.35)
γ5 =− qj¯wj¯
Aj¯w0c
2
0
−
qjˆwjˆ(1 + cjˆz0L,jˆ +
1
λ
cjˆ)
Ajˆw0c
2
0
< 0 (B.36)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dcj¯
> 0,
dz0
L,j¯
dcj¯
ambiguous.
B.1.2.3.4 cj¯, cj¯ 6= c0
γ2 =
1
λθj¯
wj¯e
λzL−1
L,j¯ − 1
ηθj¯
wj¯e
−2λZ¯HeλZH
(
z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
)
> 0 (B.37)
γ5 =
e−2λZ¯H
ηθj¯
wj¯
w0c0
(z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
) > 0 (B.38)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dcj¯
ambiguous,
dz0
L,j¯
dcj¯
< 0.
B.1.2.4 Effect of labor productivity
B.1.2.4.1 Ajˆ
γ2 =
Aj¯
ηqj¯θj¯
qjˆwjˆ(1 + cjˆz0L,jˆ +
1
λ
cjˆ)
A2
jˆ
eλZHe−2λZ¯H > 0 (B.39)
γ5 =
Aj¯
qj¯θj¯
1
ηλAjˆ
(
ηqjˆθjˆ
Ajˆ
e
−λZL−1
L,jˆ − e−2λZ¯H λqjˆwjˆ
Ajˆw0c0
(1 + cjˆz0L,jˆ +
1
λ
cjˆ)
)
> 0 (B.40)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dAjˆ
ambiguous,
dz0
L,j¯
Ajˆ
< 0.
B.1.2.4.2 Aj¯
γ2 =
w0c0
ληθj¯qj¯e
−λZH
(
−1 + e−λZ¯H
(
1 + e−λZ¯H
λqj¯wj¯
Aj¯w0c0
(1 + cj¯z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
cj¯)
))
< 0 (B.41)
by − 1 + e−λZ¯H
(
1 + e−λZ¯H
λqj¯wj¯
Aj¯w0c0
(1 + cj¯z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
cj¯)
)
< −1 + e−2λZ¯H
(
eλZ¯H + eλZ¯H − 1
)
= −(1− e−λZ¯H )2
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γ5 =
1
λAj¯
e−λZH − 1
ηθj¯
e−2λZ¯H
wj¯(1 + cj¯z0L,j¯ +
1
λ
cj¯)
Aj¯w0c0
> 0 (B.42)
⇒ dz
0
L,jˆ
dAj¯
< 0,
dz0
L,j¯
Aj¯
ambiguous.
Ad Proposition 2. To determine the effect of the model parameters on the difference
in knowledge levels, we derive the derivative of the difference in knowledge levels with
respect to z0L,j and use the insights from Proposition 1.
The difference in the knowledge levels of two adjacent layers is given by
∆ = z`L,j − z`−1L,j
d∆
dz`−1L,j
= eλz
`−1
L,j − 1 > 0
By Equation (2.16), the knowledge at higher layers is a function of z0L,j. The difference
between the knowledge at higher layer and production knowledge increases in z0L,j by
∆ = z`L,j − z0L,j
d∆
dz0L,j
= 1
η
eλ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,j − 1 > 0
The difference in knowledge levels is thus increasing in θj and wj 6= w0 by the arguments
in Proposition 1.
The effect of knowledge acquisition costs is ambiguous as
d∆
dcj
=
(
1
η
eλ
∑`−1
k=0 z
k
L,j − 1
)
dz0L,j
dcj
+ 1
c2j
and dz
0
L,j
dcj
< 0 for cj 6= c0.
B.1.3 Endogenous size of the headquarters
If the number of headquarter layers is endogenous, it is necessary to separately analyze
the cost minimization problem at the headquarters given Z¯H , ZH . The cost minimization
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problem is given by:
CH(ZH , Z¯H ,
∑
j
δj) = min
H≥0
CH(ZH , Z¯H ,
∑
j
δj) (B.43)
CH(ZH , Z¯H ,
∑
j
δj) = min{nhH ,zhH}Hh=0≥0
[
H∑
h=0
nhHw0(1 + c0zhH)
]
(B.44)
s.t. nHH = 1 (B.45)
n0H =
∑
j
δj (B.46)
nhH =
∑
j
(
δj
θj
e−λ(ZH−Z
L−1
L,j )e−λ
∑h−1
k=0 z
k
H
)
(B.47)
H∑
h=0
zhH = Z¯H − ZH (B.48)
where H + 1 denotes the number of hierarchical layers at the headquarters, h = 0, ..., H
refers to the single layers and δj counts the problems that are sent from the establish-
ments at the different locations j = 0, 1. The optimal organizational structure at the
headquarters is derived for any arbitrary combination of {δj}1j=0.
As before, the number of layers H + 1 is determined via a discrete decision: the optimal
number of layers yields the lowest costs (Equation B.43). The firm chooses the optimal
number of employees nhH and the optimal knowledge levels zhH per headquarter layer h
given the optimal number of layers in order to minimize the costs that occur at the head-
quarters (Equation B.44). In doing so, the number of employees at the highest layer is
restricted to one (Equation B.45). At the lowest headquarter layer h = 0, a sufficient
number of employees has to be hired such that all problems 1
ηθj
δj sent from the different
production locations can be listened to (Equation B.46). The number of employees at the
intermediate layers is endogenously determined. In doing so, it is necessary to take know-
ledge overlaps between establishments and headquarters into account as they decrease
the probability that a solution is found in a lower headquarter layer (Equation B.47).
If there is no knowledge overlap, the probability that a solution is found in the lowest
layer is equal to e−λz0H . If there is a knowledge overlap, the probability is lower: for
sure, the solution is not found in the interval from ZL−1
L,jˆ
− ZH . The probability that
a solution is found is given by e−λ(ZH+z
0
H−ZL−1L,jˆ ). That is why δj takes account of the
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origin of problems. Finally, knowledge at all headquarter layers is restricted to sum up
to headquarter knowledge Z¯H − ZH (equation B.48). The cost minimization problem is
thus more involved than before, but as the delineation of headquarters is unobserved in
the data, it does not yield new testable insights.
To endogenize [ZH , Z¯H ], the firm solves
min
ZH ,Z¯H ,{δj ,pj}Jj=0
CH(ZH , Z¯H ,
∑
j
δj)
+
1∑
j=0
(
Cj(dj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj), ZH , Z¯H , pj)− pjdj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj)
)
(B.49)
s.t. Z¯H ≥ ZH (B.50)
δj = dj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj) ∀j (B.51)
The number of problems sent from the establishment at j, dj, has to be equal to the
number of problems anticipated in the optimization problem of the headquarters, δj.
The first order conditions are analogous to the first order conditions in Appendix B.1.1.
This yields:
z0H =
1
λθj¯
wj¯cj¯
w0c0
e
λzL−1
L,j¯ − 1
λ
∑1
j=0
qjθj
Aj
e−λZ
L−1
L,j
qj¯θj¯
Aj¯
e−λZH
− 1
c0
(B.52)
eλZ¯H + e−λZ¯H
∑1
j=0 1(ZL−1L,j > ZH)qj/Aj∑1
j=0 qj/Aj
= 1 +
1∑
j=0
λqjwj
Ajw0c0
(
1 + cjz0L,j +
cj
λ
)
−
∑1
j=0 1(ZL−1L,j > ZH)qj/Aj∑
j qj/Aj
 1∑
j=0
ηqjθje
−λZL−1L,j
Aj
− 1
 (B.53)
with ZL−1L,j = ZH for j = j¯.
With z0H defined in this manner, ZH is given by
eλZH = e−λ
∑H−1
h=0 z
h
H
1∑
j=0
ηqj
Aj(1− e−λZ¯H )
. (B.54)
This equation follows from (B.47) and (B.45).
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B.1.4 Knowledge gaps
The analysis of the optimal firm organizational structure proceeds in two steps. First, it
is necessary to study the optimization problem of an establishment with cumulative local
knowlede of less than ZH , i.e. with a knowledge gap to headquarter knowledge. Second,
we study the optimization problem at the firm level.
Optimization problem at production locations. The optimization problem is
modified to take into account that only Aj(1 − e−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H ) units
of output are produced per unit of labor input in the establishment at location j in case
of knowledge gaps. The corresponding Lagrangian equation is given by:
Lj = dj
θjη
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwj(1 + cjz0L,j) +
L−1∑
`=1
dj
θj
eλ
∑L−1
k=` z
k
L,jwj(1 + cjz`L,j) + pjdj
+ φ
j
[
L−1∑
`=0
z`L,j − ZH
]
+ ξ
j
[
qj − Aj(1− e−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H ) dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j
]
(B.55)
We underline multipliers to highlight that they are different from the multipliers used
above. The distinction is relevant for the optimization problem at the firm level, that is
analyzed below.
The following first order conditions are affected by this modification:
∂Lj
∂z0L,j
= dj
ηθj
λeλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwj(1 + cjz0L,j) +
dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwjcj
− ξ
j
dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jλAj(1 + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H ) + φj = 0 (B.56)
∂Lj
∂z`L,j
= dj
ηθj
λeλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwj(1 + cjz0L,j) +
dj
θj
eλ
∑L−1
k=` z
k
L,jwjcj
+
∑`
k=1
dj
θj
eλ
∑L−1
m=k z
m
L,jλwj(1 + cjzkL,j)
− ξ
j
dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jλAj(1 + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H ) + φj = 0 (B.57)
∂Lj
∂dj
= 1
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,jwj(1 + cjz0L,j) +
L−1∑
`=1
1
θj
eλ
∑L−1
k=` z
k
L,jwj(1 + cjz`L,j) + pj
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− ξ
j
Aj(1− e−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H ) 1
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j = 0 (B.58)
∂Lj
∂ξ
j
= qj − Aj(1− e−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H ) dj
ηθj
eλ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j = 0 (B.59)
Correspondingly, the optimal values adjust. The amount of headquarter services em-
ployed in local production at an establishment with a knowledge gap is given by
dj =
ηθjqje
−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j
Aj(1− e−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H )
(B.60)
Assuming that the knowledge constraint ∑L−1`=0 z`L,j = ZH is not binding, as required for
a knowledge gap, the optimal knowledge level is given by:
pj =
1
θjλ
eλz
L−1
L,j wjcj +
wj(1 + cjz0L,j + 1λcj)
ηθjAj(1 + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H )
(B.61)
Finally, the marginal costs of production are determined by
ξ
j
=
wj(1 + cjz0L,j + 1λcj)
Aj(1 + e−λZH − e−λZ¯H )
(B.62)
The span of control and the relationship of knowledge levels within the establishment are
given by the same expressions in the main text (cf. Equations 2.14 and 2.16).
Optimization problem of the firm. As above, the firm solves the following problem
to endogenize [ZH , Z¯H ]:
min
ZH ,Z¯H ,{pj}Jj=0
w0(1 + c0(Z¯H − ZH))
+
1∑
j=0
(
Cj(dj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj), ZH , Z¯H , pj)− pjdj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj)
)
(B.63)
s.t. Z¯H ≥ ZH (B.64)
1 =
1∑
j=0
dj(qj, ZH , Z¯H , pj) (B.65)
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Due to the different cost structure at the establishments, the optimum values of ZH and
Z¯H adjust. The optimal upper bound of headquarter knowledge Z¯H is given by equating
the marginal costs of an additional unit of knowledge with the marginal benefit, i.e.
additional output.
w0c0 = λe−λZ¯H
1∑
j=0
ξj
dj
ηθj
e−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j (B.66)
The optimal lower bound of headquarter knowledge ZH is determined by equating the
marginal benefit of increasing ZH , i.e. acquiring less headquarter knowledge, with the
marginal cost in terms of less output that is produced at the establishment with the
knowledge gap. Note that output at establishments with knowledge overlaps is unaffected.
−w0c0 = −λe−λZH
1∑
j=0
1
(
L−1∑
`=0
z`L,j < ZH
)
ξ
j
dj
ηθj
e−λ
∑L−1
`=0 z
`
L,j (B.67)
where the indicator function 1(·) determines whether there is a knowledge gap. We keep
the negative signs to highlight that w0c0 quantify the marginal benefit in this equation,
not the marginal costs as in the equation for Z¯H .
It is not possible to simplify these expressions in order to obtain more tractable terms.
We therefore impose the assumption that no knowledge gaps are possible.
B.2 Empirics
B.2.1 Imputation
Table B.1: Fraction of censored observations, by layer
Layer 0 1 2 3
# observations 5,582,625 776,496 793,869 191,725
Share censored 0.044 0.231 0.473 0.612
12.5% of observations in the sample are censored because the daily wage is above the
limit that is subject to social security contributions. The fraction of censored observations
varies across layers and tends to be higher in higher layers, as Table B.1 shows.
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We follow the procedures suggested by Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009), Card,
Heining, and Kline (2013) and Gartner (2005) and impute the censored observations using
a series of Tobit regressions for mutually exclusive sub-groups of the data.
It is typically recommended to use multiple imputation approaces to take the additional
uncertainty introduced through the imputation process into account (e.g. Schafer, 1999).
The large number of observations in our data set does not allow to use multiple imputa-
tion, however.
We define five mutually exclusive education groups (missing; primary, lower secondary
or intermediate schooling certificate but no vocational training; primary, lower secondary
or intermediate schooling certificate and vocational training; upper secondary school
certificate with or without vocational training; university training) and six mutually
exclusive age groups (below 20, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, above 59) (as Card, Heining,
and Kline, 2013). For each of the 30 age × education groups, we fit a tobit model for log
observed remuneration. We use a gender dummy, a dummy for not being German, age,
establishment size as measured by full time employees, district dummies, sector dummies
and layer dummies as well as log distance, the similarity of dialects and the similarity of
religion as covariates. We thus include all covariates that we use in the wage regression
as covariates in the imputation procedure, as recommended in the literature (Schafer,
1999). As we use firm fixed effects in our regression and run regressions separately by
layer, we additionally include the share of university graduates per establishment, the
average coworkers’ wage per establishment and the share of censored observations in the
establishment as well as the average coworkers’ wage in the same layer and firm and
the share of censored observations in the same layer and firm to account for dependence
within establishments and layers of the same firm. We include a dummy that is one for
establishments with a single worker (similar to Card, Heining, and Kline, 2013, who use
establishment fixed effects).
We impute remuneration based on the estimated model parameters and a random draw
from the associated left censored distribution. That is, if log remuneration y ∼ N(X ′β, σ)
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and u ∼ U(0, 1)
yimputed = X ′β + σΦ−1[k + u(1− k)] with k = Φ
[
c−X ′β
σ
]
.
B.2.2 Classification of occupations into layers
Table B.2: List of dropped occupations
Occupation code Description
11 Farmers (Landwirte)
12 Winemakers (Weinbauern)
42 Milkers (Melker)
555 Disabled people (Behinderte)
666 Participants of programs for professional reintegration after longer pe-
riods of illness (Rehabilitanden)
888 Personal care assistants (Pflegepersonen)
892 Members of the clergy (Angehörige geistlicher Berufe
924 Graduates from home economics school (Haushaltsschulabschluss)
971 Family members working in the firm, outside of agriculture (Mithelfende
Familienangehörige außerhalb d. Landwirtschaft)
981 Apprentices, profession not yet defined (Auszubildende mit noch nicht
feststehendem Ausbildungsberuf )
982 Trainees, profession not yet defined (Praktikanten, Volontäre mit noch
nicht feststehendem Beruf )
983 Unemployed, no further details (Arbeitskräfte (arbeitsuchend) m. nicht
bestimmtem Beruf )
991 Workers, no further details (Arbeitskräfte ohne nähere Tätigkeitsangabe)
995 Employees in early retirement programs (Vorruhestands- oder Alters-
geldbezieher)
997 Recipients of compensation allowances (Ausgleichsgeldbezieher)
.z No information (k. Angabe )
To match occupations that are not matched in our baseline procedure detailed in sec-
tion 2.3.2, we use the following criteria. We assign occupations to the core area whenever
the mode is missing because two layers are equally frequent (“core area, mode missing”)
or mode and core area are contradictory (“core area”). In cases where the core area is
missing, we assign occupations to the most frequent layer (“only layer assigned, core area
missing”). The remaining observations are matched based on plausibility considerations.
165
Appendix: Knowledge transmission costs and multi-establishment firms
Table B.3: List of occupations that are manually assigned to layers
Layer Occupation Description Criterion
0 21 Animal breeders (Tierzüchter) Only layer assigned, core
area missing
0 22 Fishermen (Fischer) Plausibility
0 41 Farm workers (Landarbeitskräfte) Only layer assigned, core
area missing
0 61 Foresters (Forstverwalter, Förster, Jäger) Plausibility
0 141 Chemical workers (Chemiebetriebswerker) Core area
0 163 Bookbinders (Buchbinderberufe) Core area, mode missing
0 173 Pressmen (Buchdrucker (Hochdruck)) Core area, mode missing
0 286 Watchmakers (Uhrmacher) Core area, mode missing
0 302 Goldsmiths (Edelmetallschmiede) Core area, mode missing
0 305 Instrument makers (Musikinstrumenten-
bauer)
Core area, mode missing
0 412 Food preservation workers (Fertiggerichte-,
Obst-, Gemüsekonservierer, -zubereiter)
Only layer assigned, core
area missing
0 466 Civil engineering (Sonstige Tiefbauer) Core area, mode missing
0 531 Unskilled worker, no further details (Hilfs-
arbeiter ohne nähere Tätigkeitsangabe)
Plausibility
0 541 Machine operators in energy industry
(Energiemaschinisten)
Core area, mode missing
0 685 Pharmaceutical assistants (Apotheken-
helferinnen)
Core area, mode missing
0 691 Banking professionals (Bankfachleute) Core area, mode missing
0 692 Building society professionals (Bauspar-
kassenfachleute)
Core area
0 773 Cashiers (Kassierer) Core area
0 781 Clerks (Bürofachkräfte) Core area
0 791 Security guards (Werkschutzleute, Detek-
tive)
Core area, mode missing
0 793 Doormen (Pförtner, Hauswarte) Core area, mode missing
0 801 Soldiers, border guards, police officers (Sol-
daten, Grenzschutz-, Polizeibedienstete)
Core area, mode missing
0 802 Professional firefighters (Berufsfeuer-
wehrleute)
Core area, mode missing
0 804 Chimney sweepers (Schornsteinfeger) Core area, mode missing
0 805 Health workers (Gesundheitssichernde
Berufe)
Core area
0 814 Bailiffs (Rechtsvollstrecker) Core area
0 823 Librarians, employees in archives and mu-
seums (Bibliothekare, Archivare, Muse-
umsfachleute)
Core area
0 834 Decorators (Dekorationen-, Schildermaler) Core area, mode missing
0 838 Artists, professional athletes (Artisten,
Berufssportler, künstlerische Hilfsberufe)
Plausibility
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Table B.3: List of occupations that are manually assigned to layers
Layer Occupation Description Criterion
0 902 Personal grooming service providers (Son-
stige Körperpfleger)
Core area
0 911 Barkeepers, hoteliers (Gastwirte, Hote-
liers, Gaststättenkaufleute)
Plausibility
1 491 Interior decorators (Raumausstatter) Core area, mode missing
1 687 Traveling salesmen (Handelsvertreter,
Reisende)
Core area, mode missing
1 855 Dietitians, pharmacy technicians (Diätas-
sistenten, Pharmazeutisch-technische As-
sistenten)
Core area
2 32 Agricultural engineers, agricultural advis-
ers (Agraringenieure, Landwirtschaftsbera-
ter)
Core area
2 52 Landscape architects (Gartenarchitekten) Core area
2 861 Social workers (Sozialarbeiter,
Sozialpfleger)
Core area
2 862 Children’s home professionals (Heimleiter,
Sozialpädagogen)
Core area
2 864 Kindergarten workers (Kindergärtnerin-
nen, Kinderpflegerinnen)
Core area
2 872 High school teachers (Gymnasiallehrer) Core area, mode missing
2 922 Consumer counselors (Verbraucherberater) Core area, mode missing
3 751 Enterpreneurs, managing directors, heads
of business area (Unternehmer, Geschäfts-
führer)
Plausibility
3 762 Senior directive administrative officer Plausibility
B.2.3 Plausibility checks on delineation of layers
This section compares summary statistics provided in Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012) and summary statistics from our data to evaluate the quality of the classification
of occupations into layers.
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Table B.4: Distribution of remuneration by layer
Distribution of daily remuneration in levels, IAB data
Layer N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
0 5,585,080 92.584 36.805 39.615 65.900 88.356 113.881 169.521
1 776,933 130.474 41.066 58.304 99.136 134.277 170.479 179.605
2 794,252 149.989 37.284 72.758 126.420 167.981 179.605 179.605
3 191,902 153.374 39.090 67.929 134.860 178.918 179.605 179.917
Total 7,348,167 104.383 43.166 41.748 71.530 97.5234 134.839 170.605
Distribution of average hourly remuneration in levels in 2005 Euros,
Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)
Layer Mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Blue collars 20.83 9.67 12.88 15.24 18.34 26.94
Clerks 19.06 9.74 13.03 15.63 19.01 28.33
Supervisors 26.30 13.14 18.14 21.87 26.44 38.94
Senior staff 47.91 19.56 28.93 35.96 44.62 69.01
CEO, directors 75.60 22.33 38.86 54.62 75.07 132.17
Distribution of observed remuneration by layer following Table 1 in Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
Blue collar workers and clerks are grouped to layer 0 in Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-
Hansberg (2012), supervisors are assigned to layer 1, senior staff to layer 2 and CEOs/
directors to layer 3. As in Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), all moments
of the wage distribution in our data increase in the hierarchical level. The maximum is
an exception. The remuneration is usually only reported up to the highest level that is
subject to social security contributions; this value may be exceeded due to one-time or
bonus payments (vom Berge, König, and Seth, 2013, p. 41).
The difference in the level of remuneration is startling at first glance. Supervisors in
France earn 26.30 Euro per hour, so 197.25 Euro on a working day with 7.5 hours,
whereas employees in layer 1 in Germany earn 130.47 Euro per day on average. Note
however that the German data compute daily remuneration based on the number of
calendar days, not working days. The yearly earnings of workers in layer 1 in Germany
are thus about 47,621.55 Euros and the yearly remuneration of French supervisors with
35 working hours per week are around 47,866.00 Euros.
The number of layers per firm or establishment is similar, as Table B.5 shows.
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Table B.5: Number of layers per establishment
# layers 1 2 3 4 All Mean # of layers
# establishments 58,846 22,595 11,903 8,618 102,146 1.709
# firms, CMR (2012) 72,918 1.50
Distribution of number of layers of establishments of multi-establishment firms following Table 2 in Caliendo, Monte, and
Rossi-Hansberg (2012). “CMR (2012)” is an abbreviation for Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
B.2.4 Additional tables
Table B.6: Bivariate correlations, log individual imputed remuneration and communica-
tion costs
Observed remuneration Residual remuneration
A. All establishments
Layer 0 1 2 3 Layer 0 1 2 3
Log distance 0.067∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ Log distance 0.071∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
Dialect 0.018∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ Dialect 0.033∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
B. Establishments of multi-establishment firms
Layer 0 1 2 3 Layer 0 1 2 3
Log distance -0.151∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ Log distance -0.040∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
Dialect -0.103∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ Dialect -0.045∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗
C. Establishments of multi-establishment firms without headquarter function
Layer 0 1 2 3 Layer 0 1 2 3
Log distance -0.134∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ Log distance -0.030∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
Dialect -0.095∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ Dialect -0.039∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗ -0.143∗∗∗
D. Manufacturing establishments of multi-establishment firms without headquarter function
Layer 0 1 2 3 Layer 0 1 2 3
Log distance -0.142∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ Log distance 0.042∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
Dialect -0.100∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ Dialect 0.029∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
The table displays bivariate correlations between log imputed remuneration at the employee level per layer and communi-
cation costs, measured using log distance and the dissimilarity of dialects. We calculate log distance as the log of observed
distance plus 1 to be able to include single-establishment firms in Panel A. The left part of the table uses log imputed
remuneration in levels. The right part of the table uses the residual from a linear regression of log imputed remuneration on
district dummies. Panel A includes all establishments. Panel B includes only establishments of multi-establishment firms.
Panel C drops establishments with headquarter function. The last panel only uses establishments in the manufacturing
sector. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B.7: Regression results for the span of control, manufacturing firms
2 Layers 3 Layers All layers
1 1 2 2 3 3
Log distance to HQ −1.538 −1.807 0.381 0.210 −2.961 −2.951
(1.217) (1.090) (0.295) (0.249) (2.090) (2.303)
Hourly wages −0.341 −0.225 −0.188 −0.102 −1.263 −0.820
(0.400) (0.340) (0.207) (0.164) (1.236) (1.087)
Hourly labor productivity 0.141 0.120 0.211+ 0.123 0.622 0.616
(0.166) (0.172) (0.124) (0.080) (0.587) (0.589)
Log average distance to university −5.925+ −2.966 2.501 3.298 13.819 9.248
(3.481) (2.660) (2.658) (2.262) (8.923) (11.537)
Constant 55.567∗ 32.913∗ −27.481 −19.783 −64.330 −38.587
(22.114) (15.251) (22.261) (15.276) (46.349) (60.731)
R-squared 0.363 0.022 0.102 0.024 0.137 0.035
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y
Sector dummies Y N Y N Y N
# firms 88 88 120 120 149 149
# observations 304 304 396 396 516 516
Dissimilarity of dialects −0.122 −0.122+ 0.036 0.010 −0.210 −0.189
(0.076) (0.064) (0.027) (0.021) (0.142) (0.154)
Hourly wages −0.271 −0.152 −0.192 −0.104 −1.212 −0.750
(0.397) (0.325) (0.206) (0.166) (1.217) (1.079)
Hourly labor productivity 0.135 0.122 0.211+ 0.122 0.639 0.622
(0.163) (0.167) (0.123) (0.080) (0.606) (0.612)
Log average distance to university −8.386∗ −4.993+ 3.132 3.568 10.075 6.215
(4.021) (2.651) (2.988) (2.578) (7.249) (9.849)
Constant 55.333∗ 29.039+−27.781 −19.782 −67.057 −45.103
(21.618) (15.548) (22.396) (15.437) (48.385) (65.329)
R-squared 0.367 0.024 0.104 0.024 0.135 0.031
Firm fixed effects N Y N Y N Y
Sector dummies Y N Y N Y N
# firms 88 88 120 120 149 149
# observations 304 304 396 396 516 516
Dependent variable: span of control, defined as sj = n`−1L,j /n
`
L,j . Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 List of countries classified as tax havens
The following countries are classified as tax havens according to Hines and Rice (1994,
p. 178):
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Island, Cyprus, Dominica,
Gibraltar, Grenada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Liecht-
enstein, Luxembourg, Macao, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat,
Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Switzerland, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu.
We are unable to distinguish investment in Monaco and Saint Martin from investment
in France. Therefore, these tax havens are neglected in our analysis.
The OECD’s list of tax havens contains the following countries (OECD, 2000): Andorra,
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, British
Virgin Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey/ Sark/ Alder-
ney, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Monaco,
Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St Lucia,
St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks & Caicos, US
Virgin Islands, Vanuatu.
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C.2 German taxation of foreign income
Foreign income, whether in the form of dividends from foreign subsidiaries or income
earned in foreign branches, is virtually tax exempt in Germany.
Dividends distributed by national or foreign affiliates as well as capital gains are tax
free. Only 5% of dividends and capital gains are taxed as non-deductible operating
expenditures (§8b KStG, the German corporate income tax code). This is an important
difference with the U.S. tax system, since a U.S. tax is due when the parent company
receives dividends from foreign affiliates, and the parent company is entitled to claim an
indirect tax credit for income taxes paid by foreign affiliates.
Income earned in foreign branches is not taxed if Germany has a double taxation treaty
with the host country, as Germany generally stipulates tax exemption of foreign income
in double taxation treaties (Höhn and Höring, 2010, p. 116). Due to the tight network
of double taxation treaties, income earned in foreign branches is de facto exempt from
taxation in Germany.
An exception to these general rules is the anti-avoidance provision of German tax law
(part of the German “Außensteuergesetz (AStG)” commonly referred to as “CFC-legisla-
tion”). The anti-deferral rules apply if a German parent controls an affiliate or branch
abroad which earns income from passive investment that accounts for more than 10% of
total income and is taxed at a rate of less than 25%. In this case, the passive income of the
branch or affiliate is apportioned to the parent and subject to German tax independent
of repatriation (§§7-9 AStG).
Passive income is defined in a negative way as income which is not active, that is, in-
come which is not generated through agriculture, production, trade, services, dividends,
disposal of shares, and, subject to further requirements, banking, insurance, renting or
leasing. Income from borrowing or lending is classified as active income if capital is raised
in foreign capital markets only and from unrelated parties and lent to active foreign busi-
nesses or permanent establishments (§8 AStG). Until recent changes for the years from
2011 onwards (draft Jahressteuergesetz 2010, i.e. tax law for the year 2010), these rules
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did not apply if the nominal tax rate was higher than 25%, even if the effective tax burden
was much lower, as for example in Malta or Panama.
Since the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Case of Cadbury Schweppes,
the provisions explicitly provide for the opportunity to demonstrate substantive activities
if the affiliate is located in the EU or EEA, which include Ireland, Luxembourg and
Liechtenstein on the list of tax havens. The rules do not apply if the affiliate can be
demonstrated to participate in the host country markets, to employ qualified personnel
and generate its own income (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2007).
A number of recent papers analyze the effect of the anti-avoidance regulation and yield
a nuanced picture on the effect of these provisions on profit shifting by multinational
enterprises. On the one hand, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) report that the CFC rules
significantly reduced passive investment in low-tax jurisdictions. They take a multina-
tional’s location decisions as given and define passive income as the total financial assets
of an affiliate minus equity holdings in and lending to affiliated enterprises to avoid dou-
ble counting. Using the same set up and a regression discontinuity approach, Egger and
Wamser (2010) find that the CFC rules are also associated with less investment in fixed
assets around the threshold from non-applicability to applicability. On the other hand,
Overesch and Wamser (2010) provide evidence that the German CFC rules do not af-
fect internal lending of foreign affiliates in low-tax locations to other foreign subsidiaries.
They find that internal debt shares react positively to tax rate differentials between dif-
ferent locations and that CFC rules do not influence this relationship. Whether and how
these provisions affect profit shifting through other strategies such as transfer pricing has
not yet been explored.
Overall, this research suggests that the CFC provisions do not foreclose tax planning
by MNEs per se, but they render it cumbersome. MNEs can still strategically relocate
activities to low tax countries and tax havens, but they have to generate income from
active local investment and may not benefit from simply setting up a “letterbox company”.
The significance of this requirement is that using a tax haven may entail considerable
fixed costs, as MNEs must generate active income to benefit fully from their tax haven
investments.
173
Appendix: Multinationals and Tax Havens
C.3 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Recall the constrained maximization problem described in equations (3.2) and (3.3). We
assume first that this constraint is fulfilled and subsequently reconsider what happens if
this is not the case. The first order condition for ψi is thus
1− (1− τi)− (1− τi)aψi
ρi
= 0 (C.1)
which implies
ψ∗thi =
τiρi
a(1− τi) (C.2)
Inserting ψ∗thi into condition (3.3) produces a condition for a and τi that must be fulfilled
for (3.3) to hold.
ρi − τiρi
a(1− τi) −
τi
2ρi
2a(1− τi)2 ≥ 0 (C.3)
⇔ τi ≤ 1−
√
1
2a+ 1 (C.4)
Consider now values of τi and a such that the constraint (3.3) is not fulfilled for ψ∗thi as
determined by the first order condition. In this case, ψi is chosen such that condition
(3.3) is satisfied with equality, which yields
ψ¯i =
ρi
a
(√
2a+ 1− 1
)
(C.5)
There are no more positive profits reported by the affiliate in the non-haven country and
hence ψ¯i equals the multinational’s profit from investing in country i, reallocated to the
tax haven, after incurring fixed cost ci.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Recall the condition (3.6) that determines n˜, such that the multinational chooses di = 1
for all countries i = 1, ..., n˜ if he holds a tax haven affiliate. Using ψ∗thi as determined by
the first order condition for ψi, this condition simplifies to
(1− τn˜)ρn˜ + τ
2
n˜ρn˜
2a(1− τn˜) − cn˜ ≥ 0 > (1− τn˜+1)ρn˜+1 +
τ 2n˜+1ρn˜+1
2a(1− τn˜+1) − cn˜+1 . (C.6)
Consider now the multinational’s situation if it has no tax haven affiliate. In this case,
profit-shifting is directed to the country charging the lowest tax rate among those in
which the multinational holds an affiliate, denoted by τ .Then the profit maximization
problem is the following
max
di,ψi
n∑
i=1
di
[
(1− τ)ψi + (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
)− ci
]
(C.7)
with di ∈ {0, 1}, subject to the same constraint (3.3) as above. The first order condition
yields
ψ∗nthi =
(τi − τ)ρi
a(1− τi) . (C.8)
Note that for the parameter condition on τi and a assumed above, this optimal ψ∗nthi also
satisfies constraint (3.3). The first order condition for di yields that the multinational
chooses di = 1 for all countries i = 1, ..., nˆ and di = 0 otherwise, where nˆ is determined
by the condition that
(1− τ)ψnˆ + (1− τnˆ)(ρnˆ − ψnˆ − a2
ψ2nˆ
ρnˆ
)− cnˆ ≥ 0
> (1− τ)ψnˆ+1 + (1− τnˆ+1)(ρnˆ+1 − ψnˆ+1 − a2
ψ2nˆ+1
ρnˆ+1
)− cnˆ+1 . (C.9)
Using ψ∗nthi as determined by the first order condition for ψi, this condition simplifies to
(1− τnˆ)ρnˆ + (τnˆ − τ)
2ρnˆ
2a(1− τnˆ) − cnˆ ≥ 0 > (1− τnˆ+1)ρnˆ+1 +
(τnˆ+1 − τ)2ρnˆ+1
2a(1− τnˆ+1) − cnˆ+1 . (C.10)
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A comparison with (C.6) shows that n˜ ≥ nˆ, since the profits realized from each country
are potentially larger if it is possible to reduce taxes by reallocating income to a tax
haven.
For the multinational, investing in a tax haven is worth the set up cost c0 if and only if
n˜∑
i=1
[
ψi + (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
)− ci
]
− c0
≥
nˆ∑
i=1
[
(1− τ)ψi + (1− τi)(ρi − ψi − a2
ψi
2
ρi
)− ci
]
(C.11)
Inserting the optimal ψ∗thi and ψ∗nthi and simplifying yields the following condition:
Incth =
nˆ∑
i=1
ρiτ(2τi − τ)
2a(1− τi) +
n˜∑
i=nˆ+1
[
(1− τi)ρi + τi
2ρi
2a(1− τi) − ci
]
− c0 ≥ 0, (C.12)
where Incth denotes the net benefit (“Incentive”) from investing in a tax haven. If this
net benefit is positive the multinational chooses to invest in a tax haven.
Q.E.D.
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Table C.2: Regression results, full sample
OLS IV FE FE IV
Average foreign non-haven 0.509∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 0.046 0.126
tax rate (0.083) (0.120) (0.101) (0.144)
Parent size -0.022∗∗ -0.024∗ -0.007 -0.013
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Parent size, squared 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-haven size -0.065∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
Non-haven size, squared 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.005 -0.118∗∗ 0.087∗ 0.088
(0.038) (0.053) (0.048) (0.059)
# of observations 16410 12755 16410 12755
# of parents 3680 2569 3680 2569
R-squared overall 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.14
R-squared within – – 0.02 0.02
Instrument N Y N Y
F-statistic – 5687.41∗∗∗ – 660.74∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Table C.3: Regression results, instrumentation based on first period’s locations
Manufacturing firms Service firms
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Ave. foreign 0.566∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.175∗ 0.323∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ -0.085 0.168
n.h. tax rate (0.096) (0.125) (0.094) (0.190) (0.162) (0.176) (0.124) (0.173)
Parent size -0.061∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.013 -0.016 0.024 0.018 -0.002 -0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.003) (0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Parent size, 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003 0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign non- -0.051∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.037∗ -0.045∗∗
haven size (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022)
For. n.h. size, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.022 -0.120∗ 0.070 0.013 -0.103 -0.185∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.062) (0.067) (0.069) (0.083) (0.075) (0.076) (0.053) (0.064)
# of obs. 10662 10170 10662 10170 5052 4833 5052 4833
# of parents 2321 2246 2321 2246 1270 1226 1270 1226
R-squared overall 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.09
R-squared within – – 0.02 0.02 – – 0.02 0.02
Instrument N Y N Y N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 5969.57∗∗∗ – 510.62∗∗∗ – 3221.87∗∗∗ – 787.27∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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Table C.4: Regression results, firms without haven activity in 2001
Manufacturing firms Service firms
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Ave. foreign 0.200∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.016 0.196∗∗ 0.144 0.050 -0.135 -0.109
n.h. tax rate (0.065) (0.070) (0.080) (0.099) (0.107) (0.103) (0.098) (0.156)
Parent size -0.012 -0.000 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.000 -0.009 -0.010
(0.011) (0.009) (0.032) (0.040) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Parent size, 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
squared (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Foreign non- -0.018∗ 0.005 -0.021∗∗ -0.014 -0.017 -0.001 -0.016 -0.020
haven size (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.021)
For. n.h. size, 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.001 0.004∗ 0.005
squared (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.017 -0.062∗ -0.032 -0.096 -0.024 -0.006 0.141∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.034) (0.032) (0.076) (0.094) (0.042) (0.039) (0.053) (0.057)
# of obs. 8594 6549 8594 8594 4123 2893 4123 2893
# of parents 1943 1333 1943 1943 1075 653 1075 653
R-squared overall 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
R-squared within – – 0.02 0.02 – – 0.02 0.03
Instrument N Y N Y N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 3681.92∗∗∗ – 568.14∗∗∗ – 2754.72∗∗∗ – 511.67∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Table C.5: Limited dependent variable models, coefficients
Manufacturing firms Service firms
Probit IV probit Logit FE logit Probit IV probit Logit FE logit
Ave. foreign 3.117∗∗∗ 5.578∗∗∗ 5.940∗∗∗ 10.883∗∗ 2.700∗∗∗ 5.874∗∗∗ 5.176∗∗∗ -2.524
n.h. tax rate (0.612) (0.984) (1.173) (5.538) (1.005) (1.272) (1.858) (8.751)
Parent size -0.194∗ -0.164 -0.314 0.325 0.239∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.504∗∗ 0.257
(0.108) (0.127) (0.221) (1.356) (0.096) (0.095) (0.210) (1.579)
Parent size, 0.029∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.059 -0.012 -0.007 -0.027 -0.010
squared (0.010) (0.011) (0.019) (0.144) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.151)
Non-haven size -0.078 -0.086 -0.003 -2.134∗∗ -0.208∗∗ -0.196 -0.353 -1.215
(0.079) (0.096) (0.168) (1.002) (0.104) (0.123) (0.216) (1.044)
Non-haven size, 0.032∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.242∗
squared (0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.104) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.125)
Constant -2.528∗∗∗ -3.387∗∗∗ -5.017∗∗∗ — -2.825∗∗∗ -3.677∗∗∗ -5.292∗∗∗ —
(0.409) (0.553) (0.846) — (0.448) (0.555) (0.888) —
Observations 10662 8533 10662 920 5052 3751 5052 447
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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Table C.6: Limited dependent variable models, average marginal effects
Manufacturing firms Service firms
Probit IV probit Logit FE logit Probit IV probit Logit FE logit
Ave. foreign 0.578∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.118 0.530∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ -0.395
n.h. tax rate (0.114) (0.201) (0.117) (0.380) (0.200) (0.276) (0.200) (1.356)
Parent size -0.036∗ -0.032 -0.031 0.004 0.047∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.040
(0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.248)
Parent size, 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024)
Non-haven size -0.014 -0.017 -0.000 -0.023 -0.041∗∗ -0.040 -0.038 -0.190
(0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.089) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.167)
Non-haven size, 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.038∗
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019)
Observations 10662 8533 10662 920 5052 3751 5052 447
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are estimated using the delta method. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
All specifications contain year dummies.
Table C.7: Regression results, including sector holding companies
Manufacturing firms Service firms
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Ave. foreign 0.684∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 0.093 0.286 0.457∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ -0.119 -0.038
n.h. tax rate (0.094) (0.150) (0.083) (0.175) (0.171) (0.216) (0.119) (0.205)
Parent size -0.029∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.008 -0.008 0.018 0.016 0.005 -0.015
(0.010) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
Parent size, 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002
squared (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign non- -0.052∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.004 -0.024
haven size (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020) (0.017)
For. n.h. size, 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.006∗∗∗
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.067∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.049 -0.070 -0.243∗∗∗ 0.114∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.063) (0.048) (0.076) (0.070) (0.082) (0.058) (0.064)
# of obs. 13611 10900 13611 10900 6372 4768 6372 4768
# of parents 3035 2213 3035 2213 1598 1070 1598 1070
R-squared overall 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.10
R-squared within – – 0.02 0.02 – – 0.01 0.02
Instrument N Y N Y N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 5359.76∗∗∗ – 493.40∗∗∗ – 2089.10∗∗∗ – 659.43∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies. The
significance level of the tax variable in the fixed effects IV specification for manufacturing firms is 10.1%.
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Table C.8: Regression results, excluding Switzerland
Manufacturing firms Service firms
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Ave. foreign 0.453∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.035 0.327∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ -0.012 0.014
n.h. tax rate (0.074) (0.116) (0.076) (0.152) (0.142) (0.163) (0.087) (0.124)
Parent size -0.057∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.009 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
(0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.028) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Parent size, 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Foreign non- -0.075∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
haven size (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.026) (0.018) (0.020)
For. n.h. size, 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.090∗∗ 0.027 0.054 -0.050 -0.006 -0.046 0.080∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.046) (0.065) (0.062) (0.082) (0.061) (0.071) (0.033) (0.049)
# of obs. 10662 8533 10662 8533 5052 3751 5052 3751
# of parents 2321 1696 2321 1696 1270 832 1270 832
R-squared overall 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.09
R-squared within – – 0.02 0.01 – – 0.03 0.04
Instrument N Y N Y N Y N Y
F-Statistics – 4064.39∗∗∗ – 465.73∗∗∗ – 1872.06∗∗∗ – 717.80∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
Table C.9: Regression results using tax rates from Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho,
and Shleifer (2010)
Manufacturing Services
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Average foreign non-haven 0.517∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗
tax rate (0.122) (0.153) (0.209) (0.309)
Parent size -0.078∗∗ -0.080∗∗ 0.026 0.016
(0.030) (0.036) (0.019) (0.020)
Parent size, squared 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Foreign non-haven size -0.069∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.038 -0.039
(0.020) (0.027) (0.032) (0.040)
Foreign non-haven size, 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗
squared (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.149∗ 0.195∗ -0.086 -0.135
(0.090) (0.111) (0.085) (0.117)
# of observations 1482 1254 686 543
# of parents 1482 1254 686 543
R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.08
Instrument N Y N Y
F-statistics instrument – 2106.93∗∗∗ – 1063.09∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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C.5 Endogeneity of non-haven size
To address the endogeneity of non-haven size, we focus our analysis on the years 2002
and 2008.1 We restrict our regression sample to firms that changed their tax haven
use between 2002 and 2008. Thus, our strategy mimics fixed effects logit, where the
coefficients are identified given that the dependent variable has changed. We define a
new dependent variable that takes the value zero if a firm holds a tax haven affiliate in
2002 and does not in 2008, and the value one if a firm does not have a tax haven affiliate
in 2002 and does so in 2008:
∆i =

0 if yi2002 = 1 and yi2008 = 0
1 if yi2002 = 0 and yi2008 = 1
(C.13)
About 60% of firms start using a tax haven, around 40% of firms close down their tax
haven activities. As independent variables, we use changes in parent size, the size of
non-haven activities and the average foreign non-haven tax rate. This way, we partial
out the firm fixed effect.
To construct the instrument, we focus on affiliates that a multinational holds in both 2002
and 2008, because tax rate changes at these locations are exogenous to any locational
changes that a firm has made after opening an affiliate in a tax haven or closing down
its haven activities. To take the endogeneity of the foreign non-haven size into account,
we use the insight that affiliate growth can be very well explained by GDP growth with
a coefficient that is not significantly different from one (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006).
We inflate the size of the foreign non-haven affiliates in 2002 by GDP growth between
2002 and 2008 and use the resulting hypothetical change in the foreign non-haven size
as an instrument for the actual change in foreign non-haven size between 2008 and 2002.
Only actual non-haven size includes affiliates which may have been opened or closed due
to the decision to invest or stop investing in a tax haven. Note that we can only include
size linearly in our regression because our strategy yields only one instrument.
1Note that considerable fraction of variation is lost in this manner, because firms exit before 2008
or enter after 2002, or because they revise their decision to invest in a tax haven more than once during
our period of analysis.
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Table C.10: Regression results, endogenous non-haven size
Manufacturing firms Service firms
1 2 3 4
∆ ave. foreign 0.052∗ 0.048 0.052 0.056
n.h. tax rate (0.027) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030)
∆ parent size 0.120∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.134 0.134
(0.041) (0.041) (0.143) (0.134)
∆ non-haven size 0.153∗∗ 0.181 0.128∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(0.069) (0.128) (0.044) (0.101)
Constant 0.704∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.170) (0.162) (0.189)
# of parents 88 88 32 32
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.18
Endogenous variable Tax Tax & Size Tax Tax & Size
F-statistics (tax) 27.35∗∗∗ 32.86∗∗∗ 27.24∗∗∗ 14.77∗∗∗
F-statistics (size) – 42.80∗∗∗ – 2.56∗
Partial R-squared (tax) – 0.16 – 0.45
Partial R-squared (size) – 0.12 – 0.17
Standard errors Robust Robust Robust Robust
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The significance level of the coefficient of non-haven size is 15.6% in column 2. The coefficient of the average foreign
non-haven tax rate has a P-value of 18.7% in column 2 and 24.7% in column 4.
Dependent variable: dummy variable; 1 if a parent firm did not hold an affiliate in a tax haven in 2002, but does so in
2008, zero if it did hold a tax haven affiliate in 2002 and does not so in 2008. Independent variables: differences in the
average foreign non-haven tax rate, the number of parent employees and the number of non-haven employees between 2002
and 2008.
We instrument the difference of the average foreign non-haven tax rates with the difference
of tax rates had a firm refrained from adjustments in its location choices. The idea of
this alternative instrument is to capture changes in the firm’s average tax rate that are
exogenous to the firm and do not depend on changes in tax haven use.
We calculate the sum of the differences of the tax rates interacted with GDP at the
locations where a firm is present in both 2002 and 2008 and weight the single differences
with the difference in GDP:
Tit =
∑L
l=1(τl,2008 ·GDPl,2008 − τl,2002 ·GDPl,2002)∑L
l=1(GDPl,2008 −GDPl,2002)
, (C.14)
where l = 1, ..., L are the locations of a firm in both 2002 and 2008.
Table C.10 presents the estimation results, which, for manufacturing firms, are largely
consistent with estimated tax effects obtained earlier using different identification meth-
ods and much larger samples. In the specification that instruments only for the average
foreign non-haven tax rate, the 0.052 coefficient indicates that firms whose average for-
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eign non-haven tax rates increase are more likely than others to add a tax haven affiliate.
This effect is significant at the 5.9% level in a two-tailed test, implying that it is possible
to reject (using a one-tailed test) that high non-haven foreign tax rates discourage tax
haven affiliate ownership, as reported by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) for U.S. firms. If
both non-haven size and taxation are instrumented, the resulting coefficients are of simi-
lar magnitude but lower significance levels, reflecting in part the small sample size. Firms
with growing parent companies are more likely than others to add tax haven affiliates,
which is consistent with earlier findings.
It is difficult to draw ambitious inferences about the behavior of service firms from the
regressions reported in columns 3-4, largely due to the problem of using instrumental
variables methods with a small (32 firms) sample, though greater size of non-haven foreign
operations is associated with adding tax haven operations, which is again consistent with
patterns appearing in other regressions.
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C.6 Alternative instrumentation strategy
This section presents regression results based on an alternative instrumentation strategy
similar to the one used in Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006). We instrument the parent’s
foreign non-haven tax rate with the competitors’ average foreign non-haven tax rate.
The competitors are defined as the other firms in the same sector. Firms in the same
sector react to similar incentives in choosing their investment destinations because similar
location factors are beneficial for them. At the same time, the competitors’ investment
decision is exogenous to whether a certain firm in the sector invests in a tax haven.
Endogenous and correlated group effects as discussed by Manski (1993) are unlikely to
contaminate the regression results, i.e. it is unlikely that a firm’s tax haven investment
decision is directly affected by the choices of other firms in the same sector, or that
the tax haven investment by firms in the same sector is correlated because entry in
a tax haven of some firms exerts competitive pressure on the remaining firms in the
sector to follow suit. As highlighted by Manski (1993), the existence and detection of
group effects presupposes that the reference group relevant to an individual is correctly
specified and that the group mean behavior can be correctly perceived by the individual
group members. It is unlikely that the firms in the same sector in our data constitute
the reference group to a firm. The sector classification is assigned to the firm by the
statistical department of the Bundesbank. It is coarse and the resulting firm groups are
sizeable. Firms’ reference groups are determined by their choice of products and markets.
Further, for some endogenous effect to exist, a firm would have to be able to observe the
other firms’ mean tax haven investment and activities. There is no evident way how firms
could obtain this information. For sake of reputation, firms are unlikely to announce that
they have opened a tax haven affiliate and intend to reallocate taxable income there.
Nonetheless, we prefer the instrumentation strategy used in the main text of this chapter
because it is difficult to rule out the possibility that firms in similar industries are influ-
enced by correlated omitted variables that influence the location of all of their foreign
investments, including tax havens and non-havens. As it happens, the estimation results
based on competitors’ average foreign non-haven tax rates are very similar to the esti-
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Table C.11: Regression results, instrumentation as Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006)
Manufacturing firms Service firms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS 2SLS FE FE IV OLS 2SLS FE FE IV
Ave. foreign 0.007∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.029 -0.000 -0.046
n.h. tax rate (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.165)
Parent size -0.064∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.008 0.024 0.023 -0.002 0.007
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.053)
Parent size, 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Foreign non- -0.051∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.037∗ -0.051
haven size (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.020) (0.051)
Foreign n.h. size, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
Constant -0.006 -0.597∗∗∗ 0.051 -0.995 -0.160∗∗ -0.742 0.119∗∗ 1.357
(0.060) (0.212) (0.068) (0.684) (0.069) (0.604) (0.055) (4.443)
# of observations 10661 10661 10661 10661 5052 5047 5052 5047
# of parents 2320 2320 2320 2320 1270 1269 1270 1269
R-squared 0.17 0.09 0.01 – 0.11 – 0.02 –
F-Statistics – 40.95∗∗∗ – 6.53∗∗ – 5.76∗∗ – 3.36∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
parent firm or bootstrapped with 200 replications.
The coefficients of foreign non-haven size in column 4 are significant at 12.5% (linear term) and 5.3% (squared term). The
F-statistic for the instrument is significant at 1.07%. In column 6, the coefficient of linear non-haven size has a P-value
of 10.7%. Regression sample: column 1-4 manufacturing firms, i.e. firms classified NACE 1500-3700; column 5-8 service
firms, i.e. firms classified NACE 500-9300, except NACE 65xx, 70xx, 7490, 75xx, 95xx. Dependent variable: dummy
variable which denotes whether a parent owns at least one affiliate in at least one tax haven in a given year. Independent
variables: see Table 3.2.
mation results in the main text, so there is reason to expect that the impact of potential
correlated omitted variables is not particularly strong.
Table C.11 corresponds to Table 3.3 in the main text. The regression results are very
similar; merely the significance levels are higher for the group of service firms in Table 3.3.
Table C.12 corresponds to Table 3.4. We do not report regressions with interaction terms,
as both the R&D intensity and the interaction term usually turned out insignificant.
Effects in Table C.12 are weaker than effects in Table 3.4, possibly reflecting the fact
that the strength of the instrument as measured by the F-statistic is much higher if the
instrumentation is based on firms’ initial location decisions.
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Table C.12: Regression results including sector R&D intensity, instrumentation as Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2006)
Manufacturing Services
1 2 3 4
OLS IV OLS IV
Average foreign nh. 0.007∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.053
tax rate (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.065)
Parent size -0.060∗∗ -0.057∗∗ 0.014 0.013
(0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015)
Parent size, squared 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-haven size -0.051∗∗ -0.038 -0.076∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗
(0.021) (0.025) (0.022) (0.048)
Non-haven size, 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
squared (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Sector R&D intensity -0.001 -0.007 0.009 0.027
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.021)
Constant -0.026 -0.755∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗ 1.544
(0.077) (0.291) (0.050) (1.805)
# of observations 9915 9915 3860 3860
# of sectoral groups 23 23 14 14
R-squared 0.17 0.04 0.16 –
F-Statistics – 11.88∗∗∗ – 4.78∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
parent firm.
Dependent variable: dummy variable which denotes whether a parent owns at least one affiliate in at least one tax haven
in a given year. Independent variables: see Table 3.2; sector R&D intensity: calculated as expenditures on innovation over
total sales by sector.
Finally, Table C.15 displays results estimated on imputed data and Tables C.13 and C.14
present summary statistics to gauge the quality of the imputation.
As indicated in the main text, almost a fifth of observations on parent firms in services
drop from the regression sample because the number of parent or non-haven employees
is zero, so size is not defined.
We impute the data in order to use all available observations and ensure that our results
do not reflect sample selection based on size. We impute the sales variable because zero
observed sales are a result of the reporting requirements. Sales are surveyed in million
euros, so they are zero for any firm with a turnover of strictly less than 500,000 euros.
This implies that a reported figure x disguises possible true sales values ranging from
1, 000, 000x− 500, 000 to 1, 000, 000x+ 500, 000, except for 0 which disguises the interval
[0; 499, 999].
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We use a model for grouped data developed in the statistical literature by Heitjan and
Rubin (1990), imputing parent and non-haven sales based on the assumption that sales
are log-normally distributed. This assumption is reasonable given the distribution of
observed sales in our data. The imputation procedure basically consists of two steps.
First, we estimate the relationship of the natural log of parent sales and the natural
log of non-haven sales and the other variables employed in our analysis using the EM-
algorithm proposed by Hasselblad, Stead, and Galke (1980). Then, we follow Heitjan
and Rubin (1990) and impute plausible values for parent sales and non-haven sales given
the other variables as well as the coefficients derived in the first step and based on the
assumption of a normally distributed error term. Conditional on the other covariates, we
generate 120 sets of plausible data, as Heitjan and Rubin (1990) use a similar number of
imputations in their study.
Tables C.13 and C.14 provide summary statistics on several sets of imputed sales com-
pared to the observed parent and non-haven sales. The left parts of the tables show
statistics for all parent-years, that is, including those units with missing observed sales.
As expected, the mean of the imputed sales are lower and the standard deviation is
higher. The right part of the table shows the statistics only for those units with non-
missing observed parent and non-haven sales. The moments of the distributions of the
imputed data sets are very close to the corresponding moments of the observed data. We
are thus assured of not introducing some artificial correlation or bias into our analysis
through our imputation procedure.
We re-run our analyses and re-calculate coefficients and standard errors based on the
formulas developed by Rubin (1987) which take into account that our data are imputed.
Table C.15 provides the estimated coefficients for regressions using data on service firms.
The use of imputed data does not appear to produce major changes in the coefficient
and significance patterns. In particular, higher average non-haven foreign tax rates con-
tinue to be associated with greater likelihood of tax haven affiliate ownership in the
uninstrumented regressions and with no effect on tax haven affiliate ownership in the
instrumented regressions. There are small differences in the estimated effects of parent
size on tax haven affiliate ownership, but these are largely unimportant, so this evidence
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suggests that the difference in the effect of taxes on tax haven investment between manu-
facturing and service firms is unlikely to be attributable to sample selection among service
firms.
Instead of this rather complex procedure, one could opt for a more pragmatic solution
such as plugging in “1” in place of the zeros. One could argue that “1” is close to
zero relative to the other values observed, so measurement error should be negligible,
but nonetheless, all observations could be used in the analysis. We prefer imputation
because plugging in “1” would create an artificial censoring value. According to a recent
literature started by Rigobon and Stoker (2007, 2009), this could introduce further bias in
our analysis because previously missing observations then pile up at ln(1). For the same
reason, plugging in any other value below 500,000 instead of the zeros is not a viable
option. Further, the imputation procedure takes into account the correlation between
the sales variables and the other variables employed in our analysis, so it deals with the
missing data in a statistically appropriate way.
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Table C.15: Regression results based on imputed data, service firms
OLS IV FE FE IV
Average foreign non-haven 0.005∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.029
tax rate (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.208)
Ln (parent sales) -0.065∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.024 -0.016
(0.034) (0.025) (0.036) (0.043)
Ln (parent sales), squared 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Ln (non-haven sales) -0.176∗∗∗ -0.090∗ -0.172∗∗ -0.217
(0.055) (0.055) (0.072) (0.033)
Ln (non-haven sales), 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008
squared (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
Constant 1.536∗∗∗ 0.0757 1.414 2.4513
(0.144) (0.427) (0.866) (7.684)
# of observations 6140 6140 6140 6140
# of imputations 120 120 120 120
Instrument N Y N Y
Mean F-statistics — 12.03∗∗∗ — 10.30∗∗∗
Standard errors Cluster Cluster Cluster Bootstrap
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications contain year dummies.
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